Estonia

Date range: 1992-2020

Case notes

Estonian National Independence Party

The Estonian National Independence Party (Eesti Rahvusliku Sõltumatuse Partei, ERSP, or occasionally ENIP) was founded in 1988 as a movement to oppose the communist regime and remained the vehicle of radical nationalism through the 1992 elections. Despite possessing the biggest party organisation at the time, it polled a disappointing 8.7% and disappeared soon after as the independence question receded (Arter 1995, 253, 261). It acted as a coalition partner to the conservative Pro Patria party in government, where it was seen to moderate much of its rhetoric and policy (Auers and Kasekamp 2015, 144). By 2015 it merged formally with Pro Patria to create the Pro Patria Union, which does not appear to be populist or radically nationalist.

The party’s nationalism in 1992 is generally considered “radical” (Kivirahk 1993, 157; Auers and Kasekamp 2015, 144) (LR_POSITION = FR), and takes shape particularly against Russian interference (OTH_FOREIGN = 3), and the Russian ethnic minority in Estonia (OTH_ETHNIC = 3). According to Mäe (Mäe 1995, 211), the party saw Estonian statehood as the only mechanism by which the Estonian people can survive the geopolitical threat of their neighbours.

We have not seen evidence that it employed populist rhetoric against the domestic political class (OTH_POLCLASS = 1). Available evidence suggests that it was generally free-market (Mäe 1995, 212), despite being, in Fitzmaurice’s words, “less interested in economic issues” than nationalist ones (Fitzmaurice 1993, 173)(OTH_ECONOMIC = 1). Despite being a well-organised party it had not participated in government by the time of the 1992 elections (INSIDER = 1), and its leadership is not often considered significant to its identity (CHARISMA = 1). Further research should probe whether the party violated LIBDEMNORMS – for now we have seen no clear evidence that it did so (= 1).

Estonian Citizen

Estonian Citizen (Eesti Kodanik, EK) was formed a month before the 1992 elections by Jüri Toomepuu, a flamboyant Estonian-American and retired US, army lieutenant-colonel. EK polled a surprising 6.9% in 1992 but drifted into obscurity by the time of the 1995 poll, after which it disbanded.

EK was built around the personality of Toomepuu (Kasekamp 2003, 405) (CHARISMA = 3). It has been considered an “anti-party” party (Millard 2004, 70) due to Toomepuu’s “aggressive, American style populism” (Kasekamp 2003, 405; Kivirahk 1993, 158; Auers and Kasekamp 2015, 144; Arter 1995, 257; Rosimannus 1995, 33). He was particularly convinced that the former communist elite was still running the country via the post-transition parties (OTH_POLCLASS = 3).

Ideologically, EK is considered to have a lot in common with the ERSP (Kasekamp 2003, 404; Auers and Kasekamp 2013, 237), specifically in its advocacy of forced repatriation of ethnic Russians (Kasekamp 2003, 405; Arter 1995, 266), and for this reason we’ve coded it 3 on OTH_ETHNIC and OTH_FOREIGN, and FR on LRPOSITION. We have not seen much evidence for the LIBDEMNORMS variable, but given that Mikkel claims that the party “never questioned the legitimacy of the political system as such and never used illegal methods in the political process” (Mikkel 2006, 28), we’ve kept this variable at 1.

Independent Royalists

The Independent Royalists were a small party that emerged in time for the 1992 elections. The literature suggests that the Royalists were initially a satirical protest party “with only a semi-serious intent to win elections” (Grofman, Mikkel, and Taagepera 2000, 336; see also Fitzmaurice 1993, 168; Wilder 1993, 74). In a similar vein to Sweden’s New Democracy, the party and its “Territorial Marshal” Kalle Kulbok campaigned in costumes (Arter 1995, 266).

The party did not have many serious policies (Arter 1995, 266; V. A. Pettai 1993, 119) (Estonia has never actually had a monarchy of its own), and the party even decided some votes in parliament by coin toss (Clemens 1994, 399). we’ve therefore labelled them N/A on LRPOSITION. There is no evidence that the party was a threat to democracy (LIBDEMNORMS = 1), nor any hostility to OTH_ETHNIC, OTH_FOREIGN or OTH_ECONOMIC. However the Royalists are universally considered to be an “anti-party protest” party (Kivirahk 1993, 157; see also Wilder 1993, 76; Arter 1995, 266; Rosimannus 1995, 33) (OTH_POLCLASS = 3). The picture on CHARISMA is less clear: while Kulbok was clearly the leader of the party we’ve seen no source that mentions the centrality of his personal leadership over its other leaders (= 1).

