Poland

Date range: 1989-2020

Case notes

Stanisław Tymiñski / Party X

Stanisław Tymiński, a Polish-Canadian businessman, ran an unlikely presidential campaign in 1990 with his newly founded “Party X”. Although he started with very little name recognition, he surprised all observers by coming second in the first ballot (23.1%), although he only increased this to 25.75% in the second where he was roundly defeated by Solidarity’s Lech Wełeşa. Party X did not do well in following year’s legislative elections (0.5%), and Tymiński did not play an important role in Polish politics afterward.

Tymiński’s campaign consisted of a personality centric diatribe against the political class – including both the post-communist and Solidarity factions – calling himself a “third force” that was neither left nor right wing (De Lange and Guerra 2009, 535; Stanley and Cześnik 2019, 70; Jasiewicz 2008, 22; Kucharczyk and Wysocka 2008, 80) (OTH_POLCLASS = 3). For this his 1990 campaign is universally considered “populist” (Pankowski 2010, 66; Surazska and Bivand 1997, 76; Millard 1994, 54; Van Kessel 2015a, 124). While his policy proposals were light, his “entrepreneurial populism” (Kasprowicz and Hess 2017, 204) was built on the idea that as a successful business man he could create wealth for the people (Sanford 2002, 178; Schöpflin 1991, 239), generally catering to those who felt that they had lost out in the transition to a market system under Solidarity (Surazska and Bivand 1997, 76; Bell 1997, 1268; Sanford 2002, 178). This makes him difficult to code on LRPOSITION, but we have coded him C.

Not a lot is written about his platform, but Rok claims that Tymiński was anti-semitic (Rok 1992), and other sources claim that party supporters exhibited high levels of xenophobia (Jasiewicz 2008, 22). While there is not a lot of evidence to corroborate this, we have coded him 2 on OTH_ETHNIC. We have seen no evidence for anything registering on the OTH_IMMIGRANT and OTH_FOREIGN variables (= 1). As a “self-made” millionaire, he did not present any hostility to the rich (Schöpflin 1991, 248) (OTH_ECONOMIC = 1). The party was based totally on Tymiński’s persuasive (Jasiewicz 2008, 22) and “eccentric” (Bell 1997, 1270) persona (Schöpflin 1991, 239) (CHARISMA = 3). Tyminski had no affiliation with the political class, and no established party organisation (Bell, 1997:1267) (INSIDER = 1). We have seen no evidence that he violated LIBDEMNORMS (= 1).

League of Polish Families

The League of Polish Families (Liga Polskich Rodzin, LPR), founded in 2001, was a clerical social conservative party that was puritanically anti-EU and opposed to foreign influences in “traditional” Polish (Catholic) culture. The party was the product of conservative Father and media figure Tadeusz Rydzyk, who cobbled together various right wing and Catholic parties in existence at the time (Rafal Pankowski 2010:111). After two strong performances in 2001 and 2005 (7.9% and 8% respectively), the party joined a coalition government with Civic Platform and Order and Justice, after which it was seen by supporters to compromise too much on its program and receded by the early 2007 elections. Most of its voters turned to PiS (Zuba 2017, 91).

Anti-establishment rhetoric was an important pillar of LPR’s discourse (De Lange and Guerra 2009, 539; Zuba 2017, 100), as it frequently accused the political class of conspiring with foreigners to subvert Polish values and interests. Several scholars point out that the party’s anti-establishment rhetoric was not as extreme as other populists at the time (notably Self Defence) (Markowski and Tucker 2010, 526), but from the available evidence this should still be coded as 3 in the OTH_POLCLASS variable. The party had a generally ethnocentric outlook on the nation (Jasiewicz 2008, 15; Moroska and Zuba 2010, 131), and according to de Lange & Guerra, (De Lange and Guerra 2009, 538) it “vehemently opposes” non-Catholic “others”, and “openly attacks the roles that Jews” have in society. Members of affiliated youth movements (see below) also promoted explicitly anti-Semitic doctrines (Rafal Pankowski 2010, 116). For this we have coded the party 3 on OTH_ETHNIC. Immigration was not high enough during LPR’s time in parliament to register in its populism (Moroska and Zuba 2010, 131). That said, de Lange & Guerra, (De Lange and Guerra 2009, 539) record that a number of LPR politicians made statements against immigration on cultural grounds. We have left OTH_IMMIGRANT at 1 for now, but there is a case to be made that it should be 2.

