Pakistan

Case notes

Muhajir Qaumi Movement/ Muttahida Qaumi Movement

The Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM), which in 1997 changed its name to the Muttahida Quami Movement, represents the “Muhajirs” (“migrants” or “refugees”) in Pakistan – Urdu-speaking Muslim immigrants who moved to Pakistan (primarily to the Sindh province and Karachi in particular) from various parts of India after partition. With roots in the Muhajir student organisation from the 1970s, the party emerged as a political force out of the 1985-86 ethnic riots in Karachi under the charismatic leadership of Altaf Hussain, appealing primarily to second generation Muhajirs, more open to ethno-nationalism than their parents (Malik 1995, 51). Initially supported and armed by military ruler Zia ul-Huq in the 1980s as a spoiler to the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) in Sindhi (M. A. Shah 1998, 508), the MQM subsequently formed alliances with both major parties over its three decades. After it embraced violence against state and military officials in the early 1990s, “Operation Clean-up” targeted its leadership forcing Hussain into exile in London from which he has never returned. The party has had several offshoots against Hussain’s leadership, including the unsuccessful MQM-Haqiqi faction and more recently the so-called MQM-Pakistan, however the only MQM parties to poll over 5% in national elections are those that Hussain has led. After a heavily-criticised speech in 2016 in which he called Pakistan a “cancer for the whole world”, Hussain effectively lost control of the party and its fortunes plummeted in the subsequent 2018 elections.

The MQM claims that Muhajir’s have been the victims of systematic oppression and disloyalty by successive Pakistani governments since independence. In Hussain’s words: “What has been done in twenty years by the government? […] The faces change, but the policies remain the same” (Baloch 2012, 6). And in another speech: “We are left with half-achieved independence. Muslims got the country, but we are still slaves. Before it was the foreigners, the colonialists and today we are slaves to our own people” (Baloch 2012, 7). The MQM claimed that it had diverged from traditional “drawing room politics” of the other major parties by truly representing the excluded poor (Waseem 1996, 625). It also claims that a feudal “privileged class” runs Pakistan, and that the party sought to “end the rule of the 2%, and create the rule of the 98% (Richards 1994, 307–8; see also Schied 2001, 34). The policy background was the establishment of the quota system that sought to make appointments to the civil service (in which Muhajir’s had been highly overrepresented) more equally distributed. While Muhajirs were overrepresented in the state bureaucracy in the early decades after independence, various quota systems have made it more difficult for them to get jobs in the federal and provincial bureaucracy (Haq 1995, 992). The MQM has repeatedly claimed that this system was a deliberate strategy to marginalise Muhajirs, especially young and relatively poor. It also claimed that the decision not move the capital from Karachi to Islamabad in 1958 was a done deliberately to marginalise Muhajirs (Haq 1995, 991). For this reason we have coded OTH_POLCLASS at 3 for each election.

MQM discourse emphasised (and arguably created) the concept of Muhajir as an ethnic identity, and positioned itself as the exclusive defender of that community’s interests (Naqvi 2020; Shahzad 2013; M. A. Shah 1998, 510). At its peak this included demands for a separate province to be carved out of Sindh as a formal homeland necessary “for their [Muhajir’s] very survival” (Schied 2001, 36). In championing the Muhajir cause the MQM’s rhetoric frequently asserted that other ethnic groups were essentially antagonistic to Muhajir interests. This targeted Pakistan’s biggest ethnic bloc, Punjabis, (K. M. Shah and Sareen 2019, 7; Schied 2001, 32) and especially the Sindhis and Pashtuns in and around Karachi and Hyderabad, all of whom were frequent “others” to the Muhajir identity as portrayed in MQM discourse. By the late 1990s the party attempted to moderate its ethnocentric image, including changing the meaning of “MQM” to Mutahida Qaumi Movement (United National Movement) (Haq 1995, 1001). By some accounts this was part of a significant strategy to shift from an ethnocentric party limited to Urban Sindh to a broader middle-class movement. However the available evidence suggests that this was not a substantial shift, as the party’s demands, rhetoric and leadership remained essentially unchanged (Schied 2001, 39), and it was ultimately “unable to transition to non-ethnic politics” (K. M. Shah and Sareen 2019, 14) (OTH_ETHNIC = 3).

