Ecuador

Date range: 1984-2017
A military dictatorship was established in Ecuador in 1972, overthrowing Velasco Ibarra, the great populist figure of the 20th century who had been president on five different occasions and had declared himself as dictator two years before. In 1978, the military called for a referendum and the Ecuadorians chose a new democratic constitution. Presidential elections were held in 1978-1979 and Jaime Roldós, of the Concentration of Popular Forces (CFP) was elected president. Ecuadorian politics includes many populist parties. The most relevant ones are CFP, PRE, Patriotic Society Party and Alianza PAIS.

Case notes

Ecuadorian Roldosist Party

Abdalá Bucaram, nephew of Assad and brother-in-law of Roldós, led the division of the CFP and created a new party; the Ecuadorian Roldosist Party (PRE). He is considered one of the most important populist figures in Ecuador (De La Torre 1997; Sosa-Buchholz 1999; Ulloa 2017). Abdalá became the mayor of Guayaquil and then presented his candidacy to the presidential election in 1988, 1992 and 1996, finally winning that last year. Abdalá was known as “el loco”, the crazy one, and presented himself as a passionate politician who did not abide by the etiquette of traditional politicians (Ulloa 2017, 101). “He challenges their respectability [of the elite] by glorifying the qualities of the people, insulting his rivals, and acknowledging and accentuating his own ugliness” and employed “simple, humorous, direct, and authentically popular language” (De La Torre 1997, 17; Moreano y Donoso 2006). His ideological basis was summed up in one of his campaign slogans: “Only one ideology, against the oligarchy” (Sosa-Buchholz 1999, 153). As he stated once: “The oligarchy is an amorphous entity, an insensitive and exploitative system, an anti-Christian system. ... I think that the oligarchy is everywhere” (Bucaram 1990, 24). De la Torre argues that the oligarchy is incarnated mainly in rival politicians thus, for example, “in the 1988 elections, Bucaram presented himself as the child of Christ in struggle against ‘the devil,’ [Socialist leader] Rodrigo Borja” (De La Torre 1997, 16). Bucaram employed a moralistic language to frame the struggle between the people and the elite and contrasted the effeminate nature of the elite with the virility of the Ecuadorian people (De La Torre 1997, 16) (OTH_ECONOMIC = 3, OTH_POLCLASS = 3).

The ideological classification of Abdalá Bucaram is complicated, because he “presented himself as a rejection of the elites, rather than a clear project” (De La Torre 1999, 560). Several authors coincide in the diffuse character of his ideology (Moreano y Donoso 2006; Ulloa 2017). He has been called a neopopulist because “he campaigned with a leftist discourse but implemented neoliberal measures during his government and formed his team with members of the oligarchy” (Ulloa 2017, 118). He ran on the promise to improve the living conditions of the poor (Sosa-Buchholz 1999, 153) and had as a campaign slogan “the strength of the poor” (Ulloa 2017, 117). In government, he applied personalistic measures such as the “Abdalact, cheap milk for Guayaquil’s suburbios, of free back-packs and textbooks, notebooks and pencils bearing the president’s name for poor students” (Sosa-Buchholz 1999, 154). However, not only did he never question capitalism (De La Torre 1997, 18), he even implemented strong neoliberal policies by inviting Domingo Cavallo, a former Argentinian finance minister, to advise him. He also showed a great degree of pragmatism forming coalitions with other parties or including members of the former conservative government into his cabinet. We have decided to code him as CL on LRPOSITION to reflect his pro-poor policies, although it should be noted that, as other populists in the 1990’s, he shifted significantly once in government.

Although the military did not form the main target of his attacks, he criticized it considerably. In 1985, he flew to Panamá because he was sentenced to four days in prison for saying that the military “had no other use than spend money and march in civic celebrations” (OTH_MILITARY = 2). Abdalá tried to “incarnate the representation of Indians, cholos, whites, blacks and mestizos” (Ulloa, 2017: 120), thus, we have coded 1 for OTH_ETHNIC. We have not found any criticism of immigrants, in fact, as his family was of Lebanese origin, he used this background as part of his narrative “he narrates how his humble social origins as a child of Lebanese immigrants has not prevented him from becoming a successful lawyer, politician and businessman” (De La Torre 1999, 562) (OTH_IMMIGRANTS = 1).