Opposition to European integration was the definitive policy of the party (Moroska and Zuba 2010, 130; Jasiewicz 2008, 15; De Lange and Guerra 2009, 537; Markowski and Tucker 2010), as it considered European liberal values to be antithetical to conservative Polish ones (Jasiewicz 2008, 11). Polish politicians sympathetic to EU integration were accused of “anti-Polish” politics (Moroska and Zuba 2010, 131). Numerous members also made statements alleging that Germans and Jews were the principle beneficiaries of the EU’s schemes (Jasiewicz 2008, 15).This tied in with its generally nationalist outlook that frequently alleged that foreign interests of conspiring against Polish ones (Pankowski 2010, 113) (OTH_FOREIGN = 3). The party opposed foreign investment in Poland (De Lange and Guerra 2009, 539), but in more of a nationalist than an economic sense. Giertych did however accuse Poland’s new business elite of conspiring with foreign interests and former communist officials (Rafal Pankowski 2010: 113), and for this reason I’ve coded it 2 on OTH_ECONOMIC.

While there is an argument that the party’s ideology shifted somewhat in its 7 years in Parliament, based on the above policies we have labelled the party FR on LRPOSITION, and it is usually considered so by scholars (Wysocka 2013, 295; Pankowski 2010, 113; Markowski and Tucker 2010, 526). Father Tadeusz Rydyk, owner of a media empire that included the influential Radio Maryja, was a charismatic influence in founding and endorsing the party (Zuba 2017, 90; Moroska and Zuba 2010, 127; Pankowski 2010, 111; Jasiewicz 2008, 15; Stanley and Cześnik 2019, 72). While he was never actually leader, we have coded it 2 on CHARISMA for the 2001 elections given his direct relationship to the meaning of the party. Subsequently, the young Roman Giertych took over and established himself as a charismatic leader (Millard 2006, 1017; Kucharczyk and Wysocka 2008, 78) (especially via a committee post that empowered him to investigate corruption, see: (Pankowski 2010, 112–13)), albeit of a party with a strong base. Therefore we have kept the CHARISMA coding at 2 for the 2005 and 2007 elections.

The party had direct links with the All-Polish Youth (Młodzież Wszechpolska, MW) (Kucharczyk and Wysocka 2008, 78), a radical and violent nationalist street movement whose members “came to dominate the wider party organisation” (Rafal Pankowski 2010, 112-116). MW members intimidated opponents or the LPR and targeted LGBT, feminist and Jewish organisations in particular (Pankowski, 2010:113-16). For this reason we have coded it 3 for LIBDEMNORMS. The party and its leaders had not participated in government before joining in coalition with PiS following the 2005 election (Millard 2009, 791), after which (2007 election) I have coded it 2 on INSIDER.

Self Defence

Self Defence (Samoobrona Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej, SRP) was long an agrarian trade union before it became a political party, even though it sent candidates to run for office from the 1990s. Appealing to the rural “losers” of the post-communist transition, it was seen by many to espouse a nostalgia for the former regime, albeit with some nationalist ideas (Pankowski 2010,132). It achieved a breakthrough performance of 10.2% in 2001, and Lepper polled 15.1% in the 2005 presidential election before the party receded to 1.5% in the 2007 legislative election. It briefly served in coalition government with PiS and LPR between 2005 and 2007. The party was totally dominated by its founder-leader Andrzej Lepper, and the inconsistency of many of its (his) positions makes it very difficult to code.

