Greece

Case notes

Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK)

The Panhellenic Socialist Movement (Panhellinion Socialistiko Kinema, PASOK) was a left-wing party founded by Andreas Papandreou after the end of the Greek military Junta in 1974. After rapid growth in the late 1970s the party formed government after winning 48.2% in the 1981 elections and was then re-elected with 45.8% in 1985. PASOK has been one of the two major parties (the other being New Democracy) in the Greek party system until that system changed dramatically after the economic crisis in the 2010s.

While the party eventually became a non-populist centre-left party (Papathanassopoulos, Giannouli, and Andreadis 2016, 197; see also Fouskas 1998), it is usually considered to have practiced a kind of populism in the 1970s and 1980s. That said, deciding when to include the party is a difficult question, and some comparative populism scholars (Van Kessel 2015) have chosen to avoid it altogether. On the balance of evidence of its 1980s rhetoric, we’ve included the party for the 1981, 1985, 1989 (x2) and 1990 elections, but following Lyrintzis (Lyrintzis 2005, 248, 250) and Spourdalakis and Tassis (Spourdalakis and Tassis 2006, 499) it seems that the party adopted a much more moderate “modernising” discourse by the 1993 election, after which its original populism never returned. Katsambekis & Stavrakakis date this transition to the “early 1990s” (Katsambekis and Stavrakakis 2017, 391).

At its foundation in the 1970s, PASOK was an anti-systemic” “protest” party (Moschonas 2001, 12) Rather than appealing to one particular social class (as the Greek communist party did), PASOK appealed to a broad and vague category of “non-privileged” (Mavrogordatos 1984, 160): by which it meant “farmers, workers, employees, craftsmen and artisans, the youth and all the people who are subject to odious exploitation by modern monopoly capital, local as well as foreign” (cited in Lyrintzis 1984, 111). Conversely, the “privileged”/“establishment” were represented as an “oligopoly” consisting of local and foreign forces (Lyrintzis 1984, 668; Mavrogordatos 1984, 160; Katsambekis and Stavrakakis 2017, 396), including the former Junta and the political “right” – byword for the party’s political enemies (Pappas and Aslanidis 2015) (OTH_POLCLASS = 3) (OTH_ECONOMIC = 3).

PASOK made the “foreign factor” – imperialism and foreign capital – the enemy (Lyrintzis 1984, 111; Moschonas 2001, 12; Markou 2017, 65–66) in its populism, and used nationalistic statements like “Greece belongs to the Greeks” (Papathanassopoulos, Giannouli, and Andreadis 2016, 197). This rhetoric was positioned in a well-developed narrative relating to the underdevelopment of peripheral and post-colonial states in the world economy (Pappas and Aslanidis 2015, 183). It was initially opposed to membership in the EEC, although this softened in its first term in office and by 1985 it was pro-accession (Moschonas 2001, 12). These sentiments gave the party’s discourse a strong degree of nationalism (OTH_FOREIGN =3). There is no evidence of anything that would register on the OTH_ETHNIC, OTH_IMMIGRANTS and OTH_MILITARY variables (all = 1).

While unambiguously left wing at its outset (Lyrintzis 1984, 111), PASOK has both drifted to the centre and engaged in ideological vagueness (Lyrintzis 1987, 667) in its program. We’ve coded the party’s LRPOSITION as L in its first two elections and CL after its embrace of austerity following the 1985 election. The party was never internally democratic, and “the personality and charisma of Papandreou influenced powerfully its development and nature” (Lyrintzis 1984, 111–12, 114; see also 1987, 668; Mavrogordatos 1984, 160; Pappas 2014, 9–10) (CHARISMA = 3). We have coded it 3 on INSIDER after the 1981 election, before which it was a 2, as Papandreou had served in senior positions in the government in the 1960s).

