Indonesia

Case notes

Prosperous Justice Party

The Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Kaedilan Sejahtera, PKS) formed out of the Justice Party (PK) which contested the 1999 election without much success. Both entities emerged from networks of students without links to the major parties, linked to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the powerful tarbiyah movement of Islamist education. The PKS was an ostensibly Islamist party, and has been situated among the ‘modernist’ family of Muslim parties in Indonesia, but one that initially eschewed calls for sharia and an Islamic state in favour of universalist policies focusing on clean government (Eliraz 2004, 124). The party had a breakout performance in the 2004 election, tallying 7.3%, doing particularly well in Jakarta (25%). It has since matched and exceeded that performance in subsequent elections.

There is frustratingly little written about the PKS’ precise rhetoric regarding the political class. In broad terms, however, there is wide consensus in the literature that the party accused the political system writ large of corruption and self-interest at the expense of ordinary people (Hasan 2009, 3; Smith 2004, 2; Liddle and Mujani 2005, 121; Aspinall 2005, 154; Nakamura 2005, 29). While all parties in the reformasi period (immediately post-Suharto) used the language of opposing ‘Korupsi, Kolusi, Nepotisme’ or KKN, the PKS was notably more extreme in calling for a more holistic “change of regime” (Aspinall 2005, 134). In Buchori’s words (cited in Collins 2003, 15): “[t]he party reiterates time and again that the present chaos in Indonesia is caused primarily by a lack of morality among the nation’s leaders”. In the 2004 election it released material citing the “24 reasons PKS is the enemy of slippery characters”, listing the multiple times that its leaders in provincial assemblies had refused to partake in corruption along with the major parties (Collins and Fauzi 2007). It built this image in part on the fact that it was both relatively young in in its leadership and cadres, and unconnected to the personalities or parties of the Suharto era – something unique among the major parties in 2004 and a major distinction between it and other Islamist parties like the PPP (Machmudi 2008, 11; Collins 2003). In contrast to the established political parties, PKS presented itself as “clean” (Shihab and Nugroho 2008, 253; Smith 2004, 3) and “caring” (Qodari 2005, 80; Liddle and Mujani 2005, 121), and emphasised its commitment to help “little people” who had been neglected (Machmudi 2008, 15; see also Siregar et al. 2020, 9; Slater 2004, 62–63). In Slater’s words: “PKS represents a challenge to this system insofar as it insists that politics should be about representing the rakyat (the people) rather than carving up the perquisites of state.” (Slater 2004, 62–63). According to Tanuwidjaja (2012, 535), the party’s rhetoric had not changed by 2012, even as it began to be mired in corruption scandals of its own. Under the leadership of Anis Matta from 2013, the party started to take on a more aggressive posture against the “enemies of PKS”, particularly the anti-corruption bodies that had pursued PKS leaders (Machmudi 2020, 174). Owing to the lack of direct examples of party rhetoric, and the fact that it adopted an increasingly accommodating strategy regarding other parties and elites over the years, a case could be made that the party should either be consistently coded 2 on OTH_POLCLASS or start at 3 and come to 2 in later elections. Further research should clarify this – according to the available evidence we’ve coded it 3 for the duration.

PKS is Islamist in the sense of advocating piety to the core values of Islam, and proposing that these values could be used to solve national problems. It has not used religious identity in an exclusionary or defensive way to assert the rights of Muslims over others or posit that Muslims were under any kind of threat by the party’s main rivals (Hasan 2009, 6). In a number of ways, the party emphasised that it was not intolerant of non-modernist Muslims, even to the point of choosing non-Muslim candidates in some local elections (Collins 2004, 119). The party’s Islamic credentials have become even more moderate over later election cycles (Tomsa 2012), and its 2008 agenda explicitly praised the “plurality in Indonesian society” as an “asset” for national progress (Shihab and Nugroho 2008, 242). For this reason we’ve coded the party 1 for OTH_ETHNIC. Likewise, we’ve seen no evidence that it should register above 1 on either OTH_IMIGRANT, OTH_ECONOMIC, or OTH_MILITARY. The party’s consistent opposition to the United States and Israel – albeit on more of a pan-Islamic sense than a domestic grievances one – has been a consistent element of its rhetoric and appeal (Hasan 2009, 17; Machmudi 2008, 14). Given that this has not risen to the point of accusing domestic rivals of being controlled by these foreign states, we’ve coded the party 2 on OTH_FOREIGN.