One aspect of the SRP that was not at all ambiguous was that it was “anti-establishment by nature” (Moroska and Zuba 2010, 132). Lepper self-identified as “populist” campaigning for the ordinary citizen against the “self-proclaimed new elites” (Jasiewicz 2008, 13; see also Van Kessel 2015a, 125), thus tapping into a growing cynicism of the political class among voters (Szczerbiak 2007, 212) (OTH_POLCLASS = 3). It also often espoused xenophobia, especially towards Germans (Moroska and Zuba 2010, 130) and Jews, whom Lepper has called “the most dangerous nation for Poland” (Pankowski 2010, 139). While there is a case to be made that the ambiguity, inconsistency, and unpredictability of these positions should dampen their place in the party’s core outlook, we have labelled SRP 3 on OTH_ETHNIC. We have seen no evidence that the party was concerned with OTH_IMMIGRANTS (= 1), although this may be wrong.

In its more nationalist tones, the party alleged that foreign interests interfered with the Polish economy. It was occasionally opposed to EU integration, arguing that it would harm the wellbeing of ordinary farmers and enrich a small elite (Jasiewicz 2008, 11; Stanley and Cześnik 2019, 71). For this the party earns a 2 on OTH_FOREIGN (there is a case to be made that this should be 3). Moroska & Zuba, (Moroska and Zuba 2010, 133) claim that the party stood against foreign capital and capitalists, and much of its early political activities were aimed at opposing debt collectors and high interest charging banks repossessing farms (Pankowski 2010, 133; Markowski and Tucker 2010, 527). (OTH_ECONOMIC = 3).

The party’s ideology was ambiguous and erratic (Pankowski 2010, 135) – even to the point that some have called it non-ideological. This was in part due to the fact that Lepper’s charismatic leadership was the essence of its political meaning (Jasiewicz 2008, 14; Pankowski 2010, 142) (CHARISMA = 3). In the words of Moroska & Zuba, (Moroska and Zuba 2010, 129), “Andrzej Lepper consequently became not only the person who expressed his party’s position, but also a spontaneous creator of that position.” While the party has occasionally been considered left wing (Jasiewicz 2008, 11; De Lange and Guerra 2009, 537; Markowski and Tucker 2010, 527; see also Pankowski 2010, 135), the preponderance of evidence suggests that it espoused no actual ideology other than a vague championing of the rural poor (Moroska and Zuba 2010, 130, 132), and Lepper himself seemed to stress different ideological labels at different times, and at other suggested that it was neither left, right or centre, but just “patriotic” (Pankowski 2010, 136). We have therefore coded its LRPOSITION at C.

As a social movement, Self Defense often held rallies that were accused of violence and lawlessness (Pankowski 2010, 132–33; Markowski and Tucker 2010, 527), and when in Parliament Lepper often brought in PA speakers to drown out the other members when he wanted to drown out other members (Jasiewicz 2008, 13). According to Pankowski, this image of anti-system lawlessness was a key part of the party’s image and appeal (Pankowski 2010) (LIBDEMNORMS = 3). The party was never in government before joining a coalition in 2005, after which (2007) it is coded 2 on INSIDER.

Law and Justice

Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) is the party of brothers Jarosław and (the late) Lech Kaczyński, two senior members of the Solidarity movement that took a particularly hard line on the role of ex-communists in the new regime in the 1990s. The brothers initially created the Centre Agreement party in the early 1990s, but without a populist stance nor significant electoral success. After Lech’s stint as Minister of Justice in the centre right Buzek government in which he became popular for fighting corruption (Millard 2009, 790–91), the brothers founded PiS in 2001, gaining 9.5% in that election. In 2005 Lech Kaczyński won the presidency and the party entered minority “populist coalition” government with the LPR and SRP, which collapsed in 2007. While its coalition partners faded in that vote, PiS saw its popularity rise (essentially swallowing the supporters of its two coalition partners), only more so after the death of Lech in a plane crash in Russia in 2010. PiS formed government outright in 2015, when it also retook the presidency. In many of the OTH_ variables, PiS is noted to have made a steady shift away from the centre towards radicalism, particularly by the time of its 2005 and 2007 elections (Jasiewicz 2008, 23; Markowski and Tucker 2010, 528; Pankowski 2010; Vermeersch 2007, 6), which makes its early elections (2001 in particular) slightly difficult to code.

