Venezuela

Case notes

Movement for Socialism/ MAS

Movement for Socialism (“Movimiento al Socialismo/MAS”) is a very difficult party to classify. It emerged in 1971 from a split from the Communist party led by Teodoro Petkoff criticizing harshly its verticality and authoritarianism and defending a deeper democratization of both parties and institutions (Petkoff 1981, 1121-22). The party still declared itself socialist and aimed for a socialist revolution of society (Ellner 1988, 73), however, it rejected the idea of the economy as a “superstructure” (Petkoff 1989b, 42), rejected the “established Marxist dogma” and gave more importance to politics (Ellner 1988, 64). It is here where its anti-elitism becomes evident. The party emerged with a clear criticism of the “bipartidism” of the moment, the elites (“cogollos”) and the bureaucratization of power (Petkoff 1989a, 105). Its main proposal to renovate politics was to deepen the democratization of parties and institutions, exemplified by institutionalizing in its own party the existence of diverse tendencies (Petkoff 1981). Petkoff’s anti-elitism was very clear when he argued that “the transformation must take place by breaking the power over society of those social and political sectors that, in relation to the interests of the majority, define options aimed at reinforcing minority privileges and optimizing their economic benefits” (Petkoff 1989b, 41) (OTH_POLCLASS = 3).

Ideologically, the party was on the far left because it proposed public ownership of the productive system and to control financial elites. The party aimed at the combination of democratic freedoms and social justice (Petkoff, 1989a) and also defended “workers’ control, democratic socialism, decentralization and municipal autonomy (Ellner 1988, 66). They argued for a criticism of both capitalism and Stalitinst socialism (Ellner 1988, 70). Petkoff, the party’s leader stated that their platform was based on”the revolutionary struggle against capitalism” and that theirs was an alternative to both “existing socialism” and “capitalism” (Petkoff 1989b, 40). Together with political parties, the bourgeoisie was the other big elite group that was attacked. “They felt that members of the Venezuelan bourgeoisie should be singled out for special attack, as they constituted the main enemy in the upcoming stage” (Ellner 1988, 73) (OTH_ECONOMIC = 3, LRPOSITION = FL).

MAS’ foreign policy is, as Ellner describes it, a “vacillating and subject to a mechanical and awkward policy of balancing criticism of the United States with that of the Soviet Union.” (Ellner 1988, 82). There was also division within the party: “Marquez [a prominent MAS leader] more strongly condemned U.S. foreign policy and was less critical of the socialist bloc than was Petkoff. Nevertheless, MAS has consistently favored third-world struggles for independence from super-power domination and opposed all foreign intervention” (Ellner 1988, 80). However, “Petkoff argued against the thesis that the anti-imperialist struggle should be directed mainly against the United States because of its greater hold over all facets of Venezuelan society. Petkoff and other MASistas maintained that precisely because of the U.S. position of dominance, Mas should display greater flexibility and establish ties with influential North Americans in order to deter a possible U.S. intervention against Venezuelan socialism” (Ellner 1988, 78). Thus, we have labelled this mixed evidence as 2 on OTH_FOREIGN.

Regarding the military, MAS also broke with the traditional Marxist critical view of the military. They viewed the military as a problematic corpse, but one that had to be included into the normal social life of Venezuela. As (Ellner 1988, 85) argues, “MAS’s statements regarding the moral integrity of the armed forces—though not as unqualified as those of AD and COPEI—lend credence to the party’s thesis regarding the need to facilitate the integration of the armed forces in the nation’s political and administrative life”. And “MAS called for specific measures in order to facilitate the military’s further integration into society, some of which were undoubtedly viewed as detrimental and even threatening by the military hierarchy” (Ellner 1988, 83). Thus, we have coded 1 for OTH_MILITARY.

We have coded a 1 for LIBDEMNORMS due to its dedication to democratizing parties and institutions (Petkoff, 1989a). Petkoff was the party’s presidential candidate in 1983 and 1988 but the party supported Rafel Caldera in 1993 and Hugo Chávez in 1998 and 2000. Petkoff had no role in government previously (INSIDER = 1) and although he was one of the leaders of the party, the party emerged out of a political split with the Communist Party and did not depend on one candidate (Ellner 1988, 38) (CHARISMA = 1). In recognition of their support, President Rafael Caldera named Petkoff as Minister of Health which means they by the 1998 elections they are coded as (INSIDER = 3, INC_PARL = 2).