Beyond its general espousal of “clean” political values and practices, PKS did not, in Hasan’s words, have a “political blueprint for social transformation”, and lacked clear policy stances on many of the salient issues of the day, save several things clearly in its wheelhouse such as opposition to pornography and support for Palestine (Hasan 2009, 11). It has been consistently pro-welfare and anti-poverty (but not in a class-based sense) yet culturally conservative. Party Chairman Hidayat Nur Wahid called the PKS a “centrist Islamic party” (Collins 2003), and though there may be a case for coding it C on LIBDEMNORMS, the salience of cultural conservatism in its policy leads us to code it CR.

The party has neither opposed democracy nor supported violence (Nakamura 2005, 29; Kershaw 2004, 363). Though they are classified as an Islamist party, they have consistently eschewed calls to implement an Islamic state governed by Shariya, and maintain that participating in the democratic system is compatible with pursuing Islamic values in government (Collins 2004, 119; see also Hasan 2009, 4) (LIBDEMNORMS = 1) The PKS is generally considered to be genuine vehicle of mass participation and internal rules based democracy (Kershaw 2004, 362), without a reliance on leadership or an elite network. Numerous scholars have emphasised that the party did not revolve around its leader in the same way that other parties did at the time (Hasan 2009, 10; Baswedan 2004, 18) “PKS is the best organized of all Indonesian parties, with 400,000 carefully selected and well-trained cadres, and has cultivated an image of collective decision making in which no individual leader stands out.” (Liddle and Mujani 2005, 121). At no election has the PKS’s current leader served in a government (INSIDER = 1).

Gerindra/ Prabowo Subianto

Prabowo Subianto is a former military General and inner-circle member of the late Suharto regime (he was the Suharto’s son-in-law). After a period in exile after the collapse of the New Order regime, he returned and unsuccessfully sought the Golkar presidential nomination in 2004, losing out to Wiranto. In 2008, he created his own party, Gerakan Indonesia Raya (Greater Indonesia Party, or “Gerindra”) as a personal vehicle for his presidential aspirations. Gerindra underperformed in the 2009 elections (gaining 4,5%), but emerged in 2014 as a part of a coalition of parties big enough to support Prabowo’s presidential bid against Joko Widodo (Jokowi). Funded by his billionaire brother Hashim, Prabowo built alliances with conservative Islamist parties and movements, narrowly losing to Jokowi in both 2014 and 2019.

Despite being a scion of the political establishment and oligarchy, Prabowo’s presidential campaigns have been based on a trenchant critique of the political class, which he classifies as “corrupt” (Gammon 2020, 106; Rakhmani and Saraswati 2021; Warburton and Aspinall 2019, 266), and “traitors” (Aspinall 2015, 13; Kimura 2017, 1). While general accusation of corruption are commonplace among most Indonesian politicians, Prabowo elevated this rhetoric to a more precise and invective allegation that the nation was run by a “mafia” (Aspinall 2015, 18) that was “stealing the Indonesian people’s money” (Gammon, cited in Hadiz and Robison 2017, 493), in contrast to which he styled himself as the avatar of the “Indonesian people” (Aspinall 2015, 18; Hellmann 2017, 170). He applied this critique not to specific politicians or parties, but in blanket terms to the entire political elite (Aspinall 2015, 18; Hellmann 2017, 170) (OTH_POLCLASS = 3. Several scholars have pointed out that Prabowo mimicked the oratory style of Soekarno, even to the point of wearing similar safari suits and using replica microphones similar to those used by the former president (Aspinall 2015, 13).