The party advocated a “fourth republic” that would rid the polity of the corrupt leadership which characterised the third republic (as the post 1989 state had been known) (Jasiewicz 2008, 9; Wysocka 2013, 303; Kucharczyk and Wysocka 2008, 79; see also Markowski 2008, 1056). It targeted what it called the uklad (“network” or “pact”) of elites – ex-communist officials, corrupt post-solidarity politicians, and foreign influences – whom it alleged ran the state: “The network has taken everything for itself. That explains why, after 1989, the people have not had a chance” (cited in Wysocka 2013, 304). There are several scholars who think that PiS only really adopted anti-political class populism by 2005 (Van Kessel 2015a, 121) or that it was radicalised by 2007 (Jasiewicz 2008, 23; Markowski and Tucker 2010, 528). Stanley & Cześnik (Stanley and Cześnik 2019, 73) persuasively argue that the party was hostile to corruption in 2001, but not nearly as radical as the LPR and SRP (see also Pankowski 2010, 153). Therefore we have coded it 2 on OTH_POLCLASS in 2001, and 3 from 2005 on. There is some suggestion that PiS had a more moderate and less confrontation stance in the 2010 presidential election (Szczerbiak 2013, 485), but not enough evidence to justify changing the coding.

The PiS clearly considered the “people” in ethnic and sectarian (Catholic) terms, especially after it inherited the nationalist far-right mantle of the LPR by 2007 and the support of the fundamentalist Radio Maryja with it (Pankowski and Kornak 2013, 162). Over time Jarosław Kaczyński made statements to the effect that he had been mistaken to oppose anti-semitism in the past (Pankowski 2010, 155), and the party included some known anti-semitic politicians in its ranks (Pankowski 2010, 157). There was also an infamous incident in which the party and its campaign managers accused Lech Kaczyński’s 2005 presidential rival Donald Tusk of being too German because his grandfather allegedly fought briefly with the Wehrmacht (Tusk’s grandfather was actually from the Kashuba ethnic minority which had been forcibly conscripted by the Nazis). According to Pankowski (Pankowski 2010, 157), this triggered ethnocentric anti-German and anti-Kashuba hostility as much as nationalist disloyalty. Amid the EU refugee crisis in 2015, PiS honed a sharply anti-Islam discourse, alleging that Muslims posed a threat to Polish society, and alleging that they had taken over neighbourhoods and churches in Western Europe (Krzyżanowska and Krzyżanowski 2018, 615; Krzyżanowski 2018). Like other variables, it is difficult to pin down precisely when this rhetoric began and what level it achieved. We have coded OTH_ETHNIC 1 in 2001, 2 2005-2011 and 3 from 2015 on (when anti-Muslim sentiment started to dominate). By 2015, the European Migrant crisis led the PiS to adopt a harsh xenophobic line on asylum seekers (Krzyżanowska and Krzyżanowski 2018, 615; Krzyżanowski 2018), and in doing so won over many voters “who normally never would have voted for it” (Fomina and Kucharczyk 2016, 62). Before 2015 immigration was not a major topic of political discourse (Krzyżanowski 2018, 76) (OTH_IMMIGRANT = 1 2001-2011, 3 2015-).

A number of foreign powers are highly relevant to the PiS’s populist nationalism. Hostility toward Germany (historically a rich vein for the Polish right) was a key pillar of PiS’s politics (Wysocka 2013, 305; Szczerbiak 2013, 489), and after the 2010 crash that killed Lech the party propagated a number of conspiracy theories that alleged a Russian assassination (Stanley and Cześnik 2019, 75; Szczerbiak 2013, 486). The party has also over time become thoroughly hostile to the EU, which it accuses of imposing socially liberal values on Poland – although this only developed around 2005-07 (Markowski and Tucker 2010, 528). According to Pankowski, (Pankowski 2010, 157–58), each of these oppositions were significantly milder in the 2001 election (OTH_FOREIGN = 2 in 2001, 3 from 2005). While a pro-welfare class politics has often been a pillar of the Kaczyñskis politics (Szczerbiak 2007, 218; Pankowski 2010, 163), this does not appear to rise above 1 on the OTH_ECONOMIC variable (= 1).