One of Hussain and the MQM’s key political targets has been the Pakistani military, which it has accused of genocide against Muhajirs (Haq 1995, 1001). Hussain has also associated the higher ranks of the armed forces with the core of the corrupt political system: “we must not forget the Generals. Lest we forget, they remain the real oppressors today” (Baloch 2012, 7). In contrast to the sacrifice of the Muhajir migration, he portrays the military elite of being “wealthy but devoid of moral fibre and patriotism” (Waseem 1996, 628; see also Schied 2001, 36). Hostility to the military became especially strong after the army’s violent Operation Clean-up in 1992 (Ahmar 1996, 1035). According to Baloch, it was only after this that Hussain started to directly criticise the military. For this reason, we’ve coded OTH_MILITARY 1 for the 1988 election and 3 from 1993. Despite claiming to represent the poor, the MQM was “policy neutral” on key economic matters (Waseem 1996, 626), perhaps in part due to the fact that may Muhajirs were well established in the business community (OTH_ECONOMIC = 1). We’ve seen no evidence that OTH_FOREIGN sentiment features in the party’s discourse (= 1).

Ironically, even though the MQM’s mission is to represent migrants from outside of Pakistan, and has consistently advocated for increased immigration of Muslims from other parts of India and Bangladesh (“stranded Pakistanis”) (Shahzad 2013, 133), it has often engaged in nativist anti-immigrant politics targeting immigrants from other places (Waseem 1996, 626). This has focussed especially Pashtuns from Afghanistan and non-Muhajir Pakistanis into urban Karachi and Hyderabad (Schied 2001, 40). It’s early charters demanded that only citizens (or “real Sindhis”) be able to vote, own businesses, and buy property (Shahzad 2013, 133), and that Afghan refugees be deported back to Afghanistan (Haq 1995, 998). Later on, it claimed that the influx of Pashtuns into Karachi signified the Taliban’s “taking over” the city (K. M. Shah and Sareen 2019, 14) (OTH_IMMIGRANTS = 3). The MQM is very difficult to pin down on a left-right ideological spectrum. It is at once “ideologically agnostic” (Waseem 1996, 626), a self-proclaimed champion of the poor, yet a “fascist leaning” (Newberg 1994) party of violent ethno-nationalism. Given that the latter of these best describes the party’s core discourse and activities, we’ve coded it FR on LRPOSITION, but this could be further scrutinised.

Altaf Hussain gained complete control over the organisation from 1987, and became known as quaid (“the leader”) and Pir Sahib (“spiritual guide”) (Haq 1995, 997). The MQM created a “cult of personality” around him, promoting an explicit doctrine of “blind faith” in its leader (Waseem 1996, 625; Naqvi 2020, 81; see also Malik 1995; Schied 2001, 43; Gayer 2003, 21; Baloch 2012). Most scholars consider the MQM agenda to have been solely set by him (Ahmar 1996, 1043; N. Khan 2010, 108), and even after fleeing to London he still addressed party meetings by phone (Haq 1995, 1002). This is sufficient to code the party 3 on CHARISMA.

Since its emergence from the riots of the 1980s, the MQM has been a fundamentally violent movement (Ahmar 1996, 1037; Shahzad 2013; N. Khan 2010; Abid 2017; M. A. Shah 1998, 511). MQM rallies have explicitly advocated violence, and even been used to distribute weapons (N. Khan 2010, 68). It has also violently harassed and intimidated critical journalists, (Haq 1995, 1002–3; Waseem 1996, 627; Ahmar 1996, 1034; Malik 1995, 66; Shahzad 2013, 145), extorted Karachi businesses into donating to the movement (Haq 1995, 1002–3), and violently clamped down on internal dissent against Hussain’s leadership and non-MQM Muhajirs who were seen as a threat for not supporting the party (K. M. Shah and Sareen 2019, 9). Party workers have abducted and tortured military officers (Waseem 1996, 627). While these activities probably peaked during the violent periods of the late 1980s and 1990s, the party’s use of violence continued through the 2000s (Siddiqui 2022, 2), although Khan claims that it has went somewhat “underground” (N. Khan 2010, 75). For these reasons we have consistently coded the party 3 on LIBDEMNORMS. Given that the party was a part of a power sharing agreement with the PPP after its first election in 1988, we have coded it 1 on INSIDER for that election, and 2 for subsequent elections.