According to Pappas and Aslanidis,

Successive PASOK governments developed an ever-growing disrespect for political liberalism and its institutions, which, as the current logic went, could be compromised, impaired, or otherwise twisted as long as it was in favour of realising popular supremacy. Following that logic, institution building ceased to be a priority, and an understanding of institutions as means of achieving the gratification of the people was put firmly in place. (Pappas and Aslanidis 2015, 185)

Although we’ve seen no evidence that this reached the level of a critical threat to democracy itself, we’ve coded the party 2 on LIBDEMNORMS.

The Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS)

The Popular Orthodox Rally (Laikos Orthodoxos Synagermos, LAOS) was an ultra-nationalist party founded in 2000 by George Karatzaferis, a renegade journalist and former member of the centre-right New Democracy (ND) party. It launched amid a controversy relating to the PASOK government’s removal of religious affiliation from Greek national identity cards, a move strongly opposed by the Orthodox Church. The party only breached the 5% mark in the 2009 election, before collapsing totally after its support for the unpopular bailout in 2011, after which most of its key politicians were absorbed into ND.

LAOS engaged in anti-establishment politics, accusing the “rotten establishment” of both PASOK and ND (the two dominant parties at the time) of enslaving the country to its enemies (Ellinas 2012, 131; Katsambekis and Stavrakakis 2017, 399; Verney 2004, 21). Unlike “all the others” in the political sphere, LAOS stressed its own absolute fidelity to “the people” in classically populist terms (Pappas and Aslanidis 2015, 186) (the word “laos” even means “people” in Greek). While this clearly suggests an OTH_POLCLASS coding of 3, according to Katsambekis & Stavrakakis, (Katsambekis and Stavrakakis 2017, 400) LAOS engaged in an office-seeking strategy to win power in 2009 (the only election included in the dataset), employing a much softer rhetoric against the other parties. On this basis we’ve coded it 2 for the 2009 election, however this should be reviewed. In advancing nationalist claims about the people’s sovereignty, opposition to foreign influence in a number of forms was particularly relevant to LAOS. The party suggested that PASOK and ND were overly-deferential to the US (Ellinas, 2012:130), and was uncompromisingly critical of other traditional foreign enemies of Greece such as Turkey and North Macedonia (Ellinas 2012, 130; Bistis 2013, 38) (OTH_FOREIGN = 3).

LAOS also constructed “the people” and their “others” in explicitly ethnocentric and religiously sectarian terms (Georgiadou 2013, 83; Katsambekis and Stavrakakis 2017, 399). As its name suggests, it presented itself as the political wing of the Orthodox Church (particularly of its leader Archbishop Christodoulos, who was something of a populist in his own right) (Papastathis 2015, 233). Antisemitism was one of its recurring themes in this regard, with Karatzaferis suggesting in 2000 that Greece was “run by Jews” (Ellinas 2012, 130). It also practiced a strong hostility toward Muslims (Ellinas 2012, 130; Lazaridis and Tsagkroni 2016, 211) (OTH_ETHNIC = 3). It was also strongly opposed to immigration, proposing to use state funds to resettle immigrants back in their home countries (Lazaridis and Tsagkroni 2016, 207; Doxiadis and Matsaganis 2012, 53; Papathanassopoulos, Giannouli, and Andreadis 2016, 207; Katsambekis and Stavrakakis 2017, 399) (OTH_IMMIGRANTS = 3).

It is universally considered to be far right in the literature (Doxiadis and Matsaganis 2012, 53; Lazaridis and Tsagkroni 2016; Bistis 2013) even though it has included some more moderate members of the right and exhibited a degree of ideological “ambiguity” (Georgiadou 2013, 84) (LRPOSITION = FR). Key to this ambiguity was its approach to welfare policy and attacks on the financial elite. While LAOS had been generally free-market and a proponent of lower tax cuts, by the 2009 election the party dropped its tax liberalism (Bistis 2013, 39), and according to Ellinas, (Ellinas 2012, 131) “LAOS makes a significant effort to appeal to leftist voters, especially low-earning workers, through fierce populist attacks on globalization, foreign chains and commercial banks” (see also Georgiadou 2013, 83). Karatzaferis actually considered his party left-wing on social issues, and used his first speech in Parliament to declare that “Bankers are thieves, Mr Prime Minister, and you must send the attorney in to check on them” (cited in Ellinas 2012, 131) (OTH_ECONOMIC = 3).