While PiS always advocated for a pro-welfare policy of state intervention in the economy (Millard 2006, 1021; Kucharczyk and Wysocka 2008, 79; Szczerbiak 2007, 211), it has always been considered a party of the post-solidarity right, whose anti-communism makes it incompatible with any left wing branding. According to a number of observers (Wysocka 2013, 293; Pankowski 2010, 152) the party started off as centre right in the early 2000s, before embracing a more right wing agenda in subsequent elections. Owing to the above traits of ethnocentrism and nationalism, the party should clearly be defined as far right today (Kasprowicz and Hess 2017, 204). While it is debatable exactly when this shift should take place, we have coded its LRPOSITION CR in 2001, R in 2005, and FR from 2007, as this election is when it is usually considered to have taken LPRs place on the far right (Jasiewicz 2008, 11).

The party has been defined by the personalities of the Kaczyñski twins (Jasiewicz 2008, 12; Wysocka 2013, 306) who also control its organisation totally (Pankowski 2010, 164), although according to Fomina & Kucharczyk, (Fomina and Kucharczyk 2016, 60) the party pulled Jarosław “out of public view” for the 2015 elections. It is also worth noting that other leaders have served as PiS Prime Minister and President in its recent terms in government. Furthermore, according to some, the brothers are not actually particularly charismatic, even if they are well known. This makes the party difficult to code on CHARISMA – we’ve coded it 2, but this could possibly be 3. The brothers had actually been intimately involved with the highest levels of post-1989 politics (Jasiewicz 2008, 11; Pankowski 2010, 151), making PiS a 2 on INSIDER up to 2005, when it formed government and is thenceforth coded 3.

The PiS has, from its inception until its time in government, projected a majoritirian authoritarianism that threatens liberal democratic norms (Fomina and Kucharczyk 2016; Pankowski and Kornak 2013, 162). In its early manifestos, PiS made it clear that it wanted to expand the powers of the presidency (Millard 2006, 1017) and reduce those of the legislature and courts (Jasiewicz 2008, 13). It also proposed in 2003 to rewrite the constitution as an explicitly Catholic document – beginning its draft with the words “In the name of God Alighty!” and removing all references to religious and ethnic minorities (Pankowski 2010, 154). In government it has been particularly hostile to the judicial system and media scrutiny (Wysocka 2013, 306, 309) when these have been critical of the party’s interests. According to Pankowski, in the 2001 elections the PiS “did not challenge the basic elements of the Polish democratic system” (Pankowski 2010, 151),, and hence we have coded it 2 on LIBDEMNORMS in that election and 3 ever since.

Palikot’s Movement

Palikot’s Movement (Ruch Palikota, RP), was a short-lived left-wing party best known for its anti-clerical stance. It was a vehicle for the flamboyant and controversial businessman Janusz Palikot, who broke from the Civic Platform in 2010 after accusing its leadership of veering too far to the right. On top of its anti-clericalism, the party advocated a number of left-wing stances, such as drug liberalisation, legalised abortion, and LGBT rights (Szczerbiak 2013, 389). The party performed surprisingly well with 10% in the 2011 election, but after significant internal divisions waned into insignificance by the 2015 polls, by which time it was a member of a left coalition that could not be considered populist.