Fifth Republic Movements/ United Socialist Party of Venezuela

Populism in Venezuela is mostly linked to Hugo Chávez’s “Bolivarian Revolution”. There are significant differences in the tone, aggressiveness and rhetoric of Chávez before and after winning the 1998 elections, although he defended a similar ideology based on revolutionizing Venezuelan politics, opposing the decadent political regime and combatting neoliberal policies. In a couple of interviews before the election, he assured he would not nationalize any media company, he welcomed foreign investment (Ramos 1998) and he argued in favour of private ownership of certain industries (tourism, lottery, banking) (Bayly 1998). According to Scocozza y Colucciello (2016, 29), the real increase in aggressiveness came after winning the election as a way of marking a breaking point with the previous political establishment particularly after the failed 2002 coup d’état against him. Maduro’s presidency has seen a general deterioration of the political situation in Venezuela, an exacerbation of Chávez’s rhetoric and an intensification of political repression.

We have also included in the dataset the parties Fatherland for all (“Patria para todos”) and For Social Democracy (“Por la Democracia Social /Podemos”) because they are satellite parties of Chávez in the 2005 legislative election which simply did not wish to become part of his vertical party structure. However, given that they support Chavismo we have followed the same coding as the one we used for the 2005 elections for Chávez’s party.

Chávez’s initial political rhetoric in 1998 focused on the idea of revolution, on a symbolic and mythic connection with the heroes of the Venezuelan past, particularly of Simón Bolívar, on constant messages to his Christian values and on the call for a “proceso constituyente” (López Maya 2008), that is, for the creation of a new constitution that would give power to the people.

Chávez argued forcefully for the creation of a new political era. This was explicitly mentioned in his address to the Congress when debating the new constitution and in his rejection of the previous political system by saying that the “IV Republic was born with the applause of the conservative oligarchy” (Scocozza y Colucciello 2016, 33). Moreover, Roberts (2012: 145) argues that “Chávez defined the enemy primarily in terms of the political establishment against which he had launched his ill-fated coup attempt in 1992. In particular, he condemned the leaders of AD and COPEI as a corrupt, entrenched, and self-serving political elite that made a farce of representative democracy” Roberts (2012: 145) (OTH_POLCLASS = 3).

However, his classification in left-right axis and against the financial elite is less clear in the 1998 and 2000 election campaigns. Slogans such as “homeland, socialism or death” or “Socialism of the XXI century” did not gain relevance until after the failed coup (Scocozza y Colucciello 2016, 30). In his first electoral campaign, Chávez was considerably more moderate and gained his inspiration more from nationalism than socialism (Bolívar 2001, 47; Roberts 2012, 145). While, on one side, Ellner (2004, 11) and (Gates (2010, 3) argue that Chávez was a “staunchly anti-neoliberal” candidate in 1998 and Molina (2002, 231) points out that he based his 2000 campaign on “claims on social division between rich and poor, presenting himself as a friend of the poor and an enemy of the oligarchs”, on the other side, Roberts, drawing on Blanco Muñoz (1998, 611-14), defends that

“Chavismo could define itself in opposition to international capital and globalized neoliberalism, without rejecting capitalism or capitalists per se. Indeed, Chávez came to power advocating a ‘humanistic’ mixed economy that borrowed from both capitalist and socialist development models, with a market freed from monopoly control and a developmentalist state committed to nurturing national producers, both public and private” (Roberts, 2012: 146).

In fact, he even rejected the label of “socialist” in favor of “Bolivarian” before the 1998 elections (Bayly, 1998). Nevertheless, by the standards of our dataset it is still possible to code MVR as far-left and opposed to the financial elite (LRPOSITION = FL, OTH_ECONOMIC = 3). From 2004 socialism really became the centre of Chávez’s political discourse with the creation of the “New strategic map of the Bolivarian Revolution” (Colmenares, 2011: 11). In the 2012 election campaign, this was evident when he attacked his political opponent as a “lackey of imperialism” and a “lackey of the bourgeoisie” (Scocozza y Colucciello 2016, 33).