There can be little doubt that the personal charisma of Karatzaferis was essential to the party’s identity, and that it was built on a generally “personalistic structure” (Dinas 2008, 605) (CHARISMA = 3), and although he was an ND MP before founding the party, this level of power should not escalate the party to a 2 on INSIDER (= 1). The party is difficult to code on LIBDEMNORMS: its character seems of a keeping with illiberal far-right parties in Europe, but we’ve seen no evidence in the secondary literature that it practiced any violence (this absense is inferred by Roushas 2014, 10), or showed particular hostility to liberal state institutions that could be considered a threat to liberal democratic norms, and hence we’ve coded it 1 for now.

The Independent Greeks (ANEL)

Independent Greeks (Anexartitoi Ellines, ANEL) was a right-wing populist party led by Panos Kammenos, who – similar to Karatzaferis and LAOS – split from ND to form the party in 2012. It rose to prominence after opposing the 2012 bailout (which LAOS supported), drawing on nationalist themes to poll 10.6% in the 2012 elections. After this success it joined an unlikely “populist coalition” with Syriza, with which it was in government until 2019, when it withdrew due to disagreements over the Macedonian naming compromise. It did not participate in the 2019 elections.

In the context of the financial crisis, Kammenos accused the whole political class of corruption and disloyalty to the people, asserting that the major parties are involved in a decades-old “pact” to hand the wealth of the country to foreign forces (Pappas and Aslanidis 2015, 192; Doxiadis and Matsaganis 2012, 79). Both major parties (PASOK and ND) were considered “traitors” and “conspirators” for their willingness to comply with the austerity demands of the “troika” (Katsambekis and Stavrakakis 2017, 401; see also Aslanidis and Rovira Kaltwasser 2016, 1081) (OTH_POLCLASS = 3).

In typically nationalist terms, ANEL’s most important “others” were foreign entities. It alleged that there was a “New World Order” controlling Greece, and that national politicians are complicit inwilfully surrendering national sovereignty to it (Pappas and Aslanidis 2015, 192). Accordingly, the party suggested that the financial crisis was artificially induced by foreign actors (with PM Papandreou acting as a willing agent) and that the bailout was a way for those actors to steal Greece’s wealth (Pappas and Aslanidis 2015, 192). Anti-German sentiment was particularly strong, as ANEL accused Chancellor Merkel of imposing a “4^th Reich” on Greece via its austerity demands (Papathanassopoulos, Giannouli, and Andreadis 2016, 200). Kammenos also engaged in anti-American rhetoric, while stressing the “Orthodox bonds” Greece had with Russia (Petsinis 2016, 286, 288). In the context of this foreign assault, ANEL claims to fight for national sovereignty (Fielitz 2018, 2) (OTH_FOREIGN = 3).

ANEL’s narrative of “the people” is constructed in mainly ethnic terms (Papathanassopoulos, Giannouli, and Andreadis 2016), and the party has engaged in racist and anti-Semitic rhetoric (Aslanidis and Rovira Kaltwasser 2016, 1081) (OTH_ETHNIC = 3). Its discourse was also

strongly hostile to immigrants (Ellinas 2013, 558), who were alleged to have been sent by the New World Order to harm the country (Pappas and Aslanidis 2015, 193), and who constituted a threat to the Greek ethnos (Fielitz 2018, 15) (OTH_IMMIGRANTS = 3).

ANEL’s economic policy had strong elements of state interventionism (Katsambekis and Stavrakakis 2017, 401), but is always considered in the literature to be either right-wing (Stavrakakis, Andreadis, and Katsambekis 2017, 450; Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou 2013, 529) or far/extreme/radical right (Lazaridis and Tsagkroni 2016, 210; Aslanidis and Rovira Kaltwasser 2016; Fielitz 2018). It is likely the case that the former designation is a product of implicit comparisons with the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn, and that by global or regional standards it is a typically far right party (LRPOSITION = FR). The party’s OTH_ECONOMIC rhetoric in the context of the financial crisis was clearly strong, and even though this was tied up with its OTH_FOREIGN discourse, its references to “loan sharks who have enslaved the nation” (cited in Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou 2013, 533) earn it a 3 on this variable.