Note that in 1988, MQM candidates officially participated as independents, and in 1990-97 they were officially called the “Haq Parast Group” (HPG) (Dawn 2018). Despite this, the secondary literature universally refers to both election groups as MQM, and there should be no doubt that this is the same party.

Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf

Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) was formed in 1996, by cricketer Imran Khan. As one of the country’s most identifiable sports personalities during the 1980s and 1990s, Khan entered the political realm via his philanthropic endeavors. While the party did not gain any momentum in its first decade, during the military regime of Perves Musharraf (1999-2008) Khan became a feature on political talk shows, often criticising Musharraf’s pro-US actions during the War on Terror, and maligning the political class for its corruption (Yılmaz and Shakil 2021, 7). After boycotting the 2008 election (in protest of Musharraf’s decision not to stand down), PTI first emerged electorally in 2013, winning 17% of the vote mainly from middle and upper classes mobilised through newly available electronic media avenues. By emerging as the favoured candidate of the military, and benefitting from high profile corruption scandals in 2016-17, Khan and the PTI took almost 32% of the vote in the 2018 election and formed government.

The core political theme of the PTI is Khan’s “aggressive anti-corruption crusade” (Faiz 2022b, 55; see also A. Shah 2019, 129; Javid and Mufti 2022, 77; Mulla 2017, 4185; Javid 2019, 11; Rastogi 2021, 3). He developed an “anti-politics” discourse (Evans 2012, 221) which describes the elite as a “corrupt mafia ruling over Pakistan” (Faiz 2022b, 59; Shakil and Yilmaz 2021, 6), and (in the party’s manifestos) as “inept, corrupt and selfish politicians, feudals, civil and military bureaucrats with vested interests” who have “plundered” the nation (T. M. Khan 2020, 66; see also Sheikh 2018, 110). Repatriating money stolen from the national coffers, Khan suggested, would finance the “new (naya) Pakistan”, prosperous and free of corruption (Shakil and Yilmaz 2021, 8). An essential element of this narrative is that the two major parties (the Pakistani People’s Party/PPP and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz/PML-N) were equally culpable in creating and benefitting from this corrupt order. He has accused PPP and PML-N of engaging in a muq muqa, (“nefarious deal” in Punjabi slang), in which they acted as each other’s faux opposition, taking turns in government and partaking in the same forms of corruption (T. M. Khan 2020, 60; Faiz 2022b, 56). The Panama Papers leaks in 2016, which revealed the offshore holdings of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s family, gave this narrative a significant boost before the 2018 election (Faiz 2022b, 59). Several scholars (T. M. Khan 2020; Javid and Mufti 2022, 78) have noted that that the party shifted away from its mass-party organisational approach between 2013 and 2018 elections in order to build coalitions with other “electables” (politicians whose wealth, connections, and land ownership enabled them to win local contests) and therefore form government. However, there is no indication that this altered the party’s or Khan’s discourse in the latter election. Therefore, we have coded OTH_POLCLASS as 3 for the duration.

The military relationship with PTI is somewhat complicated. In his early years of political engagement Khan was often critical of the military’s actions, especially during the Musharraf regime. This included “severe criticism” of Musharraf’s (military) regime and strong opposition to the military’s cooperation with the US War on Terror, positions which “did not endear him to the military establishment” (T. M. Khan 2020, 64). But in a deeper sense the PTI was always connected to the military establishment (Faiz 2022b, 55), with which he shared a common interpretation of Pakistan’s problems (T. M. Khan 2020, 64). Early manifestos of the PTI were noticeably silent on the subject of the military’s intervention in politics (Sheikh 2018, 110). Shah (A. Shah 2019, 130) claims that “Khan always omits Pakistan’s decidedly unaccountable military from his boasts about holding politicians accountable,” and it is commonplace among scholars to assert that the military establishment had a hand in ensuring that the PTI won the 2018 elections instead of the PPP or PML-N (A. Shah 2019, 129; Faiz 2022b; Javid and Mufti 2022). In government, Khan espoused a narrative of “unprecedented civil-military harmony” (Faiz 2022b, 62). For this reason, we’ve coded the PTI as 1 on OTH_MILITARY.

