Philippines

Date range: 1986-2020.
The Philippines resumed open democratic elections after the fall of the Marcos regime in 1986. Populism since that time has been most visible in the styles of several presidential candidates. Parties, however, are more challenging. Most studies suggest that parties in the Philippines are weak and decentralised, relying on patronage, local brokers, and machine politics to gain votes rather than centrally defined ideologies or messages (see Webb 2023; Kusaka 2017a, 53). It is a frequent practice for legislators to switch to the party of a victorious presidential candidate after they win, or for local leaders to back presidential candidates from other parties, both of which happened with Rodrigo Duterte’s election in 2016 (Cook and Salazar 2016, 11; Thompson 2016a, 52). Hence, while we’ve coded many presidential candidates here, but we’ve only coded parties in legislative (House of Representatives) elections when populist presidential candidates or incumbents are leading them. There may be a case for using only presidential results in the Philippines.

Case notes

Miriam Defensor Santiago

Miram Defensor Santiago was a former law professor, judge, and cabinet secretary, when she ran for president in the Philippines’ second post-Marcos elections in 1992. Santiago had built a reputation and a following as a “graft-busting” firebrand within the outgoing Aquino administration (Putzel 1995, 27). Without a major party behind her, she formed the People’s Reform Party (PRP) and relied mainly on the support of urban students and supportive media organisations. She placed second in that election with almost 20% of the vote, after which she won a senate seat in 2005 and ran for president again in 1998 and 2016, polling below 5% on both occasions. Her PRP has never won over 5% of the vote in a legislative election.

Santiago ran a “single issue” campaign against corruption in 1992 (Thompson 2010a, 124; see also Fontaine 1992, 178). This campaign targeted all members of the trapos (a reference to traditional politicians which literally means “old rag” in Tagalog) (Putzel 1995, 27, 38), rather than just specific corrupt actors (see Törnquist 1993, 487). She claimed, for example, that all three of her main presidential rivals were part of the “evils of graft, corruption and incompetence” (Shenon 1992). According to Fontaine she conducted her campaign with “evangelical fervor… freely employing King Jamesian biblical language to describe her crusade against corruption and corrupt politicians and officials” (Fontaine 1992, 178). Numerous other sources have also noted the “acerbic” or “ruthless” tone of her discourse (Thompson 2010a, 124; Pinches 1993, 94), and that she used insults against other politicians to build support among people tired of the political system (see Landé 1996, 16). While we could not find many specific quotes from Santiago that flesh out the specifics of this anti-politician narrative, this secondary evidence is sufficient to consider her campaign populist by our definition, and to code her 3 for OTH_POLCLASS.

We’ve not seen any evidence that ethnic groups, immigrants, foreign actors, or economic powerbrokers were relevant to Santiago’s campaign (OTH_ETHNIC, OTH_IMMIGRANTS, OTH_FOREIGN and OTH_ECONOMIC = 1). On the latter, Törnquist argues that she was friendly towards the business elite (Törnquist 1993, 487). She also had some close ties to the military (Putzel 1995, 31) (OTH_MILITARY = 1), although she would go onto be highly critical of its corruption in later years (Rivera 2005, 130).

Santiago is somewhat hard to position on the ideological spectrum. Landé claims that her programme focused on liberalising trade and building low-cost housing (Landé 1996, 17), and Törnquist describes her as “neo-liberal” due to her stances against regulation (Törnquist 1993, 487). Evidence is thin here, but we’ve coded her CR on LRPOSITION.

As she was a cabinet secretary in the Aquino government, we’ve coded her 2 on INSIDER in 1992. Numerous sources stress that she had no significant party organisation behind her (Thompson 2010a, 125; Putzel 1995, 18), and that this was her major disadvantage. She therefore “relied solely on her popularity among the middle class” to gain votes (Parreñas 1993, 272), and on the media attention that she gained from “colourful attacks upon her detractors” (Landé 1996, 16). The PRP certainly seems to have been little more than her personal vehicle in 1992 (CHARISMA = 3). While her anti-corruption stances (and her background and a judge) would seem to support a stance in favour of liberal democratic institutions, before the election she claimed that “If I lose, it can only mean that I was cheated” (Shenon 1992), and she fought to overturn the vote in the courts on evidence that the literature considers to be very thin (Putzel 1995, 38; Timberman 1992, 116). For this we’ve coded her 2 on LIBDEMNORMS.