Palikot’s populism targeted the power of the Church in Polish politics: “The Church is not so holy. It is a greedy political party that tries at any cost to keep a firm hand on its own interests” (cited in Zuba 2017, 92). Within this construction, he accused the political class of dependence on the Church (Zuba 2017, 100; see also Fomina and Kucharczyk 2016), and maintained a generally anti-establishment character (Szczerbiak 2013, 489; Van Kessel 2015a, 130) – even to the point of saying that he and his nemesis Jarosław Kaczyński were alike in their “being against the system” (Wróbel 2011, 450). In the party’s own anti-political class words: ‘[w]e are not the next configuration of the same old elite . . . AWS, PiS, PO, ZChN, PC, KPN, ROP, and now PJN – different names, but the same people’ (cited in Stanley and Cześnik 2016, 706) (OTH_POLCLASS = 3).

Palikot ran a very business-friendly campaign promising liberal small government (Szczerbiak 2013, 489) (OTH_ECONOMIC = 1), and while the party is usually considered left-wing (Zuba 2017; Szczerbiak 2013; Sokołowski 2012), this has less to do with economic policy than social policy – which by all accounts was a more important pillar of the party’s image (Stanley and Cześnik 2016, 707) (LRPOSITION = L). There is no evidence for anything on the OTH_ETHNIC, OTH_IMMIGRANT, or OTH_FOREIGN variables, which are all coded 1. As its name suggests it was totally dominated by its leader (Zuba 2017, 92; Kosowska-Gąstoł and Sobolewska-Myślik 2019, 14) (CHARISMA = 3), and there is no evidence that it violated LIBDEMNORMS (= 1). Despite being a well-known deputy in the PO government until 2010, Palikot wasn’t really powerful or established enough to be an INSIDER (= 1) (Kosowska-Gąstoł and Sobolewska-Myślik 2019, 15).

Kukiz ’15

The Association for a New Constitution Kukiz’15 (Stowarzyszenienarzecz Nowej Konstytucji Kukiz’15, usually referred to as just “Kukiz ’15”), was the creation of rock singer Paweł Kukiz, who gradually became active in politics in the 2000s-2010s. Originally affiliated with the Civic Platform, his main concern grew into constitutional reform of the electoral system, advocating the adoption of single member districts. Kukiz stood in the 2015 presidential election, where he added a holistic criticism of the political class to his calls for electoral reform, picking up a surprising 20.8% to place third. Months later, he built on this momentum by creating an “association” to contest the parliamentary elections on broadly the same campaign themes. Despite winning 42 seats, the group collapsed early in the term due to internal disagreements. Both campaigns relied heavily on online platforms (Facebook and Twitter in particular) and were targeted at young voters (Kasprowicz and Hess 2017, 212; Olczyk and Wasilewski 2016; Stanley and Cześnik 2019, 83).

Kukiz’15 is frequently regarded as “anti-establishment” (Fomina and Kucharczyk 2016, 60; Zuba 2017, 100; Stanley and Cześnik 2019, 75; Olczyk and Wasilewski 2016, 58; Lipiński and Stępińska 2019, 72), and “anti-system” (Kosowska-Gąstoł and Sobolewska-Myślik 2019, 22; Stanley and Cześnik 2019, 81; Szczerbiak 2018) for its total rejection of the political class, which it regarded as corrupt and oligarchic (Kosowska-Gąstoł and Sobolewska-Myślik 2019, 16; 2017, 146; Kasprowicz and Hess 2017, 206; Olczyk and Wasilewski 2016, 59; Stępińska et al. 2016, 315). It propagated a narrative of the “partiocracy” – an established network of professional politicians whose parties (including both CO and PiS) only pretend to differ in any meaningful way (Stanley and Cześnik 2019, 76) (OTH_POLCLASS = 3). For this reason it was very careful not to define and register itself as a party, but as an “electoral committee of voters” (Kosowska-Gąstoł and Sobolewska-Myślik 2019, 15). In line with its “ordinary person” appeal, candidates for the parliamentary elections were selected by a simple online questionnaire (Kosowska-Gąstoł and Sobolewska-Myślik 2017, 147) – one reason why it was so difficult to keep together after the vote.