Opposition to foreign interference in Pakistan has been a strong theme in Khan and the PTI’s discourse, particularly regarding the United States (Evans 2012, 221; A. Shah 2019, 131; Mulla 2017, 4187; Yılmaz and Shakil 2021, 8). The American use of drones in the War on Terror, many instances of which occurred in northwest Pakistan and included high civilian casualties, drew fierce criticism from Khan. According to Shakil and Yilmaz, this reached a proportion in which “‘the West’ and its supporters were deemed the antagonistic and conspiring other” (Shakil and Yilmaz 2021, 7). India has also featured as a foreign power behind the status quo in Khan’s rhetoric (Faiz 2022b, 60; Shakil and Yilmaz 2021, 9). According to Yilmaz and Shakil (Yılmaz and Shakil 2021, 11) he has openly accused his critics of being “agents of ‘India’s fascist government’”, and accused the national elite of making Pakistan a “puppet state” and a “slave” to the west and its financial institutions (particularly the IMF) (Shakil and Yilmaz 2021, 8). There may be some debate about whether this consistently reaches the highest level on the OTH_FOREIGN scale, but on the balance of evidence we’ve coded the party 3. The literature does not present any evidence that PTI or Khan engaged in an ethnocentric politics (OTH_ETHNIC = 1). Likewise, there is no evidence of any discourse against economic elites (OTH_ECONOMIC = 1) or immigrants (OTH_IMMIGRANTS = 1).

Almost all articles on the PTI’s rise emphasis how Khan’s charisma was essential to its meaning in the eyes of voters (see Javid and Mufti 2022, 68; Mulla 2017, 4184; Shakil and Yilmaz 2021, 11). This was especially true for its early elections when the PTI was totally synonymous with Khan (T. M. Khan 2020, 63; Yilmaz and Shakil 2021, 5). The party’s use of social media was one of the factors that allowed Khan’s personality to connect directly with voters in an unmediated way (Javid and Mufti 2022, 81; Mulla 2017; Faiz 2022b, 58). The literature does not suggest that Khan and the PTI consistently espoused any consistent economic ideology with political salience, but was rather an “amalgamation of piecemeal ideologies” (Yılmaz and Shakil 2021, 10; see also Khalid 2020). The reason why Khan and the PTI are usually considered “right wing” (Faiz 2022b, 55; A. Shah 2019, 128) or “centre-right” (Sheikh 2018, 109) has to do more with its embrace of cultural conservatism and nationalism. Khan is has consistently portrayed himself as a religious conservative, and a major part of his public identity before starting PTI in 1996 was a shift away from his former playboy lifestyle and an embrace of a devout form of Islam after the death of his mother (Shakil and Yilmaz 2021, 6; A. Shah 2019, 131; Faiz 2022b, 57). He has often vilified liberal and progressive intellectuals for seeing Pakistan through a “westernised lens” (Yılmaz and Shakil 2021, 9; see also Faiz 2022b, 57; Shakil and Yilmaz 2021, 9). For this reason we’ve coded PTI as R on LRPOSITION.

Khan was notable among major politicians for expressing solidarity with the Taliban, whom he labelled “freedom fighters” (T. M. Khan 2020, 64). The Tehrik Taliban Pakistan even nominated Khan to be their representative in negotiations with the government 2014, which he declined (Faiz 2022b, 57). Evidence suggests that media freedoms were curtailed during the PTI’s time in government (Hussain, Abbas, and Sheikh 2022; Mulla 2017), and Faiz contends that Khan abused anti-corruption authorities to target opposition politicians (Faiz 2022b, 56). After losing the 2013 election, Khan discredited electoral institutions, claiming that a number of state bodies (including the judiciary) had rigged him of victory (Faiz 2022b, 58; A. Shah 2019, 131; Javid and Mufti 2022, 80; Cheema, Chacko, and Gul 2019, 32). These are all violations of liberal democratic standards, but given the context of Pakistani politics we find that this doesn’t quite reach the threshold of 3 on LIBDEMNORMS (= 2). As Khan had not served in government prior to 2018 PTI is coded 1 on INSIDER.