Immigration to Venezuela is rarely mentioned in Chavez’s discourses or in academic texts on his politics. In fact, he carried on mass nationalizations of immigrants in 2003 under the project “Misión Identidad” (López Maya 2008) (OTH_IMMIGRANT = 1). Being a soldier himself and having created a movement inside the military that preceded his political party (“Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario 200” (MBR-200)), Chávez did not associate the military with the elite, in fact, the military was seen as a possible agent of revolutionary change (Colmenares, 2011: 9). In the 2012 election Chávez explicitly praised the military for “being committed, as the working class, with the Bolivarian Constitution” (Scocozza y Colucciello 2016, 33) (OTH_MILITARY = 1).

Chávez positioned nationalism and retrieving popular sovereignty as the central axis of his 1998 campaign. He started his inaugural speech with a reference to the “father of the homeland”, Simón Bolívar, that summed up his nationalist discourse: “Blessed is the citizen who, under the coat of arms of his command, summons national sovereignty to exercise his absolute will” (Chávez, 1999). In this sense Chávez's nationalism was “inclusionary” of groups that previously felt excluded such as working class or indigenous citizens and not based on the exclusion of ethnic “aliens” such as European right-wing populism (Mudde y Kaltwasser 2013). In fact, Chávez stressed constantly his commitment to Americanismo and to Bolívar’s notion of Gran Patria, that is, the vision of a common interest and identity to all Latin American countries (Colmenares, 2011: 9). Chávez repeated constantly his commitment to the improvement of the indigenous communities, however, he did not identify with one particular ethnic group. The 1999 constitution declared Venezuela to be “multiethnic and pluricultural” (Constitution of Venezuela 1999). Moreover, he did not make this the main axis of his politics, but instead understood the fight for indigenous people as one aspect of the larger struggle between the people and the elite. Taking this into consideration, we have coded him 1 for OTH_ETHNIC.

Roberts (2012: 145) has argued that “while Chávez had always been critical of U.S. imperialism and its ties to elite interests in Venezuelan society, he intensified his critique in response to Washington’s thinly veiled support for the military coup that briefly removed him from office in April 2002”. Moreover, in an interview with Bayly (1998), Chávez stresses the desire of collaboration with the IMF and other international institutions. Attending to this criterion, we have coded 2 for OTH_FOREIGN in the 1998 and 2000 elections and a 3 since the 2006 election.

Chávez was a well-known character in Venezuelan politics before his election in 1998, particularly after his failed coup in 1992. However, he did not hold any office before becoming president. Thus, he is coded as a 1 in INSIDER in 1998 and a 3 in the rest of elections.

There is much debate over the characterization of Venezuela as a democracy or as a dictatorship. Freedom House (2017) considers the country “Partly Free” until 2017, where it becomes “Not Free” and Polity IV (2014) considers it an open anocracy since 2007. Chávez took over the years a series of measures that threatened political pluralism and freedom of the press. He dissolved the opposition-controlled Congress in favor of a Chávez-leaning Constituent Assembly, he extended the powers of the president by weakening checks and balances against the executive branch, the new constitution made no mention to political parties, he replaced many military officials and oil company managers with men close to him, he changed the electoral system to favor his political party and took control over some media companies (Colmenares G. 2011, 33; Roberts 2012). In 2006, the opposition decided not to participate in the elections as a protest against their “undemocratic nature”. However, formally, Venezuela continued to be a democracy and Chávez passed these reforms in several referenda. Although there is a significant difference between measures taken by Chávez and measures taken under Maduro’s government, such as the imprisonment of political opponents like Leopoldo López or Antonio Ledezma, overall, actions taken by both governments can be considered as a radical break with previous liberal democracy norms (LIBDEMNORMS = 3).

There is a clear cult around Hugo Chávez in his movement and he identified directly with the people. He argued repeatedly that “Chávez is not just a man, but that Chávez is a people” (Michelutti 2017). Nevertheless, the political system before his victory in 1998 showed clear signs of decomposition and all candidates in that election where anti-establishment (Molina, 2002). After Chávez’s death, there was plenty debate over if Chavismo would survive under Maduro’s leadership, which it has done. However, Maduro draws his support from Chávez’s charisma, and it is perfectly imaginable that another politician could have taken its place. We have coded the Chávez’s parties 3 on CHARISMA, and the United Socialist Party of Venezuela 2 under Maduro.

In 2019 the country suffered a deep institutional crisis when the opposition parties to Chavismo questioned the results of the 2018 presidential elections and named Juan Guaidó as interim president. The opposition parties also boycotted the 2020 legislative elections which resulted in very low participation levels and a huge victory for the United Socialist Party of Venezuela. Results of the 2018 and 2020 elections should be taken with a grain of salt as well as the rest of elections since the promulgation of the new constitution, which have been subject to enormous criticism due to their lack of democratic standards.