Joseph Estrada

Joseph “Erap” Estrada was a former movie star who entered politics as the mayor of San Juan City in the 1960s. Soon after the fall of the Marcos regime he entered the senate – one of the few pro-Marcos candidates to win after the People Power movement. He formed the Force of the Filipino Masses (Pwersa ng Masang Pilipino, PMP) and ran successfully for the Vice Presidency (which is elected independently of the Presidency in the Philippines), where he served between 1992 and 1998 alongside President Fidel Ramos. In 1998 he ran for president, uniting smaller parties with the PMP to form the Struggle of the Nationalist Filipino Masses (Laban ng Makabayang Masang Pilipino, LaMMP) ticket and won in a landslide with almost 40%. LaMMP won 26.7% in the simultaneous legislative elections. Less than halfway through his term he was ousted by a series of protests and elite machinations that followed corruption allegations within his administration. Estrada was barred from standing in the next election in 2004 (where he endorsed fellow film star Fernando Por Jr.) but made a comeback in 2010, where he came in second with 26.8% representing the PMP. The PMP did not pass 5% in any other legislative election after 1998.

Estrada is a very difficult case for the dataset. The literature universally considers him “populist”, but this generally appears to be for reasons different to our core definition. Specifically, his initial candidacy is considered to have merged his movie roles, where he tended to play outlaw characters fighting corrupt powerbrokers on behalf of the poor (Flores 1998; Webb and Curato 2019, 56). Studies of the “populist” characteristics of his political discourse have focused on his cultural identification with the poor (masa) far more than any anti-elite element (see Hedman 2001). For example, his campaign slogan was Erap para sa mahirap (Erap is for the poor) (Montinola 1999, 127), and he stylistically embraced lower class lingo and social habits that contrasted with other established national politicians, all of which built an indelible linkage between himself and poorer voters. The literature also emphasises that Estrada’s campaigns were the first to truly bypass traditional party machines and build a coalition of poor voters from multiple regions (Garrido 2017, 650; Hedman 2010, 109), fitting the more “politico strategic” conception of populism (see: Barr 2018).

We have found very few mentions of Estrada’s campaign rhetoric really targeting the elite as self-servings culprits of the plight of the poor. Kasuka notes that he “criticised elite rule and pledged to implement a new politics for the poor” (Kusaka 2017b, 96), and Thompson states that his campaign narrative was to “help the common tao (people) at the expense of the elite.” (Thompson 2016b, 279). Speaking more generally about the Estrada’s populist wing of Filipino politics, Thompson also says “The populist narrative portrays corruption as maintaining an unjust elite rule that oppresses the poor” (Thompson 2010c, 7). On his return to presidential politics, he seems to have taken a harsher and more explicit line against political elites, specifically those who removed him from power. In one election rally he gave what Arugay and Slater consider a “fiery speech in which he accused the elites of conspiring to unseat him” (Arugay and Slater 2019, 129), and in 2006 Claudio states that “he claimed that the military, the Church, and the business elite had all conspired against him in a grand ‘ouster plot.’ In particular, he pointed out the role of two of the most powerful business families—the Ayalas and the Lopezes—played in his removal.” (Claudio 2014, 549). He went on to note that these business elites opposed him because he opposed their plan to increase water prices in Manilla. There is a case for Estrada to be left off the dataset in 1998, but we’ve decided to include him with OTH_POLCLASS the only variable above 1 (= 2) for that election. By the time he came back in 2010, we’ve elevated his OTH_ECONOMIC to 2 and OTH_POLCLASS to 3 given his more specific accusations of elite conspiracy against him (and by extension, the people), however more specific evidence of his anti-elite claims from both periods would be useful to confirm this. Some literature points to Estrada’s anti-American positions in the late 1980s (Kusaka 2017b, 96), but this is not consistent enough in the writings on his election campaigns to affect the OTH_FOREIGN variable (= 1). Estrada’s initial campaign targeted the gap between the wealthy and the poor (Montinola 1999, 127), but we haven’t seen evidence that it targeted the rich as elite “others” to the ordinary people. The above evidence suggest that this changed by 2010, hence we’ve increased OTH_ECONOMIC from 1 to 2 in 2010. We’ve seen no evidence that Estrada considered the military, ethnic others, or immigrants in his campaigning discourse (OTH_MILITARY, OTH_ETHNIC, OTH_IMMIGRANT all = 1).