Not included

The Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) is often considered a populist party in its early years under the leadership of Zulifkar Ali Bhutto (Jones 2020; Shafqat 2020, 25; Ayoob 1985, 157; Nasr 1996, 259). This includes its first period in government in the mid-1970s. Bhutto, a charismatic student leader and cabinet minister in the 1960s, led a mass movement to overthrow the military rule of Gen Ayub Khan in 1969, going on to institute a relatively reformist period in power before being overthrown by the military in 1977 and executed in 1979. The PPP has formed government several times since 1980, including two prime ministerial stints under Bhutto’s daughter and successor Benazir Bhutto (1988-90, 1993-96), and another between 2008 and 2013 under Yousaf Gillani and Raja Ashraf. Benazir’s husband Asif Ali Zadari also served as president between 2008 and 2013, following the former’s assassination in 2007. There is a strong case that the rhetoric of the elder Bhutto’s campaigns in the 1970s constitute populist discourse by our definitions. However the available evidence suggests that following this period the PPP became a more mundane and patronage-based party (Jones 2020; Faiz 2022a). Benazir Bhutto’s 1980s and 1990s campaigns saw her “court” military leadership rather than antagonising it (Newberg 1994, 168), and the extent of populist sentiment appears to be the evocation of the legacy of her father (Syed 1991), and reformist policy proscriptions were significantly softened (Rais 1989, 205). More recently the PPP has acted as a mainstream party, even when in opposition. In Faiz’s interpretation, it “largely operates as a conventional opposition party whose resistance to government does not include an anti-system narrative” (Faiz 2022a, 1).

References

Abid, Muhammad. 2017. “Muttahida Qaumi Movement: Mode of Politics and Political Attitudes.” Pakistan Perspectives 22 (2).

Ahmar, Moonis. 1996. “Ethnicity and State Power in Pakistan: The Karachi Crisis.” Asian Survey 36 (10): 1031–48.

Ayoob, Mohammed. 1985. “Dateline Pakistan: A Passage to Anarchy?” Foreign Policy, no. 59: 154–73.

Baloch, Bilal. 2012. “The Role of Leadership and Rhetoric in Identity Politics: Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), a Case Study.” Al Nakhlah, 1–13.

Cheema, Azeema, Johann Chacko, and Shirin Gul. 2019. “Mobilising Mass Anxieties: Fake News and the Amplification of Socio-Political Conflict in Pakistan.” Fake News 17.

Dawn. 2018. “Muttahida Qaumi Movement - Pakistan,” July 18, 2018. https://www.dawn.com/news/1404613.

Evans, Alexander. 2012. “Continuity and Change in Pakistani Politics1.” Contemporary South Asia 20 (2): 213–24.

Faiz, Asma. 2022a. “The Peculiar Case of the Pakistan Peoples Party as an Opposition Party.”

———. 2022b. “We Are on the Same Page: The Curious Case of Imran Khan’s Populism in Pakistan.” In Contemporary Populists in Power, edited by Alain Dieckhoff, Christophe Jaffrelot, and Elise Massicard, 55–74. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.

Gayer, Laurent. 2003. “A Divided City:‘Ethnic’and ’Religious’ Conflicts in Karachi.” Pakistan (Www. Ceri-Sciences-Po. Org.

Haq, Farhat. 1995. “Rise of the MQM in Pakistan: Politics of Ethnic Mobilization.” Asian Survey 35 (11): 990–1004.

Hussain, Shabir, Qamar Abbas, and Mohammad Anas Sheikh. 2022. “Media Freedom in a Populist Regime: Evidence From Pakistan.” International Journal of Communication 16: 20.

Javid, Hassan. 2019. “Patronage, Populism, and Protest: Student Politics in Pakistani Punjab.” South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, no. 22.

Javid, Hassan, and Mariam Mufti. 2022. “Electoral Manipulation or Astute Electoral Strategy? Explaining the Results of Pakistan’s 2018 Election.” Asian Affairs: An American Review 49 (2): 65–87.

Jones, Philip E. 2020. “Pakistan People’s Party: From Populism to Patronage.” In Pakistan’s Political Parties: Surviving Between Dictatorship and Democracy, edited by Mariam Mufti, Sahar Shafqat, and Niloufer Siddiqui, 41–59. Washington, UNITED STATES: Georgetown University Press. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/rmit/detail.action?docID=6177091.

Khalid, Muhammad Umair. 2020. “Valence Populism in Pakistan: Making Sense of Imran Khan’s Ideological Cluelessness.” Central European University.

Khan, Nichola. 2010. Mohajir Militancy in Pakistan: Violence and Transformation in the Karachi Conflict. Routledge.