Centre Party

The Centre Party (Keskerakond) was founded by Edgar Savisaar (Prime Minister 1990-92) in 1991 and has been a significant part of the Estonian political scene ever since. The party is centre-left (LRPOSITION = CL), and includes many Russian speakers in its base. The party is a personality vehicle for Savisaar, a charismatic figure almost universally considered “controversial” for his sharp rhetoric and corruption allegations. Savisaar’s domineering personality, according to many observers, defined the party until he was replaced in November 2016 (Saarts 2015, 220) (CHARISMA = 3). After this, we have not included the party as populist, given that this designation in the literature seems to rely on Savisaar’s personal stylings, without which it is a mainstream party (although this could be confirmed by further research).

Numerous texts consider the party populist (Millard 2004, 112; Saarts 2015, 214; Sikk 2004, 9; Jakobson et al. 2012, 59; Ehin 2002, 99), with reference to Savisaar’s hostility to other parties. However we have not found much specific detail on this, and for now we have left OTH_POLCLASS at 2. We have also not seen any evidence of OTH_FORIEGN, OTH_ETHNIC, OTH_IMMIGRANT or OTH_ECONOMIC, all of which are left at 1.

Savisaar’s personality is considered by many to be “authoritarian” (Arter 1995, 255), but we have not found any evidence of actual contradictions of liberal democratic norms either in office or opposition (LIBDEMNORMS = 1). As he was a former Prime Minister when the party was founded, the party is coded 3 on INSIDER while it is included in the dataset.

Res Publica

Res Publica (RP) was founded in 2001 as a youthful party that attacked the petty squabbling and corruption of the dominant parties. The party had extraordinary success in in its first election in 2003, benefiting from popular discontent with the likely coalition government between the two major parties. Upon joining government it lost most of its popularity and then joined in a union with Pro Patria for the 2006 elections onwards, where it seemingly became non-populist (Učeň 2007, 59). The party had much in common with New Era in neighbouring Latvia.

RP campaigned on a generally populist “new politics” appeal (Sikk 2009, 7; Saarts 2015, 214). The party made corruption its central issue, and campaigned in a generally protest narrative against the entrenched parties (Saarts 2015, 214, 223). However, it seems that its anti-politics “purifying” image was not as explicitly hostile against the political class as other populists, making it similar to populists like Simeon II in Bulgaria (Taagepera 2006, 84–85). For this reason, we’ve left it as 2 on OTH_POLCLASS. It did not take a stance on Estonia’s ethnic political issues (Saarts 2015, 217) (OTH_ETHNIC = 1), or, to our knowledge, anything that would register on the OTH_FOREIGN, OTH_IMMIGRANT, or OTH_ECONOMIC variables.

The party had a vague and ambiguous ideological standing (Sikk 2004, 10; Saarts 2015, 217), but is usually considered centre-right (Učeň 2007, 56; Saarts 2015, 215; Taagepera 2006) (LRPOSITION = CR). There is a case that it should actually be classified as centrist based on the non-ideological way that it campaigned in 2003, which should be explored further. The party did not rely on its leader (Saarts 2015, 221; Taagepera 2006, 84) (CHARISMA = 1), did not violate any LIBDEMNORMS (= 1), and could not be considered INSIDER prior to its initial victory in 2003 (Taagepera 2006).

Estonian People’s Union

The Estonian People’s Union (Eestimaa Rahvaliit, ER) was an agrarian party formed in 2000 through a merger of smaller agrarian parties including many former collective farm managers from Soviet times (V. Pettai and Toomla 2003, 6). It did very well in the 2003 elections (13%), forming coalition government with the Centre Party, but faded after political scandals (Saarts 2015, 214). From obscurity, some members of its base merged with the Estonian Patriotic Movement to for the Estonian Conservative People’s Party (EKRE) (see below) in 2012.