Prabowo’s critique of the political elite was bound together with a general accusation that the nation was being plundered by foreign forces (Hellmann 2017, 169; Mietzner 2014, 120; Rukmana and Sugito 2020; Rakhmani and Saraswati 2021, 453; Lane 2017, 3; Warburton 2020, 31). He used the term kebocoran, (‘leaks’) to suggest that the nation was bleeding its natural wealth to these foreigners, and used this narrative to explain most of the nation’s problems (Hatherell and Welsh 2020, 58; see also Warburton 2018, 140). His 2004 book claimed that “the domination of foreign powers” amounted to a “surrender” of national independence, and the enslavement of the people of Indonesia (Aspinall 2015, 14): “Our Indonesia” he said during the 2014 campaign, “is nurtured by foreign forces like a cow” (Robison and Hadiz 2017, 901). Domestic elites, he claimed, were either too “weak” to prevent this (Hatherell and Welsh 2020, 59), or complicit cronies to these foreign agents (Widian, Satya, and Yazid 2022, 11; Satrio 2019, 176; Mietzner 2015, 36; Hara 2017, 108). He extended this to Jokowi, whom he called antek asing (a “stooge of foreigners”) (Mietzner 2015, 36) who was actively “selling Indonesia off” to Chinese investors and labourers through his infrastructure programs (Warburton 2018, 139). He was vague in identifying exactly which foreign powers were involved in this, although he did single out the IMF for waging an “economic war” against Indonesia in the wake of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis that hit the nation hard and triggered the downfall of Suharto (Aspinall 2015, 14) (OTH_FOREIGN = 3).

This rhetoric against “foreigners” is in many ways aimed at targeting domestic enemies, specifically Chinese and Christians (Widian, Satya, and Yazid 2022, 2). Even though neither Prabowo nor Gerindra are hard line Islamists, their alliances with numerous Islamist factions has led many scholars to consider them “sectarian” (Warburton 2020, 31), “nativist” (Murphy 2019, 80) and “hostile to ethnic minorities” (Gueorguiev, Ostwald, and Schuler 2018, 242). While Jokowi is also a Muslim, the Prabowo campaign, in Warburton’s words, depicted Jokowi as an enemy of the ummah (the Muslim community) and as a threat to pious Muslims and Islamist organizations” (Warburton 2020, 28). This is built on a combination of Jokowi’s pluralist ideology, his association with various Chinese and Christian political figures (notably former Jakarta Governor Ahok), and a smear campaign that Jokowi was secretly a Christian. These were tactics of convenience for Prabowo, and ironically his shift to ally with Jokowi after the 2019 election saw him embrace the government’s harsh tactics against Islamist parties (Warburton 2020, 29–30). Nonetheless, given Prabowo’s consistent – albeit implicit – reliance on ethnocentric narratives, we’ve coded him and Gerindra as 2 for OTH_ETHNIC for the 2014 and 2019 elections.

In spite of his own enormous wealth and the family connections that helped to generate it, a significant pillar of Prabowo’s campaigns targeted the financial elite and wealth inequality (Warburton 2018, 135; Hara 2017, 108; Widian, Satya, and Yazid 2022, 11), and “drew heavily on narratives of economic injustice and exploitation” (Warburton and Aspinall 2019, 276). These are often bound up with the foreign exploitation narrative, as the domestic oligarchy is accused of profiting off the plunder of national wealth at the expense of the people (Widian, Satya, and Yazid 2022, 11; Satrio 2019, 176; Mietzner 2015, 36; Hara 2017, 108). Given that this anti-oligarchic element was a significant part of Prabowo’s discourse, but that it remained somewhat vague and secondary to other “other” narratives, we’ve coded OTH_ECONOMIC 2. We’ve seen no evidence for anything on the OTH_IMMIGRANTS (= 1), or OTH_MILITARY (= 1) variables.

As a party, Gerindra was totally controlled by Prabowo and his loyalists, and dedicated solely to the goal of making him president (Aspinall 2015, 9; see also Gammon 2020, 106). Numerous sources talk of Prabowo’s commanding, demagogic charisma as an element of both his and his party’s appeal (Widian, Satya, and Yazid 2022, 14; Kenny 2017, 33), and the fact that his rhetorical style was “self-referential to a degree that is unusual among Indonesian politicians” (Aspinall 2015, 13), something which contrasted with the political styles of other Indonesian politicians (CHARISMA = 3).