On his leadership role it is important to point out that the party was created and led by Abdalá and that he was his candidate in all elections. Moreover, he used a personalistic style by which he personified the “real Ecuador”. “His propaganda delivered a populist message of total antagonism between the people, whose will he claimed to embody, and the evil oligarchy that needed to be crushed. His commercials started with images of extreme poverty and suffering provoked by oligarchical governments. Then they presented Bucaram as the”leader of the poor,” the messiah, who will redeem the underprivileged from misery” (De La Torre 1999, 560) (CHARISMA = 3).

Abdalá was related to both Assad Bucaram and Jaime Roldós and was mayor of Guayaquil, Ecuador’s second most important city, before running for president in 1988. Therefore, he can be considered as a significant figure in previous governments (INSIDER = 2). We have not found references or significant attacks on foreign powers or interests (OTH_FOREIGN = 1). Although several authors point to his “lack of respect for the rights of others” (De La Torre 1997, 19) or his clientelism (Acosta 1996), he did not deviate significantly from the liberal-democratic norms of other parties. He entered into pragmatic coalitions with other parties, thus reproducing the existing political system he criticized (Ulloa 2017, 118). He is said to have “never surpassed the frame of representative democracy (Ulloa 2017, 118) and did not”criticize the mass media, as Correa and Chávez do” (Ulloa 2017, 284) (LIBDEMNORMS = 1). In fact, when his economic austere policies resulted in widespread opposition, he was impeached by the parliament under the vague pretext of his mental incapacity and was substituted by an ‘interim president’ a novel move for Ecuadorian politics of dubious constitutionality. A new constitution was approved, and elections followed in 1998.

With its leader gone and new elections coming soon, the PRE had to find a replacement and Álvaro Noboa was chosen as the presidential candidate for the 1998 elections. He was one of the most successful businessmen in Ecuador. Nevertheless, he lost that election and then founded the Institutional Renewal Party of National Action, or PRIAN and ran for president in all elections until 2013, coming in second place in 2002 and in 2006. Noboa has sometimes been described as a populist (Nohlen 2005, 372), however, his classification as such is contentious. Although he cultivated an image of a political outsider, in 1998, he stressed his technical abilities in management and differentiated himself from Abdalá Bucaram (Noboa 2010). More importantly, as Carlos de la Torre argues, Noboa lacks the Manichaean confrontation between the people and the power in his discourse (Ecuadorinmediato 2006). He is better described as a personalistic leader than as a populist candidate. Thus, we have not included him in the dataset.

We have, however, included the party in the dataset since the party’s position did not change after Abdalá left office. In the 2002 elections, the last in which the party obtained more than 5% of the vote, the party was led by Jacobo Bucaram, Abdalá’s older brother. Jacobo was a sportsman and university chancellor who had been part of Jaime Roldós government (although not in ministerial role), became vice-president of the Congress between 1992 and 1993 and was major of the city of Milagro. He was known in the country for beating Congressman Jamil Mahuad (who would later become president). Due to his political career as vice-president of the congress and brother of the president we have codified him as a 2 on INSIDER. He was in favour of the construction of a united Latin American currency that would help redistribute wealth and combat the problem of insecurity (BBC Mundo 2002). He also wished to renegotiate Ecuador’s debt with the IMF and promote an agrarian revolution (BBC Mundo 2002). We have also keep the same code for CHARISMA = 3, as it was understood that he stood in replacement of his brother.