ANEL is clearly a “leader-centric” party that revolves around Kammenos (Pappas and Aslanidis 2015, 192; Stavrakakis, Andreadis, and Katsambekis 2017, 457), who monopolises its representation in the media (Fielitz 2018, 16) (CHARISMA = 3). According to Pappas & Aslanidis (Pappas and Aslanidis 2015, 192) it was not characterised by violent tendencies. However aspects of rhetoric – declaring that the 2012 election was not a “democratic process” but rather “we are dealing with occupation troops which violate democracy” (Pappas and Aslanidis 2015, 193) – and immigration policy – its policy that illegal immigrants be placed in maximum security detention, (Lazaridis and Tsagkroni 2016, 209) – justify a 2 coding on LIBDEMNORMS, although this should be confirmed. Kammenos was not powerful enough in ND to be considered an INSIDER by the time of the 2012 election (= 1).

Golden Dawn

“People’s Association – Golden Dawn” (Chrysi Avgi, GD) is a fascist and nationalist movement started in 1983 by Nikos Michaloliokos. After two decades flying under the radar it achieved a breakthrough in the 2010 local elections, when Michaloliokos won a seat on the Athens city council. Following this GD’s national vote spiked at 6.92% in the 2013 elections – conducted in the heat of the economic crisis – and remained constant through the two 2015 elections (6.3%, 7.0%) before collapsing to below 3% in 2019. Due to its extremism some scholars do not consider the party populist, particularly those who see populism and fascism as exclusive categories (Katsambekis and Stavrakakis 2017, 404; Stavrakakis, Andreadis, and Katsambekis 2017, 450).

GD’s political discourse is highly critical of the political “establishment” (Pappas and Aslanidis 2015, 202), and it has frequently been called “anti-system” (Roushas 2014, 5; Ellinas 2015, 4). It considers non politicians “thieves” functioning in only a “pseudo democracy”, with prosecutions of GD members attributed to the “conspiracy” of these established forces (cited in Ellinas 2015, 4; see also Koronaiou and Sakellariou 2013, 337) (OTH_POLCLASS = 3). It is explicitly racist, calling for a state which is homogenous on the lines of “race, blood and ancestry” (Georgiadou 2013, 88; Pappas and Aslanidis 2015, 200; Ellinas 2013, 549). Party leadership has repeatedly disputed the “Greekness” of citizens who are not ethnically Greek (Ellinas 2015, 5), and the party refers to ethnically Greek citizens as “the people” (Kyriazi 2016; Stavrakakis, Andreadis, and Katsambekis 2017, 450). It is also deeply anti-Semitic, attributing the ills of both capitalism and communism to the forces of international “Zionism” (Koronaiou and Sakellariou 2013, 336) (OTH_ETHNIC = 3). Relatedly, GD is sharply hostile to immigrants, associating them with crime and unemployment and advocating for their forced expulsion from the country (Pappas and Aslanidis 2015, 200; Bistis 2013, 47; Roushas 2014; Ellinas 2015, 4). It also accused the “parties of the establishment of the so-called left” of pursuing high rates of immigration in order to achieve a “demographic alteration” of the Greek nation (Ellinas 2013, 549), and cultural “genocide” (Kyriazi 2016, 2532) (OTH_IMMIGRANTS = 3).