Radical Cause and others

Radical Cause (“Causa Я”) is a clear antecedent to Chávez. It was the main party of the opposition to Caldera in the 1993 election and Lalander (2008, 40) that it was “the party closest to Chávez and that a great number of their militants, union leaders and MPs would later be part of ‘Chavismo’”. Thus, we have coded them in a similar fashion as MVR for the 1993 election and again in the 2000 election in which it was the main party of the opposition in the presidential election. The 2000 election shows the relevance of the populist discourse of Chávez because the candidate of Radical Cause was one of the colleagues of Chávez in the 1992 failed coup d’état.

References

Bayly, Jaime. 1998. «JAIME BAYLY ENTREVISTA A HUGO CHAVEZ 1998». https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mE84o4Yxh70 (30 de octubre de 2023).

Blanco Muñoz, Agustín. 1998. Venezuela del 04F-92 al 06D-98: habla el comandante Hugo Chávez Frías. Caracas: Catedra Pio Tamayo, CEHA/IIES/FACES/UCV.

Bolívar, A. 2001. «El insulto como estrategia en el diálogo político venezolano». Oralia. Análisis del discurso oral 4: 47-74.

Colmenares G., Leopoldo E. 2011. «La Exportacion de la Revolución Bolivariana hacia América Latina - .pdf». Military Review: 8-23.

Constitution of Venezuela. 1999. Constitución de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela.

Ellner, Steve. 1988. Venezuela’s Movimiento al Socialismo: From Guerrilla Defeat to Innovative Politics. Durham and London: Duke University Press.

———. 2004. «Leftist Goals and the Debate over Anti-Neoliberal Strategy in Latin America». Science & Society 68(1): 10-32.

Freedom House. 2017. «Venezuela: Freedom in the World 2017 Country Report». Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org/country/venezuela/freedom-world/2017 (30 de octubre de 2023).

Gates, Leslie C. 2010. Electing Chavez: The Business of Anti-neoliberal Politics in Venezuela. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt5vkf5d (30 de octubre de 2023).

Lalander, Rickard. 2008. «El contexto histórico del chavismo y los partidos políticos venezolanos de la izquierda». Reflexión Política 19. https://revistas.unab.edu.co/index.php/reflexion/article/view/535/517 (27 de septiembre de 2023).

López Maya, Margarita. 2008. «Venezuela: Hugo Chávez y el bolivarianismo». Revista Venezolana de Economía y Ciencias Sociales 14(3): 55-82.

Michelutti, Lucia. 2017. «“We Are All Chávez”: Charisma as an Embodied Experience». Latin American Perspectives 212(44(1)): 232-50.

Molina, José E. 2002. «The Presidential and Parliamentary Elections of the Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela: Change and Continuity (1998–2000)». Bulletin of Latin American Research 21(2): 219-47.

Mudde, Cas, y Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser. 2013. «Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary Populism: Comparing Contemporary Europe and Latin America». Government and Opposition 48(2): 147-74.

Nohlen, Dieter, ed. 2005. Elections in the Americas: A Data Handbook. New York: Oxford University Press.

Petkoff, Teodoro. 1981. «El Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) venezolano». Revista Mexicana de Sociología 43(3): 1121-39.

———. 1989a. «El MAS y la búsqueda de un perfil distintivo». Nueva Sociedad 101: 104-13.

———. 1989b. «Hacia un nuevo socialismo». Nueva Sociedad: 37-52.

Polity IV. 2014. «Polity IV Regime Trends: Venezuela, 1946-2013». https://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/ven2.htm (30 de octubre de 2023).

Ramos, Jorge. 1998. «Jorge Ramos entrevista a Hugo Chávez». https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ELX1Pe07Elk (30 de octubre de 2023).

Roberts, Kenneth M. 2012. «Populism and democracy in Venezuela under Hugo Chávez». En Populism in Europe and the Americas: Threat or Corrective for Democracy?, eds. Cristóbal Rovira-Kaltwasser y Cas Mudde. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

Scocozza, Antonio, y Mariarosaria Colucciello. 2016. «Política y discurso en América Latina. El caso específico de la retórica de la violencia en la Venezuela de Hugo Chávez». Cultura Latinoamericana 24(2): 18-39.