Prabowo’s campaign constituted a direct threat to liberal democratic norms for several reasons. He has a well-known history as an “enforcer” against pro-democracy activists during the Suharto regime, and stood accused of several violations of human rights during that period (Aspinall and Mietzner 2019, 106; Mietzner 2015, 20). He also has what Warburton and Aspinall call a “well known history of personal brutality” (Warburton and Aspinall 2019, 258). He has consistently threatened democratic institutions since the collapse of the new order, including attempting to interfere with the vote count after the 2014 election (Mietzner 2014, 111). On a more ideological basis, during his campaigns he articulated an opposition to liberal democracy (Hadiz and Robison 2017, 494), despite assurances that he as in fact a democrat (Aspinall 2015, 20). This included support for returning to the 1945 constitution which included unchecked executive power (Aspinall and Mietzner 2019, 106; Satrio 2019, 176). and support for reforms aimed at “re-centralising... power and disassembling key democratic institutions” (Pardede 2020, 41), such as the abolition of direct presidential elections and returning to the system where a constituent assembly decides, this being more in line with “Indonesian traditions” (Lane 2017, 4). Prabowo has openly lamented that “Indonesia is not ready for democracy,” and considered a “benign authoritarian regime” more suitable (Mietzner 2015, 22). In a more general sense, many scholars have pointed out that Prabowo and Gerindra have become leading figureheads in an anti-democratic compact between nationalist oligarchs and hard-line Islamists. (Lane 2017). For these reasons they deserve a clear 3 on the OTH_LIBDEMNORMS variable.

Prabowo and Gerindra have been called “nationalist” (Hellmann 2017, 162), “economically nationalist” (Aspinall 2015, 14) and “ultranationalist”(Arifianto et al. 2019, 44; Mietzner 2014, 112), “conservative nationalist” (Robison and Hadiz 2017, 901), and “right-wing”. While much of his economic rhetoric constituted a critique of liberalisation, “it would be a mistake”, in Aspinall’s words, “to exaggerate the policy cohesiveness or sophistication of his economic nationalism” (Aspinall 2015, 15). Owing to this and the salience of Probowo’s cultural nationalism, we’ve placed him and Genindra as R on LRPOSITION. Given that Prabowo was a political/military insider in the Suharto regime (Aspinall 2015, 6), we’ve coded him 2 on INSIDER

Not Included

The Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demockrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, PDI-P) is the successor to the lineage of Indonesia’s first president, Sukarno, who was ousted by Suharto in 1967. It was formed in 1999 by Sukarno’s daughter, Megawati Sukarnoputri, who served as president from 2001-2004 and has remained a powerbroker since. Sukarno had a notably populist style, and some have suggested that Megawati embodied this style by claiming his political legacy and mandate (Thompson 1999, 2). However the available evidence suggests that Megawati has maintained an aloof personal style, characterised by “self-restraint” rather than charisma (Ziv 2001, 85), and that the PDI-P under her leadership has been similar to Suharto’s Golkar party. Before the 2014 elections she handed the party’s presidential nomination to popular Jakarta governor Jokowi. The literature frequently considers Jokowi populist (Pardede 2020, 41; Hara 2017; Mietzner 2014; Hadiz and Robison 2017; Kenny 2022, 88), but this is more in the sense of his perceived kinship with ordinary people and genuine non-elite origins than any anti-elite rhetoric or outright rejection of the political status quo (Warburton 2018, 137). Jokowi has campaigned as more of a technocrat than a demagogue (Hatherell and Welsh 2020), offering what Aspinal and Mietzner call a “mellow developmentalist vision” (Aspinall and Mietzner 2019, 104). While he did campaign against corruption, this was done no more than any other politician (Hatherell and Welsh 2020, 60). For this reason we don’t think that he has met the WPD’s minimum definition of populism, and he is not in the database. The National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN) is the creation of Amien Rais, a student leader during the reformasi protests against the Suharto regime. The party is explicitly secular but has roots in the modernist Islamic political tradition. Rias ran for president in 2004. PAN and Rais are occasionally considered “populist” (Liddle 2000, 35; Carnegie 2008, 4), but there doesn’t appear to be much evidence of this in their rhetorical approach other than the fact that Rais is considered “outspoken” (Ziv 2001) and clearly more charismatic than other party leaders (for more on PAN see Zenzie 1999; Sherlock 2004).

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