GD has also adopted a strong degree of “anti-plutocratic” discourse against multinational business and neo-liberal capitalism (Ellinas 2013, 550), which it associates with Zionism (Koronaiou and Sakellariou 2013, 335). Some scholars have suggested that the party’s food drives to unemployed (and ethnically Greek) citizens developed a kind of “Robin Hood” image (Bistis 2013, 49; see also Koronaiou and Sakellariou 2013) (OTH_ECONOMIC = 3). GD accuses the establishment of being controlled by foreign forces at the expense of national sovereignty (Ellinas 2013, 551), and refers to the 2010 memorandum signed between the government and foreign debt holds the “ethnocide memorandum” (Lazaridis and Tsagkroni 2016, 213). It also makes irredentist claims against Albania, and is sharply opposed to accepting the name “Macdedonia” in any form in North Macedonia (Ellinas 2013, 551). It is also hostile to the EU and opposed to “American Zionism” (Ellinas 2015, 4) (OTH_FOREIGN = 3).

Despite its somewhat left-wing economic policies (such as higher taxes on businesses and opposition to privatisations (see Roushas 2014, 19–20), GD is universally considered radical/extreme right in the literature (LRPOSITION = FR). According to Ellinas (Ellinas 2013, 552), GD is totally controlled and defined by the “towering presence” of Michaloliokos, whose hierarchical leadership is embedded in military-like hierarchies (Dinas et al. 2016, 81) (CHARISMA = 3). GD has a strong paramilitary presence, and its members have engaged in violence against immigrants and leftists for decades (Georgiadou 2013, 87–88; Pappas and Aslanidis 2015, 200; Ellinas 2013, 548; Bistis 2013, 44–45; Doxiadis and Matsaganis 2012, 55). Among numerous examples, party MPs have assaulted political rivals on television, party vigilantes have engaged in ‘cleansing’ operations to attack dark-skinned merchants in market places, and party documentation asks members to reject the authority of Parliament (Ellinas 2013, 549–50). Michaloliokos has also defended the legitimacy of the right-wing military Junta that ruled Greece 1967-74 (Bistis 2013, 51; Roushas 2014, 8). It is also hostile to media scrutiny, with Michaloliokos once accusing a TV interviewer of “taking orders from the New York Times and international Zionism (cited in Ellinas 2013, 550). Due to these features the party should be considered highly authoritarian to the extent that it is a direct threat to democracy itself (LIBDEMNORMS = 3). Neither Michaloliokos nor the party have ever been in government (INSIDER = 1).

Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA)

The Coalition of the Radical Left (Synaspismós Rizospastikís Aristerás, SYRIZA) is a grouping of minor non-communist left-wing parties that in various forms sat on the fringes of Greek politics throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. It vaulted into the mainstream on the back of mass protests (the “movement of the squares” or “aganaktismenoi”) against austerity measures imposed by emergency lenders following the 2010 debt crisis. Following a dramatic climb to 26.6% in the (June) 2012 elections, SYRIZA became the formal opposition party, and then after polling 36.3% in 2015 formed a coalition government with ANEL. While this coalition of opposing forms of populism was surprisingly stable, by the 2019 vote SYRIZA’s support had declined to 31.5%, and it lost government. Given that SYRIZA did a significant about-turn by accepting the bailout conditions in 2015, there would seem to be a strong case that the party might have dropped or changed its populist rhetoric toward the 2019 elections. The available evidence suggests however that Tsipras’ discourse on the people’s “enemies” remained unchanged (Markou 2017, 6).

In the context of the Greek financial crisis, SYRYZA’s populist discourse melded the political class, the business elite, and foreign actors into one “other” (Papathanassopoulos, Giannouli, and Andreadis 2016, 198). The party referred to the “establishment” of political parties including PASOK, ND, LAOS and DIMAR (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014, 129–30; Markou 2017, 62) and the diaploki – the network of political and business elites (Pappas and Aslanidis 2015, 194). In 2012 the party campaigned in Manichean terms against “an almighty authority of the triangle of sin, which has the corrupt bipartisan political system on its top corner, the bankers on the other, and the interweaving media on the third”, declaring that “It’s either Them or Us” (cited in Pappas and Aslanidis 2015, 194; see also Tsakatika 2016, 528; Markou 2017, 62) (OTH_POLCLASS = 3).