Lucio Gutiérrez and the Patriotic Society Party

Lucio Gutiérrez was an unknown coronel without political experience (INSIDER = 1) who became famous nationwide because of a coup d’état, in a similar fashion to Chávez in Venezuela. In January 2000, in the midst of a deep economic crisis, several factions of the military allied with indigenous movements to overthrow the government of President Mahuad. As (Gutiérrez 2013a) then declared: “from now on you, the people, will always be put first and those who have benefited from the people must step aside”. However, the military was not able to hold power and Mahuad’s vice-president was elected president. Gutiérrez was briefly arrested and later founded the Patriotic Society Party to run for the presidency in the 2002 elections.

De la Torre argues that Gutiérrez “employed the populist rhetoric of confrontation between the people, whom he said he represented, against the oligarchy, symbolized by the corrupt politicians” (De La Torre 2008, 201) (OTH_POLCLASS = 3, OTH_ECONOMIC = 3). He also exploited the image of the military man as a man of the people who would not sell himself to “antinational interests” as well as his humble origins (De La Torre 2008, 202) (OTH_MILITARY = 1). We have seen no reason to code above 1 for OTH_FOREIGN.

The ideological classification of Gutiérrez is not easy because he was able to “reconcile opposed tendencies as well as had an enormous flexibility to transform himself” (Montúfar 2008, 269). He has been described as a neopopulist because of his popular rhetoric before achieving power and his neoliberal policies once in government (Ulloa 2017, 102). He campaigned on a leftist platform, particularly concerned with the indigenous movement’s claims. Moreover, he campaigned against neoliberal measures (De La Torre 2008, 206). He was, however, less leftist than Chávez, as he himself stated “I admire the courage of Chávez… for challenging a corrupt government. I did the same in Ecuador. But I am not a communist. I am deeply Christian and respect private property and human rights” (El País 2005). However, once in power, he soon broke his alliance with leftist and indigenous parties and supported himself with right-wing parties (Ulloa 2017, 124). He then applied measures dictated by the IMF and appointed technocrats with ties to the business powers (Burbano de lara 2003). We believe the best classification for is to code LRPOSITION as Centre Left in 2002 and Centre Right in 2006 under Gilmar’s leadership.

His political platform was strongly based on the indigenous movements, which he identified as the main component of “the people” (De La Torre 2008, 218) and he did not attack immigrants. (OTH_IMMIGRANTS and OTH_ETHNIC = 1).

The Patriotic Society Party was created by Gutiérrez as a platform to run for president. The party did not do well in the legislative elections (2.5% of the vote share), which gives an idea of the lack of relevance of the party compared to the figure of its leader. The party later changed its ideological position when Gutiérrez did, which implies that it did not have a solid ideological basis apart from being Gutiérrez’s platform. We have therefore coded the party 3 on CHARISMA, since Gutiérrez’s populism was entirely based on his persona.

Gutiérrez’s violation of Liberal Democratic norms was patently evident. He became known in his country through a coup d’état against the elected president. His downfall also showed his lack of respect for democratic norms. Due to corruption scandals, Gutiérrez’s alliance with the conservative parties broke down, and he decided to seek the help of the PRE and Álvaro Noboa. He then proceeded to substitute judges in the Supreme court and those judges declared null the charges against Abdalá Bucaram. Massive protests followed and Gutiérrez declared the state of exception and sacked the Supreme Court judges. This was seen as an authoritarian intervention against judicial independence and, finally, in 2005, the congress voted to substitute Gutiérrez with his vice-president, who also had become extremely critical of Gutiérrez’s measures. We have coded him and the party 3 in LIBDEMNORMS.

In the 2006 elections, Gutiérrez was expecting to run for president, but the Supreme Court removed his political rights for two years. His brother Gilmar, who also had participated in Gutiérrez’s 2000 military coup and had been a congressman, had to run instead. Given his personal ties with his brother we have coded 2 in INSIDER 3 in CHARISMA because he was simply temporarily substituting Lucio Gutiérrez.

