Ireland

Date range: 1980-2020
Ireland is a tricky case for populism research by European standards. The legacy of nationalist politics has meant that there is little space for a far-right populist movement. O’Malley and FitzGibbon argue that populism has an ‘everywhere and nowhere’ presence in Irish politics (O’Malley and FitzGibbon 2015), in that the general tropes of rural people being forgotten by the establishment is almost ubiquitous in political rhetoric. This is most often said of the long-time dominant party Fianna Fáil (Garner 2007, 109; Suiter 2016, 127), although less so from the 2000s on. Despite this, there is not sufficient reason to treat that party as populist by our standards – further research should confirm this.

Case notes

The Workers’ Party

In the late 1960s Sinn Fein and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) split into two groups: the “official” group under the incumbent leadership and the “provisional” breakaway faction. The official leadership wanted to remake republicanism into a more Marxist-aligned and anti-militarist grouping, whereas the Provisionals wanted to continue armed struggle (so-called “physical force” republicanism) against the British presence in the North. Over time the Provisionals became known as simply “Sinn Fein” and the officials adopted the “Workers’ Party” (WP) by 1982. The WP gradually improved its performance through the 1980s to peak at 5% in 1989, after which it split into a number of other left-wing movements.

Information on the WP is hard to come by, but evidence suggests that it should be included in this dataset for its general anti-establishment stance and its advocacy of anti-system politics. This included refusing to participate in coalition governments (Abedi 2004, 53) (OTH_POLCLASS = 3). According to Dunphy & Hopkins, (Dunphy and Hopkins 1992, 105), it benefited from a general protest vote against the more established parties in the 1980s, particularly in the poorer areas of Dublin. As a left-wing party, it should be inferred that it maintained a strong OTH_ECONOMIC opposition (3), although it should be noted that I’ve not found explicit articulations of this populism in research to-date. Further research should confirm this.

WP initially maintained the republican tradition’s anti-foreign influence politics, accusing its rivals of being in the service of “Anglo-American imperialism in all its exploitative forms” (Dunphy and Hopkins 1992, 95). However over the years it reduced this pillar of its politics in accordance with its shift toward a more domestic class politics (Dunphy and Hopkins 1992, 97) (OTH_FOREIGN = 2), marking a significant difference from the “Provisional” Sinn Fein. The party also differed from the Provisional Sinn Fein in the force of its anti-sectarian form of republicanism (Dunphy and Hopkins 1992, 94) (OTH_ETHNIC = 1).

While the ideology of the party was strongly far-left since its foundation, during the 1989 election it was led by the far more moderate Proinsias de Rossa, who expressed more centrist views on market-based economics. While there may be an argument that this should bring the party’s LRPOSITION coding towards the centre, we have left it at FL for now given its Marxist ideological legacy since its foundation. Even though the party tried to demilitarise its political movement (the bone of contention between it and the Provisionals), it nonetheless maintained as association with a paramilitary (the official IRA) for years after the split (Dunphy and Hopkins 1992, 94, 96), and should therefore be coded as no lower than 2 on LIBDEMNORMS. We have seen no reason for the party to rise above a 1 on the CHARISMA or INSIDER variables.

Sinn Féin

Sinn Fein has been the face of the radical republican movement since its foundation in 1905, although the party has undergone a number of reformations since then. It is difficult to categorise, and doesn’t fit well into various party ‘families’ in the rest of Europe. Given its association with militant republicanism – specifically it’s historical opposition to the post-treaty government of the republic and in favour of reunification with Northern Ireland – it has generally been the placeholder of radical nationalist politics in Ireland. Yet it identifies as left wing, and campaigns on many progressive platforms, making it stand out from other ‘radical nationalist’ parties in Europe (McDonnell 2008, 212). The party was a political outlier for many decades, before emerging in greater numbers in recent elections, arguably since its more moderately nationalist rival Fianna Fail was associated with the post-2008 economic crisis and the resulting controversial austerity measures (Walsh and O’Malley 2012, 15), and since its acceptance of the 1997 Good Friday peace agreement moderated its image. The party’s fortunes improved dramatically in the 2020 elections, where it surged to 24% under new leader Mary Lou McDonald.

The most important reason for its inclusion here is its strong current of anti-establishment politics dating back to the party’s original militant opposition to the treaty which established the Republic of Ireland in 1922. SF regarded the parties who supported the treaty (including many of its own former members and factions) as sell outs to the nationalist cause. For many decades the party refused to stand in legislative elections for this reason, and recognised the pre-1922 Dáil Éireann (revolutionary parliament) as the legitimate legislature. The party slowly withdrew form this position to stand in national elections, but the legacy of the hostility to the pro-treaty political class lives on in the party. In several other aspects of policy (crime policy and anti-drugs policy for example) it has expressed a general distrust of the state, and campaigns against the established parties in a generally populist manner (Fitzgibbon and Guerra 2010, 280; McDonnell 2008, 212; Walsh and O’Malley 2012, 7; Maillot 2005, 5). In the words of O’Malley and Fitzgibbon, SF “frequently juxtaposes itself with the mainstream parties, Fianna Fáil and Labour, and promotes itself as the only uncorrupted political representatives of the Irish people” (O’Malley and FitzGibbon 2015, 284; see also Coakley 2021). In recent elections it has considered the two main parties as a single entity engaged in a “phoney war” against each other (Park and Suiter 2021, 126). Under the leadership of Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness the party has pursued a more “political” strategy of abandoning formal ties with militants (especially the Irish Republican Army, of which many see SF as the political wing) which has arguably led to a decline in its radical credentials. Nonetheless, the party still seems to deserve a 3 on OTH_POLCLASS by our standards. Under the leadership of McDonald, SF’s 2020 campaign has also been seen as highly “anti-elite” and populist (Park and Suiter 2021, 126; Little 2020, 716).