SYRIZA’s version of “the people” is put in material rather than ethnic terms, and one of their enemies are the “oligarchs” (Pappas and Aslanidis 2015, 194; Papathanassopoulos, Giannouli, and Andreadis 2016, 199; Katsambekis 2015, 154), declaring during the 2012 election campaign that the race was a battle “Between the Greece of the Oligarchy and the Greece of Democracy” (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014, 128). In this context the Memorandum was seen as a way for “oligarchs” to “increase their wealth and privileges” (Pappas and Aslanidis 2015, 194), and the party portrayed the political sphere as divided between pro-memorandum and anti-memorandum forces that aligned with the elite and the people respectively (Katsambekis 2015, 156) (OTH_ECONOMIC = 3). Tsipras declared himself the successor of Papandreou’s original PASOK, whose principles the current PASOK leadership had, in his view, abandoned (Pappas and Aslanidis 2015, 194).

The Troika of European debt holders (The European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund) were a constant “enemy” of the people in SYRIZA’s discourse, and the division of “external troika” and “internal troika” was used to denote those domestic political forces which were alleged to be acting as lackeys of the foreign forces (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014, 131; Tsakatika 2016, 528). In 2012 the WWII themes of a Nazi “4^th Reich” – in common with ANEL – were strong in SYRIZA’s discourse against German domination of Europe (Pappas and Aslanidis 2015, 193), and the party portrayed a lineage the anti-Nazi resistance group the National Liberation Front (Tsakatika 2016, 528). Given that this anti-foreign discourse relied on the context of the memorandum, we’ve coded it 1 on OTH_FOREIGN in 2007 and 3 from 2012 on. SYRIZA’s version of the “people” and their “others” are also non-ethnic (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014; Markou 2017, 63) (OTH_ETHNIC = 1), and its rhetoric was largely pro-immigrant (Katsambekis and Stavrakakis 2017, 400–401; Markou 2017, 63; Mudde 2016, 35) (OTH_IMMIGRANTS = 1).

As its name suggests, the party is unambiguously left wing (LRPOSITION = FL). It is an open question whether the party should carry this label through to the 2019 election, when it had arguably watered down its radical identity. Given that the party was a fairly well-structured coalition of parties before its rapid ascendance in 2012, and the fact that this ascendance was driven by a somewhat organic relationship with the popular protests of the 2010-12 period and earlier (Katsambekis 2016, 394–95), there doesn’t seem to be a good case to be made that it relied on the leadership of Tsipras in the 2012 election. However, according to Tsakatika, Syriza’s campaigns increasingly focused “on his person” (Tsakatika 2016, 532), and other scholars have mentioned that the leader’s personality became increasingly important to its identity over time (Pappas 2016; Mudde 2016, 9, 28, 31) (CHARISMA = 1 in 2007-12, 2 2015-19). As neither Tsipras nor the party were in power before their 2015 election victory, it is coded 1 on INSIDER before that election and 3 after.

Regarding LIBDEMNORMS, there is little to place the party above 1 in its early elections. However several actions that it undertook in government lead some scholars to claim that the party was a mild threat to liberal institutional norms. Examples of this are its such as pushing for the prosecution of statistician Andreas Georgio whom it accused of sabotaging the national debt figures in 2009 and the alleged use of state media to pursue the party’s agenda (Aslanidis and Rovira Kaltwasser 2016, 1082; Iosifidis and Papathanassopoulos 2019; Karaliotas 2021). While this should be further studied, we don’t think this quite reaches the level of 2 on LIBDEMNORMS, and therefore we’ve coded it 1 throughout its time in the dataset.

Not included

It is occasionally mentioned that New Democracy – the dominant conservative force in Greece since 1974 – went through a populism phase that mimicked PASOK in the early 1990s under Miltiades Evert’s leadership (Pappas and Aslanidis 2015, 181). From the available evidence however this appears to have a been a much softer version than that practices by Papandreou (Papathanassopoulos, Giannouli, and Andreadis 2016, 197), and we have made the decision to leave it out of the dataset.

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