Lucio was, however, able to run in 2009 and 2013 and was the undisputed leader of Patriotic Society Party since he founded the party (3 in CHARISMA and INSIDER). During this time, his rhetoric was focused on his opposition to Rafael Correa. Gutiérrez did not lose his populist rhetoric, but the elite was now embodied by the government of Correa whom he accused of corruption (Gutiérrez 2013b). Lucio called into question the transparency of the elections and criticized Correa for participating in the coup d’état that overthrew his “democratically elected government, thus violating the will of the people” (Gutiérrez 2013b). Gutiérrez was also a critic of Correa’s closure of media outlets and called into question the impartiality of the Ecuadorian institutions, saying that they only benefited the president but not the people (Gutiérrez 2013c).

Gutiérrez continued running a populist platform of difficult ideological classification. As Bowen argues, he “generally eschewed well-defined platforms in favor of personalistic appeals” and “attempted, with some success, to mobilize clientelist networks that he had built during his period as president” (Bowen 2010, 187). However, he moved from his initial leftist positions to become a critic of Correa’s progressive policies. He argued for the lowering of taxes (Gutiérrez 2012) and had become, paradoxically, “the preferred candidate among the country's economic elite who see him as the only candidate capable of challenging Correa” (Bowen 2010, 189). Thus, although he continued to be a populist leader, his definition of elite radically changed, and we could argue that his populism is mainly directed against a political elite (Correa and his government) and not anymore anti-economic class or anti-foreign interest. Therefore, we have changed both OTH_ECONOMIC and OTH_FOREIGN to 1 and kept LRPOSITION to CR in all subsequent elections.

Rafael Correa and PAIS Alliance

Rafael Correa, who obtained his PhD at the University of Illinois, was a professor of economics in Ecuador when he entered politics. Probably because of his technocratic profile, he was called by Alfredo Palacio to be Minister of Economy after the downfall of Lucio Gutiérrez. “He was the ultimate outsider—a college economics professor who had never even belonged to a party” (De La Torre 2013, 35). He remained only four months in the post because he disagreed with the free-trade policies of the government. He then created the movement Alianza PAIS (Patria Altiva i Soberana) or PAIS Alliance (Proud and Sovereign Homeland) and won the 2006 elections. Although he was a minister, we have coded him 1 on INSIDER because his time as minister was very brief and previously, he had no political experience or public exposure.

His platform has been repeatedly compared to that of Hugo Chávez (De La Torre 2013; Ulloa 2017). Correa argued for a “citizens revolution” that called “for the closure of Congress followed by elections for a constituent assembly that would write a new basic law. The underlying goal was to break the ‘partidocracia’ or system of domination by political parties” (De La Torre 2013, 36). Since his intention was to call for a constituent assembly that would create a new constitution and change the way the political system worked up until then, PAIS Alliance did not present any candidate for the legislative body. This indicated his aim to connect directly with the people, bypassing the formal institutions of representation. Ulloa points out the importance of Correa’s charisma and the concentration of party power in his hands (Ulloa 2017, 127) (CHARISMA = 3).

His aim was to “refound the homeland” to achieve “a radical and rapid change in the existing structures of Ecuadorean society, in order to change the bourgeois state into a truly popular one” (Correa 2012). In his inaugural speech, he claimed that Ecuador needed to “get its homeland back” (Correa 2006a) and argued that, under his government, “the fatherland was no longer for sale” (Correa 2006a). “Correa presented himself as a leftist candidate, anti-international credit organizations, defendant of sovereignty; he employed an anti-political discourse that was, above all, anti-party” (Ulloa 2017, 128). Correa defined himself as a “socialist from a Christian, not Marxist, source; I like to define myself as a leftist Christian humanist” (Correa 2006b) whose platform was based primarily on fighting corruption and reversing neoliberal policies. He claimed that “we will never forget the crimes of the corrupt bankers who bankrupt us” (Correa 2006a). Moreover, he stated that neoliberal policies whose “consequences have been disastrous” “were not only imposed but were also enthusiastically applauded by our elites” (Correa 2006a). Thus, Correa promised a second Independence of Ecuador (De La Torre 2013, 44) by which “Ecuador will become independent from international organizations, that represent foreign paradigms and interests” (Correa 2006a). The most appropriate coding for Correa seems to be FL in LRPOSITION, and 3 for OTH_POLCLASS, OTH_ECONOMIC, and OTH_FOREIGN.