Sinn Fein’s nationalism is built primarily around an opposition to foreign intervention, especially from the UK, and to a lesser degree from the EU, which it generally opposes (McDonnell 2008, 212; Suiter 2016, 131). The party’s designation of the UK as an enemy of the Irish people dates back to its revolutionary foundations. Its Euroscepticism has fluctuated over the years, but at times culminated in denunciations of the “euro-elite” in Brussels and their bailout policies (O’Malley and FitzGibbon 2015, 288; Fitzgibbon and Guerra 2010, see also), and after the financial crisis it accused the Irish elite of giving in too easily to easily to EU policies (ibid). This too has probably declined from a peak in the Troubles (c.1969-97) after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement (which the party supported). Nonetheless, the history and culture of anti-colonial nationalism in the party earn it 3 on OTH_FOREIGN.

While elements like nationalism strike a chord with the European radical right, several aspects of its politics differ significantly from others in this family. First the party is economically left-wing, advocating a strong welfare state and protectionist policies to restrict the impact of economic globalisation (O’Malley 2008, 969; Field 2020, 622; Müller and Regan 2021, 550) (LRPOSITION = L). The party’s nationalism is also manifest in its anti-globalisation politics. It opposes the Irish government’s reliance on foreign direct investment and instead advocates state support for indigenous businesses (Walsh and O’Malley 2012, 7). In line with its leftist economic ideology and populist rhetoric, the party has frequently juxtaposed the Irish people with the financial elite, especially after the financial crisis. It’s 2014 EU manifesto accused mainstream parties of putting “the needs of the banks ahead of the needs of the people” (O’Malley and FitzGibbon 2015, 290). This strain of its politics is somewhat vague (Doyle 2005, 5), and while worth registering does not quite reach a 3 on OTH_ECONOMIC (= 2).

Second, the party has a strong history of advocating minorities’ rights and is not anti-immigrant in any way (O’Malley 2008; Doyle 2005, 3) (OTH_IMMIGRANT = 1). The party campaigned ‘no’ on the 2004 referendum on repealing citizenship rights for the children of migrants, and has a long association with anti-racist causes and movements (Doyle 2005, 3). There are many reasons for this, but one of which may be the party’s long established advocacy for the rights of Irish migrants in other countries, particularly the UK (O’Malley 2008, 974; O’Malley and FitzGibbon 2015, 283).

The party’s ethnocentrism is also difficult to pin down. Given its firm advocacy for a united Ireland, it would seem to be somewhat majoritarian on the Irish cultural (namely Catholic) identity, to which Ulster Protestants are an important ‘other’. This is in accordance with its general anti-British attitudes. While it has renounced violence since the Good Friday Agreement, the party does have a legacy of supporting sectarian conflict in the Troubles (Walsh and O’Malley 2012, 7) which makes it controversial to this day. Despite that, given its significant focus on social issues and its repeated opposition to sectarianism, and explicit endorsement of ethnic pluralism (McDonnell 2008, 212), SF does not deserve a 3 on OTH_ETHNIC, and hence we have put it at 2 here. There may even be an argument that it deserves a 1 on this scale, which should be the subject of further investigation.

SF is has been somewhat authoritarian, not only due to its history of advocating violent struggle but also due to allegations that Adams’ leadership has relied on violence to quell internal dissent (Walsh and O’Malley 2012, 13) and various other acts of violence committed by the IRA (Fitzgibbon and Guerra 2010, 280). There would have been a time when the party deserved a 3 on the LIBDEMNORMS scale, but post-1998 (Good Friday Agreement) period it would be a stretch to categorise it as a threat to democratic governance (Doyle 2005, 10), hence they receive a 2 on this scale. The party has a long history and a robust organisation, but in recent decades has become strongly associated with the leadership of Gerry Adams (Walsh and O’Malley 2012, 13; Maillot 2005, 98), who seems to have had a very strong personal control over its strategy and identity during the later years of his leadership (see McDonnell 2008, 212 for a discussion of this point). Adams stepped down as leader in 2018 and was replaced by Mary Lou McDonald. We’ve therefore coded SF 2 on CHARISMA until 2018 and 1 in 2020. The party has never been in government (INSIDER = 1) (it has been in a power sharing government in Northern Ireland, but this should not count in this Republic of Ireland election).

