Thailand

Date range: 1980-2020 (2006 and 2014 elections are not included, as both were boycotted and annulled).
Thailand has had a patchy history of democratization, with numerous democratic constitutions and elections overturned by military coups. The 1990s period of “semi-democracy” (in which the army controlled the executive but allowed legislative elections) is a questionable inclusion in the dataset, however we have concluded that these elections should be included (although no party from this era seemed to be sufficiently populist to warrant inclusion in the dataset).

Case notes

Thaksin Shinawatra, Thai Rak Thai, Phak Phalang Prachachon, Pheu Thai

Thai Rak Thai (Thais Love Thailand, TRT) was the original political party of Thaksin Shinawatra. A telecommunications entrepreneur from Chang Mai, Thaksin was the country’s richest man in the 1990s when he served briefly in two governments as Foreign Minister (1994-95) and twice as Deputy Prime Minister (1996, 1997). Following the severe economic downturn following the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, Thaksin founded TRT to contest in the 2001 election. After landslide victories in that election and again in 2005, a boycotted 2006 poll was overturned by the courts, leading to a crisis which ended up in Thaksin’s overthrow by the military in September 2006 and the banning of TRT.

After his ouster, the exiled Thaksin has been heavily involved in two successor parties that subsequently won national elections in 2007 and 2011 – the Phak Phalang Prachachon (People’s Power Party, PPP) and Pheu Thai (People’s Party, PT), respectively. Both parties were/are officially led by Thaksin’s inner-circle loyalists and family members, leading both to be widely seen in the literature as TRT by another name (see Pongsudhirak 2008, 49; McCargo 2008, 340; Chen 2014a; Sawasdee 2019, 103). These parties are also seen to be closely related to the pro-Thaksin and anti-coup “red-shirt” movement (contra to the anti-Thaksin “yellow shirt” movement that had demonstrated in 2005-2008) that blossomed in Bangkok after the PPP government was ousted in a “judicial coup” of 2008 (Sinpeng and Kuhonta 2012, 397).

While Thaksin is universally called a populist in the Thailand literature, this is problematic for two reasons. First the term “populism” is almost always used in the programmatic sense to describe social democratic policies “popular” among the rural poor – not populist political rhetoric (Hewison 2017; Hawkins and Selway 2017). Hence the universal characterisation of TRT as a populist party in the 2001 election has more to do with its policies of subsidising health care, forgiving agricultural loans, and providing village level microfinance than any hostility to an “elite”. TRT’s 2001 campaign was also the first in which this kind of national policy had been the centrepiece of a campaign, as opposed to elite alliance-building reliant on local political bosses to drive turnout in the countryside (Pasuk and Baker 2002, 3; Choi 2005, 51) – something that is also probably relevant to its “populist” categorisation in the literature. Second, while there is literature that discusses the rhetorical form of the term, this tends to have an abstract evidence base that rarely quotes Thaksin, other party leaders, or campaign slogans.

Nonetheless, there are enough exceptions to this rule to study TRT’s potential populism in sufficient detail. This evidence suggests that the party’s initial election in 2001, while based on some anti-corruption platforms and a vaguely economic-nationalist (anti-IMF) reaction to the 1997 crisis, did not include any fundamental anti-elite populist narratives and should not be included in the dataset (see Pasuk and Baker 2008, 65; Hewison 2010, 121; Hawkins and Selway 2017, 384; Hewison 2017, 432; Thompson 2012, 68). Exactly when TRT and successor parties transitioned to an anti-elite populist discourse is debated in the literature. Pasuk and Baker suggest Thaksin’s reaction to the 2001 constitutional court case in which he was accused of violating asset disclosure rules while a minister in the 1990s (Pasuk and Baker 2004). When awaiting the verdict, he publicly described the court case as a conspiracy of the ruling elite against him and “the people” who elected him, and that he would chose loyalty to the people over loyalty to the court (Pasuk and Baker 2004, 5; see also Case 2007, 632).

In the years following, he further honed a discourse that (ubiquitously) valorised the people and (more rarely) contrasted them to an elite establishment of “old politics” (Pasuk and Baker 2008, 79–80; see also Markou and Lasote 2015, 5; Jayasuriya and Hewison 2004, 585; Norton 2012, 49; Pasuk and Baker 2013, 609–10). In one speech in 2002 Thaksin claimed that the government authority in Thailand had been abused to “serve the interests of those in power… Governments have enacted laws to sustain their own power rather than to empower the people who put them in office” (Pasuk and Baker 2004, 8). In a typically populist understanding of “the people”, he continued that ideology should play no role in modern parties, who should simply decide what to do based on “the needs and desires of the people” (Pasuk and Baker 2004, 8). According to Hewison, (Hewison 2017, 434; see also Thompson 2012, 68) during the yellow-shirt demonstrations (after the 2005 election) Thaksin’s speeches “increasingly linked himself to his supporters and declared them a democratic bedrock against elite-controlled authoritarianism. Thaksin had identified an ‘other’; the Bangkok-centred elite.”