Estrada’s campaign did not have a consistent programmatic agenda (Case 1999, 479), and what was included in it has been described as “a synthesis of pro-poor and pro-market polices” (Ferrer 2000, 241). In office he maintained the generally neo-liberal economic policies of his predecessor (Thompson 2010c, 6). We’ve coded him C on LRPOSITION to account for this ambiguity, but there may be a case to code him as CR. Given the absolute centrality of his persona within his and the PMP/LaMMP’s campaigns (Magno 2001, 261; Aquino 1998), and its unparalleled ability to command voter support beyond traditional party machines (Hedman 2010, 109), we’ve coded him 3 on CHARISMA. Estrada noted his admiration of former dictator Marcos (Case 1999, 478), but other than his various acts of corruption it does not seem to us that his campaign departed significantly from the established liberal democratic norms at the time. However in office Landé notes that he put significant pressure on the press not to publish critical content (Landé 2001, 91). We’ve therefore coded LIBDEMNORMS 1 in 1998 and 2 in 2010. Given that he was the sitting vice president at the time of his 1998 election we’ve coded him 2 on INSIDER, and 3 in 2010 after he had served as president.

Fernando Poe Jr.

Fernando Poe Jr. (sometimes called “FPJ”) was an actor and close friend of Joseph Estrada, who also had a history playing outlaw hero characters in films (Webb and Curato 2019, 57). When Estrada was banned from running in the 2004 election, he “anointed” Poe to stand in his place (De Jesus 2011, 212), and most studies write of Poe’s candidacy as if it was a continuation of Estrada’s (Thompson 2010b, 2). Poe stood as the candidate of the Coalition of United Filipinos (Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino, KNP) ticket that included PMP and other bigger parties.

As with Estrada we’ve found relatively little content for Poe’s campaign, but just enough to quality for inclusion in the dataset. In Kusaka’s words, “He sought to turn his unique resume as a high school dropout with no previous political experience into an asset, declaring that ‘unlike the elite, I am unaccustomed to politics and therefore unaccustomed to corruption’”(Kusaka 2017b, 124). Also like Estrada, Poe did not formulate much of a policy vision (Kusaka 2017b, 124), and relied on his personal popularity. We’ve therefore coded Poe the same as Estrada in every variable except INSIDER, given that he held no office prior to his campaign.

Manny Villar

Manny Villar was the former President of the Senate and a strong ally of outgoing president Gloria Arroyo when he stood for the presidency in the 2010 election. One of the country’s richest people, he built a “rags-to-riches” narrative about his childhood that attempted to mobilise the poor masa vote that had supported Estrada and Poe in previous elections (Estrada even accused Villar of stealing his image by copying his orange theme colours (Thompson 2010c, 158)). Villar’s key narrative was that he, and not his opponents, knew a life of poverty and hard work (Garrido 2017, 651), and he developed a repertoire of using TV game shows to shower life-changing sums of money on poor contestants (Thompson 2010b, 17). Despite spending enormously on his campaign, Villar’s plan was frustrated by the fact that Estrada joined the race and seemingly split their target vote, coupled with the fact that journalists uncovered evidence that his rags-to-riches story was embellished with falsehoods about his childhood (De Jesus 2011, 215). He received 15.1%. and did not stand again.