While the party’s programme was (intentionally) vague (Stanley and Cześnik 2019, 76), there were several core elements to its ideological outlook. Many of the party’s candidates and supporters were drawn from existing radical right parties (Kosowska-Gąstoł and Sobolewska-Myślik 2019, 22), giving it a nationalist and nativist politics (Stanley and Cześnik 2019, 76), often in accord with Kukiz’s own statements. According to Fomina & Kucharczyk it “spouted anti-European, nationalist, and xenophobic slogans but had no substantive program beyond reforming the electoral system” (Fomina and Kucharczyk 2016, 60). Furthermore, Kukiz himself made several barely-cryptic anti-Semitic statements about Poland’s role in the Holocaust and the role of Jews in the former communist regime (Pankowski 2018, 25). While there is a case to be made that this did not quite reach the level of a 3 on OTH_ETHNIC (mainly due to the vagueness of the party’s positions), we have coded it 3 for now. Opposition to Syrian refugees was an important pillar of the party’s rhetoric in 2015 (Stanley and Cześnik 2019, 76; Lipiński and Stępińska 2019, 72), and Wciseł claims that the migration crisis was the “driving force” behind the 2015 campaign (Wciseł 2016, 28), even though he vacillated between harder and softer approaches (OTH_IMMIGRANT = 3). The party was “anti-European” (Fomina and Kucharczyk 2016, 60), and claimed that Poland had become a “neo-colony of foreign governments and international corporations” (cited in Stanley and Cześnik 2019, 76). It also considered tolerance of refugees to equate to political allegiance to Germany (Wciseł 2016, 28) (OTH_FOREIGN = 3). There was an element of hostility towards foreign capital in the party’s discourse (Kasprowicz and Hess 2017, 210; Stanley and Cześnik 2019, 76), but these policies were not as important as the party’s nativism in its political discourse (Stanley and Cześnik 2019) (OTH_ECONOMIC = 2).

The party’s economic ideology was very vague (Olczyk and Wasilewski 2016, 57) and its formal policies were a somewhat contradictory blend of conventional left and right. This coupled with the fact that Kukiz’s music had both left and right-wing themes (Olczyk and Wasilewski 2016, 58), and with the fact that its extremely open form of candidate selection produced an eclectic mix of leaders, makes it difficult to place the party on LRPOSITION (Kosowska-Gąstoł and Sobolewska-Myślik 2017, 147). Stanley & Cześnik (Stanley and Cześnik 2019, 85) claim that the party is actually centrist – that even though it had links and affinities with the radical right, its programme is actually vague and its appeal is built mainly on anti-political class populism. However most scholars seem to agree that the party should generally be considered “conservative”/“economic nationalis[t]” (Kosowska-Gąstoł and Sobolewska-Myślik 2019, 13) and “right-wing” (Lipiński and Stępińska 2019; Szczerbiak 2018; Wciseł 2016, 28), and hence we have coded it R on LRPOSITION.

The party is clearly based around the persona of Kukiz himself (Olczyk and Wasilewski 2016; Kosowska-Gąstoł and Sobolewska-Myślik 2017, 146; Szczerbiak 2016) (CHARISMA = 3), and was a genuinely new political force (Kosowska-Gąstoł and Sobolewska-Myślik 2019, 16) (INSIDER = 1). The party was extremely hostile to media criticism, and accused the (national and global) press of being complicit in maintaining the establishment (Kasprowicz and Hess 2017, 210). It is debatable whether this should land the party on LIBDEMNORMS – we have coded it 2 for now.

Not included

There is an argument to be made that several political parties and actors from the early post-communist years should be classified as populist. The Polish Peasant Party (PSL) had a populist history that predated the communist regime, and some consider this to have lived on in the 1990s (Jasiewicz 2008, 9). However most scholars tend to agree that it was not genuinely populist by the time that most of its supporters were swallowed up by (the unambiguously populist) Self Defence in the 1990s (Pankowski 2010; Markowski and Tucker 2010, 528). There is also a case to be made that Lech Wełeşa himself should be considered a populist for his common man appeal and hostility to the communist political class. We however do not see that this continued into the 1990s to the extent that he should be included in the dataset.

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