After the 2006 coup, any vagueness regarding the people’s enemy disappeared in Thaksin’s political discourse, as he adopted the “full throated populism” against his elite rivals that he had been hesitant to use earlier (Hewison 2017, 427). For example, in one speech he claimed that “democracy was only for the elite. But now, people have filled their stomachs. And they want more. But the elite don’t want change that will affect their already happy lives” (Hewison 2017, 436). This anti-elite rhetoric has been evident in the red-shirt protests (UDD) that started in 2008 (note that it is generally accepted in the literature that red-shirts and pro-Thaksin parties – particularly Pheu Thai – are fused entities (see Sinpeng and Kuhonta 2012; Sinpeng 2014). In one speech Thaksin referred to a “power beyond the constitution” and an “invisible hand” as responsible for his over through (Winichakul 2014, 96, 104), following which the term “ammat” (or alternatively, “aphichon”) entered political discourse in reference to the aristocratic elite – i.e. the military, privy councillors, the democratic party, yellow-shirt protest leaders, and arguably (and controversially) the monarchy (Sinpeng and Kuhonta 2012, 411; Pintobtan 2011, 2–3; Nelson 2012, 17; Charoensin-o-larn 2013, 206). Ammat is juxtaposed against the prai/phrai (“people”) who back Thaksin and his parties.

Thaksin is therefore another case in which OTH_POLCLASS rhetoric clearly rose from a small base, but where it is difficult to pin this down to clear points in time. Following the literature, we have coded TRT 2 for the 2005 election, and PPP & PT 3 after the 2006 coup (2007 and 2011 elections), although there may be a case to code 3 in 2005. Likewise, there is no evidence of anti-military rhetoric from Thaksin until after the 2006 coup (Connors 2005, 366; Charoensin-o-larn 2013, 206), after which this became a sustained element of his populism (OTH_MILITARY = 1 in 2005, =3 2007-11).

It is often suggested that there were nationalistic elements to Thaksin’s politics, particularly relating to the fallout from the Asian Financial Crisis and the counter-IMF common at the time (Glassman 2004; Jayasuriya and Hewison 2004; McCargo and Pathmanand 2005, 5; Phatharathananunth 2008, 108; Pye and Schaffar 2008, 46). As Prime Minister he also occasionally clashed with foreign funded NGOs and the foreign press, considering them both to be threats to “Thai sovereignty” (Pasuk and Baker 2004, 17–18; Pasuk 2004, 4). This however only seems to be a mild form of OTH_FOREIGN rhetoric rather than a core element of Thaksin’s populist discourse, and one that disappeared after the 2006 coup, when foreign powers do not seem very relevant to Thaksin/red shirt populist narrative (= 2 in 2005, = 1 2007- ). As the country’s richest man, he also did not present any OTH_ECONOMIC populism – on the contrary he promoted entrepreneurialism among the Thai population and claimed that his business expertise was the basis of his governing ability (=1).

There is also no evidence of OTH_ETHNIC populism. In fact Thaksin and many members of his government were from the minority Chinese community – an economically powerful community that had been somewhat political marginalised, and the TRT era is considered by some to have reduced this marginalisation and produced more acceptance of Chinese-Thai culture and politicians (Pasuk and Baker 2004, 11). In his first term he enacted harsh policies toward refugees and migrants from Myanmar and Cambodia, but there is no evidence that this was a particularly important component of his populist discourse (OTH_IMMIGRANT =1) when it started.

Thaksin is very difficult to categorise on a left-right ideological basis (see Hewison 2010, 120). His most well-known economic policies (see above) are generally socially democratic. However he clearly had a generally neo-liberal view of economic policy and was hostile to bureaucracy and state intervention in general (Pasuk and Baker 2008, 64). He occasionally claimed that he was applying a “dual track” economic policy of socialism and capitalism in equal measure (Ungpakorn 2007, 16; Pasuk and Baker 2004, 10). Given his core economic philosophy was more neo-liberal than leftist, We have coded him CR on LRPOSITION here – but this could be disputed. There is less debate about the role of charisma in Thaksin’s populism, given that he dominated the identity of his parties to the exclusion of all other senior members, and later incarnations in particular are personality cults around his leadership (Pasuk and Baker 2008, 69, 76; see also Seo 2019, 556; Sawasdee 2019, 112; Thompson 2012, 75; Pasuk and Baker 2013, 610) (CHARISMA = 3). As his first election coded in the dataset is 2005, his incumbency since 2001 gives him 3 on INSIDER. Incidentally, he would have been a 2 in 2001, given that he had served as deputy PM and cabinet minister in the 1990s, and relied on many state connections to develop his business career (Pasuk and Baker 2002, 3; McCargo 2002, 115).