Most of the case literature considers Villar populist because of his claimed affinity with the masses and his targeting of the Estrada voter base, not his anti-elitism per se (see for example Garrido 2017). The fact that he was such a strong ally of Arroyo made him, according to De Jesus, “the most restrained in his campaign rhetoric against” the outgoing government (De Jesus 2011, 214). While this suggests that Villar does not quite meet our minimum definition of populism, we include him in the dataset based primarily on the evidence of Thompson, who claims that there was a current of anti-elitism in Villar’s narrative. Thompson cites reports that Villar accused opponents of being “self-righteous” and “elitist” in imposing their agenda on the people, referencing Villar’s comment that “These elitist groups think they are the only ones who can run this country. They had their chance; it’s time somebody from the masses took the lead.” Given the thinness of this evidence and the fact that Villar was a strong Arroyo ally, we’ve coded him 2 on OTH_POLCLASS, but this could be revisited.

The sources that we have seen do not provide any reason to code above 1 on OTH_ECONOMIC, OTH_FOREIGN, OTH_ETHNIC, OTH_IMMIGRANTS, or OTH_MILITARY. Given his position as an ally of Arroyo while he was President of the Senate, we’ve coded him 2 on INSIDER. Although he campaigned through the well-established Nacionalista party (one of the country’s oldest parties), source suggest he rebuilt that party around himself in the years before his 2010 campaign (Teehankee 2020, 114) (Thompson 2010a, 150), and coupled with his persona-focused narrative we’ve coded him 2 on CHARISMA. We have not seen much evidence of his ideology, but given that the Nacioalista party is generally considered right of centre, we’ve coded him and it as CR on LRPOSITION. We’ve also seen no reason to think that his campaign violated established liberal democratic norms, and Thompson point out that he accepted defeat after the election (Thompson 2010c, 155) (LIBDEMNORMS = 1).

Rodrigo Duterte

Rodrigo Duterte was the long-serving mayor of southern city of Davao when he ran for president in the 2016 election on the PDP-Laban ticket. The core theme of Duterte’s campaign was his willingness to use extraordinary violence to counter the nation’s supposed drugs crisis – a message that drew heavily on his record and “strongman” image in Davao (Teehankee and Thompson 2016). Duterte also stood out in the campaign for his vulgar tone and willingness to insult critics and opponents in ways that others would consider taboo (Webb and Curato 2019, 58–59; Casiple 2016, 181). This personality-centric style has been called “Dutertismo” (David 2016). He also differs from previous populist presidential candidates (notably Estrada, Poe and Villar) in that his support initially came from middle and upper classes rather than the masa (Teehankee 2016, 72; Thompson 2016a, 39). Duterte won in 2010 with 39%, though PDP-Laban polled under 5%. After that election numerous legislators joined the party, and it won 31.2% in the following 2019 elections.

Duterte is universally considered a populist in the literature, but he is somewhat awkward for our dataset due to the fact that the primary “other” or “enemy” of his target “people” were drug dealers rather than politicians per se (Curato and Yonaha 2021, 387; Cook and Salazar 2016, 4), and hence he primarily practiced a form of “penal populism” (Kenny and Holmes 2020; Curato 2017). The political establishment did fit into this grievance narrative however, as he portrayed the political elite as enablers of the crisis due to their corruption (Muhs 2022, 153; Thompson 2016a, 42; David 2016) and “bleeding heart” liberalism (Curato and Yonaha 2021, 387; see also Kusaka 2017a, 64). In Webb and Curato’s words:

The enemy in this narrative is within the nation—the dangerous drug pushers, as well as the greedy and tone-deaf elites of Imperial Manila, including the corrupt justice system and those who turn a blind eye to the drug scourge (Webb and Curato 2019, 59).