While not a great deal is written about the party, numerous texts mention in passing that it was populist (Taagepera 2006, 80; Jakobson et al. 2012, 59). Appealing almost exclusively to rural voters, ER featured “to some extent” (Jakobson et al. 2012, 73) a redemptive discourse in which it portrayed itself as the protector of the “people” (OTH_POLCLASS = 2). Jakobson et al claim that it engaged in some degree of ethnocentric rhetoric against non-white immigrants (Jakobson et al. 2012, 73). However, Saarts states explicitly that the party avoided a “far right” outlook in contrast with the EKRE (Saarts 2015, FN 224), and we have coded these variables more moderately (OTH_IMMIGRANTS = 2, OTH_ETHNIC = 2, OTH_FOREIGN = 2).

The party is difficult to categorise on LRPOSITION, as it was socially conservative but economically left wing (V. Pettai and Toomla 2003, 27). Most commentators seem to consider it centre-right (CR) (Petsinis 2019, 217; Braghiroli and Petsinis 2019, 5) and we have coded it such. Saarts does not consider the party’s original leader Villu Reiljan to be particularly charismatic (Saarts 2015, 2020) (CHARISMA = 1), and there is no evidence that it departed from the norms of liberal democracy (Jakobson et al. 2012, 72) (LIBDEMNORMS = 1). The party was not an INSIDER until the 2007 election (= 3 from 2007 on).

Conservative People’s Party of Estonia

The Conservative People’s Party of Estonia (EKRE) formed after the merger of the Estonian People’s Union and the far right (and much smaller) pressure group Estonian Patriotic Movement in 2012. It achieved break-out success of 8.1% in the 2015 elections, performing far better than any far-right party in Estonia since the early 1990s. This surged to 17.8% in 2019, primarily on the back of the European migrant crisis. It has signed a declaration of support with the Latvian National Alliance (NA), with which it has a lot in common.

The party’s ideology is anti-globalist, ethno-centric and radically nationalist, making it an exemplar of the European far right (LRPOSITION = FR). Among numerous examples of this ideology and rhetoric, it has advanced an officially racist immigration policy, supported controversial monuments dedicated to Nazi collaborationist soldiers who fought against the Soviet Red Army (Auers and Kasekamp 2015, 145), and campaigned against the “Islamization of Europe” (Braghiroli and Petsinis 2019, 11). It considered the migration crisis the deliberate work of global elites done to undermine the mono-ethnic nation state (Kasekamp, Madisson, and Wierenga 2019, 9). While explicitly hostile to immigrants (Kasekamp, Madisson, and Wierenga 2019; Veebel 2015), Wierenga claims that its most important “other” is the domestic Russian-speaking population (Wierenga 2017, 3). For all these positions the party is coded 3 on both OTH_ETHNIC and OTH_IMMIGRANT.

The party espouses a distinctly anti-establishment rhetoric (Braghiroli and Petsinis 2019, 11; Makarychev and Sazonov 2021, 461), and presents itself as an alternative to the political class (Auers and Kasekamp 2015, 146). For example, at its inception in 2012 it claimed to “offer a viable alternative to the voters who are sick of the forced choice between [Reform Party and Centre Party] East and West, left and right” (cited in Braghiroli and Petsinis 2019, 5) (OTH_POLCLASS = 3). It is strongly opposed to Russian interference (Lanko 2015, 51), denouncing a 2014 border treaty as a “give away” (Auers and Kasekamp 2015, 146). It is also critical of the EU for taking away Estonia’s sovereignty (Wierenga 2017, 8), imposing its cultural liberalism and enforcing bailout packages for southern European states (Braghiroli and Petsinis 2019, 6; Braghiroli and Makarychev 2022, 132). In the words of its 2018 programme, “the sovereign nation state has been transformed into a vassal state representing the interests of the European Union, of foreign capital and of parasitic elites” (Braghiroli and Makarychev 2022, 135). For these stances it is coded 3 on OTH_FOREIGN. The party does make some reference to taxing foreign capital (Braghiroli and Makarychev 2022, 135), but generally does not place the same significance on economic issues as other ones (Braghiroli and Petsinis 2019, 5). We have coded it 2 on OTH_ECONOMIC.