In government, Thaksin opposed liberal democratic norms in numerous ways (Jayasuriya and Hewison 2004, 572; Ferrara 2015, 361). He clashed with many of the oversight authorities which had been set up by the liberal 1997 constitution: questioning the authority of courts and sending emissaries to pressure judges (McCargo and Pathmanand 2005, 16; Pongsudhirak 2008, 54); clamping down on protest rights (Pasuk and Baker 2004, 19–20); taking personal control of the police (Funston 2002, 313; Pasuk and Baker 2004, 20); and packing state institutions with family members and demoting politicians who clashed with them (Pasuk and Baker 2004, 12). On several occasions he likened himself to Thai dictators of previous eras (Pasuk and Baker 2004, 70) and articulated an authoritarian vision of centralised power which included no space for political debate – this being supposedly redundant given that serving the people was an obvious and uncontentious policy that required no ideological split (Pasuk and Baker 2004, 15; Jayasuriya and Hewison 2004, 585). He was particularly hostile to media freedom, using his state power and financial resources to supress critical coverage of his government (Lee 2014, 180; McCargo and Pathmanand 2005, 1; Pasuk and Baker 2004; 2008, 70; Nelson 2007, 22; Funston 2002, 313) and suing individual journalists who provided negative coverage (Pye and Schaffar 2008, 51). Thaksin’s war on drugs in the south of the country was also highly illiberal, including summary executions which he dismissed as “not an unusual fate for wicked people” (Mutebi 2004; see also Connors 2005, 377; Pongsudhirak 2008, 48). All of this clearly warrants a coding of 3 for LIBDEMNORMS.

Future Forward

The Future Forward (Phak Anakhot Mai, FF) party of young billionaire car parts mogul Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit appeared for the first time in the 2019 election and beat all expectations by winning 18%, mainly among younger and urban voters around Bangkok (Sawasdee 2020, 65). FF was highly progressive on social issues, and became known for its leader’s confrontational style and opposition to the military junta (McCargo and Alexander 2019, 95; Kongkirati 2019, 164).

This is a debatable inclusion, but on the balance of evidence it does seem that Thanathorn’s discourse against the military and the political establishment did reach the level of populism by our definition. In the words of McCargo (McCargo 2019b, 127) “his public criticisms of the military could be bold to the point of unthinkable”, and party activists claimed that the party’s mission was to “oppose hierarchism” (OTH_POLCLASS = 3, OTH_MILITARY = 3). We have seen no other evidence of OTH_ECONOMIC, OTH_IMMIGRANT or OTH_ETHNIC (all = 1). All analysis emphasises the central role of Thanathorn’s personality in the party’s performance (McCargo and Alexander 2019, 95, 100) (CHARISMA = 3) and there is no evidence of INSIDER (= 1) or LIBDEMNORMS (= 1). Given its characterisation as “progressive” on policy positions (McCargo 2019a, 156)(McCargo, 2019a:156) we have coded FF CL on LRPOSITION.

Not included

In the early 1990s a division opened up between the pro-and anti-military factions of the political establishment following the 1992 Black May massacre. Two figures in the anti-military camp are occasionally considered populist in the literature. General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh’s National Aspiration Party was one of these, and was briefly in power before being thrown out after the 1997 crisis. Chavalit does seem to have a history of anti-elite statements (Neher 1988, 193), but it seems that NAP’s designation as “populist” is usually due to its policies rather than its rhetoric (Ockey 2005, 742; Ungpakorn 2007, 112), and there is insufficient evidence that it should be included here. A somewhat stronger case could be made for General Chamlong Srimuang, a moral “puritan” (Chen 2014b, 195) of national politics who led the May 1992 uprising. Chamlong is considered a “populist figure” by some for this reason (McCargo and Pathmanand 2005, 8), but as with Chavalit we have not seen enough evidence of genuine populist rhetoric. Chamlong’s Palang Dharma was the party under which Thaksin first entered politics.

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