Early in his presidency he would act on this by releasing a list of politicians, judges, and police generals who were allegedly complicit in the drug trade (Curato 2017, 151). Beyond the drug crisis, numerous scholars have portrayed Duterte’s narrative as being fundamentally anti-establishment (Cook and Salazar 2016, 4), anti-elite (Kusaka 2017a, 64; Dulay, Hicken, and Holmes 2022, 534–35; Heydarian 2017, 8; Casiple 2016, 181), and anti-oligarchy (Dulay, Hicken, and Holmes 2022, 531; De Chavez and Pacheco 2020, 271). He claimed to represent the “anger” of the unified Philippine people (Muhs 2022, 155), and was prone to labelling domestic critics as “enemy” when they opposed him (Pernia 2019, 63). One component of this was his somewhat regionalist hostility towards “Imperial Manila” (Thompson 2016a, 56; Curato and Yonaha 2021, 390). In Heydarian’s words:

Duterte presented himself as an antiestablishment statesman, who is capable of overhauling a dysfunctional political system, dominated by a rapacious oligarchy and corrupt patron-client electoral practices (Heydarian 2017, 23).

We have not found any direct quotes from his 2016 campaign, but early into his presidency he stated that “The only way for deliverance of this country is to remove it from the clutches of the few people who hold the power and money” (Dulay, Hicken, and Holmes 2022, 534–35). There may be a case to code Duterte 2 on OTH_POLCLASS, however owing to the above evidence we’ve coded him 3.

Duterte’s OTH_ECONOMIC stance is difficult because although he made statements against the “oligarchy” (Mendoza and Jaminola 2020; Webb and Curato 2019, 63; De Chavez and Pacheco 2020, 271), it seems that this term referred more to moneyed political elites and dynasties than economic others as a category per se. Other sources have noted that his rhetoric and supporter base transcended class division in a way that previous presidents had not done (Kusaka 2017a, 64; Arugay 2017, 286). We’ve coded him 1 on OTH_ECONOMIC, however this could be revisited.

There was a strong “anti-colonial nationalism” in Duterte’s 2016 discourse (Thompson 2016a, 53), especially targeting the United States (Teehankee 2016, 85; Heydarian 2017, 8) and any other powers seen to meddle in the nation’s internal affairs (Webb and Curato 2019, 61). At one point in his 2016 campaign he told western diplomats to “shut their mouth” over criticisms of his controversial comments (Heydarian 2017, 45). We have not seen evidence that this escalated to the point of considering domestic rivals as controlled by foreign interests, and we’ve therefore coded Duterte 2 for OTH_FOREIGN.

Dulay et al consider ethnicity to be central to Duterte’s campaign and appeal as the first major candidate from Mindanao, citing statements from the candidate such as “The thing that ruins [the Philippines] is that, for the longest time, the government has been held by the Tagalogs. It’s true! The way they look at their life, their dimensions, is Tagalog. It’s always Manila” (Dulay, Hicken, and Holmes 2022, 533–34). There may also be a regionalist or ethnocentric component to the “Imperial Manila” narrative in its appeal to the collective peoples of the peripheries (Kusaka 2017a, 64). However, we find that the evidence for this doesn’t quite extend to coding above 1 on OTH_ETHNIC, given that the preponderance of the literature notes that is campaign was fundamentally pan-ethnic (Heydarian 2017, 36) and inclusive (Webb and Curato 2019, 61). Even Dulay et al consider Duterte’s approach to other ethnicities was not “exclusionary” (Dulay, Hicken, and Holmes 2022, 534). Duterte even drew on his own mixture of Chinese and Muslim heritage to link his story to one of “national unity” (Kusaka 2017a, 63). We’ve therefore coded OTH_ETHNIC at 1, though more evidence of more statements against ethnic others may justify increasing this. We’ve also seen no evidence to code above 1 for OTH_IMMIGRANTS, or for OTH_MILITARY.

Duterte’s campaign is difficult to place on a left-right spectrum. He identified as a socialist (Curato 2017, 151) and maintained close ties with the communist movement (Heydarian 2017, 8), although this may have more to do with the Philippine left’s history of opposition to American influence than economic ideology (Thompson 2016a, 53). His actual economic policy has generally been characterised as liberal (Capuno 2020, 262) or neoliberal (Teehankee 2016, 85), and along with his clear nationalism this has left most scholars to place him on the right (see Thompson 2016a, 51). We agree and have coded him R on LRPOSITION. Despite being a member of a political dynasty in Mindanao (Heydarian 2017, 33), he never served in any position in national government (INSIDER = 1).