The party is very closely associated with its charismatic leader Mart Helme (Trumm 2018, 334), and his son Martin Helme, who, according to Auers and Kasekamp, have injected “dynamism and energy… into the moribund radical right” (Auers and Kasekamp 2015, 145) (CHARISMA = 3). EKRE has a very different membership, leadership, and ideology to the People’s Union (Saarts 2015, 214), even though the latter had been in power (Petsinis 2019, 215). Melme was once a high ranking diplomat, but we don’t think this quite reaches the point of serving in government (INSIDER = 1). Wierenga claims that the party “does not espouse anti-democratic rhetoric” (Wierenga 2017, 6), however it does possess a lively youth wing (“Blue Awakening”) that organises militarised “patrols” and rallies (Kazharski and Makarychev 2020, 173). It has also floated plans to regulate the media, which it considered part of the “establishment” (Kasekamp, Madisson, and Wierenga 2019, 20). We have left EKRE’s LIBDEMNORMS coding at 2.

Not included

In 1995 the “Rightwing Party” (a.k.a. “right-wingers”, Eesti Parempoolsed) narrowly crossed the 5% threshold to make it into parliament. The party split from Fatherland in 1994 (Grofman, Mikkel, and Taagepera 2000; V. Pettai and Toomla 2003, 13), and there is reason to suspect that this may be a populist party, but not enough evidence to code it correctly.

References

Arter, David. 1995. ‘Estonia after the March 1995 Riigikogu Election: Still an Anti-Party System’. The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 11 (3): 249–71.

Auers, Daunis, and Andres Kasekamp. 2013. ‘Comparing Radical-Right Populism in Estonia and Latvia’. In Right-Wing Populism in Europe: Politics and Discourse, edited by Ruth Wodak, Majid KhosraviNik, and Brigitte Mral, 235–48. London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic.

———. 2015. ‘The Impact of Radical Right Parties in the Baltic States Finding One’s Way through Social Space’. In Transforming the Transformation?: The East European Radical Right in the Political Process, edited by Michael Minkenberg. London and New York: Routledge.

Braghiroli, Stefano, and Andrey Makarychev. 2022. ‘Сonservative Populism in Italy and Estonia: Playing the Multicultural Card and Engaging “Domestic Others”’. East European Politics, 1–22.

Braghiroli, Stefano, and Vassilis Petsinis. 2019. ‘Between Party-Systems and Identity-Politics: The Populist and Radical Right in Estonia and Latvia’. European Politics and Society 20 (4): 431–49.

Clemens, Walter C. 1994. ‘Estonia Rebuilds: The Second Year of Independence, 1992–1993’. Nationalities Papers 22 (2): 393–403.

Ehin, Piret. 2002. ‘Estonian Euroskepticism: A Reflection of Domestic Politics’. Eastern European Constitutional Review 11 (4): 96–100.

Fitzmaurice, John. 1993. ‘The Estonian Elections of 1992’. Electoral Studies 12 (2): 168–73.

Grofman, Bernard, Evald Mikkel, and Rein Taagepera. 2000. ‘Fission and Fusion of Parties in Estonia, 1987–1999’. Journal of Baltic Studies 31 (4): 329–57.

Jakobson, M., Ilze Balcere, Oudekki Loone, Anu Nurk, Tõnis Saarts, and Rasa Zakeviciute. 2012. ‘Populism in the Baltic States’. Research report, Tallinn University Institute of Political Science and Governance / Open Estonia Foundation.

Kasekamp, Andres. 2003. ‘Extreme-Right Parties in Contemporary Estonia’. Patterns of Prejudice 37 (4): 401–14.

Kasekamp, Andres, Mari-Liis Madisson, and Louis Wierenga. 2019. ‘Discursive Opportunities for the Estonian Populist Radical Right in a Digital Society’. Problems of Post-Communism 66 (1): 47–58.

Kazharski, Aliaksei, and Andrey Makarychev. 2020. ‘Populism in Estonia and Slovakia: Performances, Transgressions, and Communicative Styles’. Populism 3 (2): 165–85.

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Sikk, Allan. 2004. ‘Successful New Parties in the Baltic States: Similar or Different?’ In The Baltic States: New Europe or Old, 22–23. University of Glasgow.

———. 2009. ‘Parties and Populism’. Working Paper 2009-02. Centre for European Politics, Security and Integration (CEPSI), University College London.

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