Peter Casey

Peter Casey is a businessperson and media personality who ran for president in 2018. Coming from relative obscurity, he finished in second place behind incumbent Michael Higgins with 23%. We’ve not found very much information about Casey, but he appears to be universally regarded as a right-wing populist (Field 2020, 619). The best information about his campaign narrative comes from Duggan, who characterises Casey as a maverick and outspoken negative campaigner against Higgins (Duggan 2019, 307). His campaign against Higgins included numerous allegations of corruption – for example that Higgins used €10,000 of taxpayers money on dog-grooming bills (Duggan 2019, 309). More information would be good to bolster this, but coupled with his “outsider” independence it appears to fit a pattern OTH_POLCLASS campaigning (= 3).

The other issue for which Casey made headlines was his allegation that the Irish traveller community were not a true ethnic minority and were instead “basically people camping in someone else’s land” (Duggan 2019, 310; Murphy 2021, 14). In the context of Irish society this is essentially OTH_ETHNIC rhetoric, and hence we’ve coded Casey as 2 on this variable. Given Casey’s pro-business background it’s safe to assume that he did not campaign on OTH_ECONOMIC discourse, and we’ve not seen any information regarding his rhetoric on OTH_IMMIGRANTS, OTH_FOREIGN or OTH_MILITARY, and hence he is coded 1 for all. We’ve coded him R in LRPOSITION in line with the literature (Field 2020, 619), and 3 on CHARISMA given his lack of party and “headline grabbing” campaigning style (Duggan 2019, 307). We’ve seen no evidence to code him above 1 on LIBDEMNORMS, and he was never part of a government before his campaign (INSIDER = 1).

References

Abedi, Amir. 2004. Anti-Political Establishment Parties: A Comparative Analysis. Routledge.

Coakley, John. 2021. ‘The Election in Context’. In How Ireland Voted 2020: The End of an Era, edited by Michael Gallagher, Michael Marsh, and Theresa Reidy, 321–39. Cham: Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66405-3_14.

Doyle, John. 2005. ‘Republican Policies in Practical Politics: Placing Contemporary Sinn Féin in a European Context’. In University College Dublin, Institute for British-Irish Studies, IBIS Working Papers, No.45. University College Dublin. Institute for British-Irish Studies.

Duggan, Alan. 2019. ‘Irish Presidential Election 2018’. Irish Political Studies 34 (2): 303–14.

Dunphy, Richard, and Stephen Hopkins. 1992. ‘The Organizational and Political Evolution of the Workers’ Party of Ireland’. The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 8 (3): 91–118.

Field, Luke. 2020. ‘Irish General Election 2020: Two-and-a-Half Party System No More?’ Irish Political Studies 35 (4): 615–36.

Fitzgibbon, John, and Simona Guerra. 2010. ‘Not Just Europeanization, Not Necessarily Populism: Potential Factors Underlying the Mobilization of Populism in Ireland and Poland’. Perspectives on European Politics and Society 11 (3): 273–91.

Garner, Steve. 2007. ‘Ireland and Immigration: Explaining the Absence of the Far Right’. Patterns of Prejudice 41 (2): 109–30.

Little, Conor. 2020. ‘Change Gradually, Then All at Once: The General Election of February 2020 in the Republic of Ireland’. West European Politics 44 (3): 714–23.

Maillot, Agnès. 2005. New Sinn Féin: Irish Republicanism in the Twenty-First Century. Psychology Press.

McDonnell, Duncan. 2008. ‘The Republic of Ireland: The Dog That Hasn’t Barked in the Night?’ In Twenty-First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European Democracy, edited by Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell, 198–216. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Müller, Stefan, and Aidan Regan. 2021. ‘Are Irish Voters Moving to the Left?’ Irish Political Studies 36 (4): 535–55.

Murphy, Gary. 2021. ‘The Road to the Election’. In How Ireland Voted 2020: The End of an Era, edited by Michael Gallagher, Michael Marsh, and Theresa Reidy, 1–22. Cham: Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66405-3_1.

O’Malley, Eoin. 2008. ‘Why Is There No Radical Right Party in Ireland?’ West European Politics 31 (5): 960–77.

O’Malley, Eoin, and John FitzGibbon. 2015. ‘Everywhere and Nowhere: Populism and the Puzzling Non-Reaction to Ireland’s Crises’. In European Populism in the Shadow of the Great Recession, edited by Hanspeter Kriesi and Takis S. Pappas, 281–94. Colchester: ECPR Press.

Park, Kirsty, and Jane Suiter. 2021. ‘Media and the Election: Social and Traditional Media Narratives in the Campaign’. In How Ireland Voted 2020: The End of an Era, edited by Michael Gallagher, Michael Marsh, and Theresa Reidy, 113–34. Cham: Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66405-3_6.

Suiter, Jane. 2016. ‘Ireland: The Rise of Populism on the Left and among Independents’. In Populist Political Communication in Europe, edited by Toril Aalberg, Frank Esser, Carsten Reinemann, Jesper Stromback, and Claes De Vreese, 127–37. New York: Routledge.

Walsh, Dawn, and Eoin O’Malley. 2012. ‘The Slow Growth of Sinn Féin: From Minor Player to Centre Stage?’ Dublin City University Working Papers in International Studies, no.2/2012. Dublin City University.