The literature very clearly emphasises the importance of Duterte’s personality and charisma in his campaign and appeal (Kenny and Holmes 2020; Heydarian 2017, 9; Muhs 2022, 155; Pernia 2019, 62; Thompson 2016a, 57). Curato and Yonaha claim that his persona was highly paternalistic in this regard, as he “emphasize[d] his role as all-knowing father who demands the loyalty and obedience of his constituents” (Curato and Yonaha 2021, 387). Though his PDP-Lakas party has a history before his leadership, it was a “defunct” when he took over (Arugay 2017; see also Thompson 2016a, 52), and in 2016 and 2019 it seems to have depended totally on Duterte’s leadership (CHARISMA = 3).

Illiberalism and violence is the most prominent characteristics of Duterte’s populism as depicted in the case literature (Thompson 2016a, 40). From the beginning of his campaign, Duterte’s history of violent policing in Davao made him a controversial “strongman” figure (Pernia 2019, 56). The candidate even called himself a “death squad” (Curato 2017, 150), and made threats to execute 100,000 criminals an leave their bodies in Manila Bay (Mccoy 2017, 516; Kenny 2018, 121). He explicitly claimed that his policies would constitute a trade-off of liberal values and due process in this regard (Webb 2017, 86). Though Philippine liberal democratic institutions may have been weak before his arrival, this rhetoric and legacy constitutes clear violations of LIBDEMNORMS (=3). This has continued after he became president (Pernia 2019, 61), although we have coded only his 2016 campaign.

Jejomar Binay

Jejomar “Jojo” Binay served as Vice President between 2010 and 2016, and entered the 2016 election as an early front runner with the United Nationalist Alliance UNA. Previously he had served as mayor of Makati. His campaign was beset by corruption allegations and he ended up coming in a distant fourth with 12.9%.

Binay is often referred to as a populist due to his “pro-poor” narrative and style being akin to Estrada or Poe in earlier elections (Thompson 2016a, 47; Webb and Curato 2019, 57; Arugay 2017, 281). However his inclusion in the dataset rests solely on the nature of his response to corruption allegations against him. In the words of Curato: “He sounded populist in dismissing all attacks against him as proof of the elitist government’s anti-poor agenda. ‘They don’t want us poor to come together,’ he said in his advertisement” (Curato 2017, 144). He also “blamed ‘the rich’ for attacking a born-and-bred representative of the Filipino poor” in his response (Sidel 2015, 225)” (OTH_ECONOMIC = 3). More data would be useful here, but we find that this is just enough to meet the minimum definition of populism, and to code Binay 3 on OTH_POLCLASS.

We’ve not found no evidence in the literature for coding above 1 on OTH_ETHNIC, OTH_IMMIGRANT, OTH_MILITARY or OTH_FOREIGN (all = 1). Likewise, we see no evidence that he violated LIBDEMNORMS (= 1). Given his position as Vice President we’ve coded him 2 on INSIDER. The UNA party seems to have been created around his 2016 candidacy (Teehankee 2022, 17) (CHARISMA = 3). We have coded him L on LRPOSITION (Thompson 2020) but this could be corroborated with more evidence.

Not included

Grace Poe, adopted daughter of former presidential candidate and movie star Fernando Poe Jr., ran for president in 2016, where her campaign has been characterised as populist by some (Webb and Curato 2019, 58; Teehankee and Thompson 2016, 128). However this seems to relate more to her stated pro-poor agenda than here allegations against the elite, and hence we have not considered her to have met our minimum definition. Corazon Aquino (who served as the first post-Marcos president 1986-92) has also been considered populist by some (Webb and Curato 2019, 56), but this appears to relate more to her stance against the former authoritarian regime than to her contemporary rivals.

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