Khan, Tabinda M. 2020. “Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf: From a Movement to a Catch-All Party.” In Pakistan’s Political Parties: Surviving Between Dictatorship and Democracy, edited by Mariam Mufti, Sahar Shafqat, and Niloufer Siddiqui. Washington, UNITED STATES: Georgetown University Press. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/rmit/detail.action?docID=6177091.

Malik, Iftikhar H. 1995. “Ethno-Nationalism in Pakistan: A Commentary on Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz (MQM) in Sindh.” South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies 18 (2): 49–72.

Mulla, Ayesha. 2017. “Mediatized Populisms| Broadcasting the Dharna: Mediating" Contained" Populism in Contemporary Pakistan.” International Journal of Communication 11: 16.

Naqvi, Tahir. 2020. “What Remains of the Muttahida Qaumi Movement.” Pakistan’s Political Parties: Surviving between Dictatorship and Democracy, 76.

Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza. 1996. “Pakistan: State, Agrarian Reform and Islamization.” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, 249–72.

Newberg, Paula. 1994. “Dateline Pakistan: Bhutto’s Back.” Foreign Policy, no. 95: 161–74.

Rais, Rasul B. 1989. “Pakistan in 1988: From Command to Conciliation Politics.” Asian Survey 29 (2): 199–206.

Rastogi, Prashant. 2021. “The Articulation of Discourse in Populism: Understanding 21st Century Pakistan.” E-International Relations. Available Online: Https://Www. e-Ir. Info/2021/01/05/the-Articulation-of-Discourse-in-Populism-Understanding-the-Case-Ofpakistan-in-the-21st-Century/(Accessed on 5 January 2021).

Richards, Julian James. 1994. “Mohajir Subnationalism and the Mohajir Qaumi Movement in Sindh Province, Pakistan.” PhD Thesis, University of Cambridge.

Schied, Michael. 2001. “The Muttahida Qaumi Movement and the Pakistani State.” Internationales Asienforum 32 (1–2): 27–45.

Shafqat, Saeed. 2020. “The Formation, Development, and Decay of the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz.” In Pakistan’s Political Parties: Surviving Between Dictatorship and Democracy, edited by Mariam Mufti, Sahar Shafqat, and Niloufer Siddiqui. Washington, UNITED STATES: Georgetown University Press. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/rmit/detail.action?docID=6177091.

Shah, Aqil. 2019. “Pakistan: Voting under Military Tutelage.” Journal of Democracy 30 (1): 128–42.

Shah, Kriti M., and Sushant Sareen. 2019. “The Mohajir: Identity and Politics in Multiethnic Pakistan.” Observer Foundation Research. http://www. orfon line. org/wp-conte nt/uploa ….

Shah, Mehtab Ali. 1998. “The Emergence of the Muhajir Quami Movement (MQM) in Pakistan and Its Implications for Regional Security.” The Round Table 87 (348): 505–19.

Shahzad, Aisha. 2013. “Ethnic Politics of MQM from 1980s till Election 2002.” Pakistan Perspectives 18 (1): 127–63.

Shakil, Kainat, and Ihsan Yilmaz. 2021. “Religion and Populism in the Global South: Islamist Civilisationism of Pakistan’s Imran Khan.” Religions 12 (9): 777.

Sheikh, Shiraz. 2018. “The Promise of ’Naya Pakistan’and the Rise of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf.” Indian Journal of Politics and International Relations (Kottayam) Vol 11: 108–47.

Siddiqui, Niloufer. 2022. “Political Parties and Violence in Karachi, Pakistan.” Comparative Political Studies, 00104140221115174.

Syed, Anwar H. 1991. “The Pakistan People’s Party and the Punjab: National Assembly Elections, 1988 and 1990.” Asian Survey 31 (7): 581–97.

Waseem, Mohammad. 1996. “Ethnic Conflict in Pakistan: The Case of MQM.” The Pakistan Development Review, 617–29.

Yilmaz, Ihsan, and Kainat Shakil. 2021. “Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf: Pakistan’s Iconic Populist Movement.” ECPS. Available Online: Https://Www. Populismstudies. Org/Pakistan-Tehreek-e-Insaf-Pakistans-Iconic-Populist-Movement/(Accessed on 7 May 2021).

Yılmaz, Ihsan, and Kainat Shakil. 2021. “Imran Khan: From Cricket Batsman to Populist Captain Tabdeli of Pakistan.”