Correa had good relations with the military at the beginning of his presidency and although it later deteriorated due to spending cuts (Flores 2016), the military was not a target of his populist speech (OTH_MILITARY = 1). Another of the pillars of Rafael Correa’s platform was what in Quechua is called the “sumak kawsay, which literally means ‘the life well lived’” (De La Torre 2013, 39). The concept “comes from indigenous cosmology, and aims to build ‘the good life,’ understood as non-Western relationships between society, nature, and development.” (De La Torre 2013, 39). This pillar was concretized in Ecuador’s new constitution with the definition of the country as ‘plurinational’ and the inclusion of “nature rights”. Additionally, Correa included a leader of the indigenous movement as president of the constituent assembly and finished his inaugural speech with some words in Quechua (Correa 2006a). His relations with the indigenous communities deteriorated later due to disagreements over mineral extraction. The indigenous communities were opposed to these extractions, but Correa’s government thought them necessary for the independence of the country (De La Torre 2013, 41). However, neither immigration nor other ethnic communities were ever identified by Correa as part of the elite or were targets of “othering” rhetoric (OTH_ETHNIC and OTH_IMMIGRANTS = 1).

Although Correa claimed to seek the democratization of Ecuador, his actions in government fall short of his electoral promises (De La Torre 2013; Ulloa 2017). Moreover, he launched several attacks on the media because, as he put it “the media have always been one of the de facto powers that have dominated Latin American countries” (quoted in (De La Torre 2013, 42)). Members of ‘El Universo’ were convicted of defamation for an editorial they wrote, and the newspaper was heavily fined as well. Moreover, every week Correa hosted ‘Enlace Ciudadano’ a three-hour show in which he criticized the media’s representation of his government treating them as political actors (Ulloa 2017, 289). Insults and mocking of other political leaders were very common in his shows.

Furthermore, his call for a constituent assembly has been questioned for its legality (Ulloa 2017, 136-37). That possibility was not one of the prerogatives of the president in the constitution and it completely bypassed the legislative body. However, he went ahead with his plans due to his massive popular support. De la Torre argues that Correa represents a case of “soft authoritarianism” similar to that of Chávez (De La Torre 2013, 22). Taking into consideration his attacks on the press, we have coded him as 2 in LIBDEMNORMS.

Carlos de la Torre points out that Correa, himself an “expert” in economics as an academic, exhibited a kind of technocratic populism by which he had the knowledge to rebuild his nation and bring progress and modernization (De La Torre 2018, 39). Thus, he combined technocracy with populism. Lenín Moreno, vice-president during most of Correa’s years in power and UN special delegate on disability issues would represent this technocratic element in his government. Moreno won the 2017 elections with PAIS Alliance. Moreno had a leftist ideology and continued with many of Correa’s policies; however, he was less charismatic than his predecessor and did not employ the level of confrontational rhetoric that Correa used. Although many saw him as the marionette of Correa, he soon started to differentiate himself from Correa in what De la Torre calls Ecuador’s “perestroika” (De La Torre 2018). Moreno strongly persecuted corruption, removed the asylum to Julian Assange and engaged in a dialogue with all political forces, including Right-wing parties; actions that were strongly criticized by Correa. Moreno’s case can be compared to that of Juan Manuel Santos in Colombia and his relationship with Álvaro Uribe, where a non or less-populist leader inherited the party that the populist leader created. Following the criteria used with Santos and acknowledging that Moreno has inherited mainly Correa’s ideological basis but not so much his populism, we have not included him in the dataset. We have, however, included Alliance PAIS in the legislative elections to show that the party was still very much influenced by Correa’s personality. We have not changed the INSIDER and CHARISMA coding given that we see the 2017 election as a continuation of the leadership of Correa.

Not included

The Popular Democratic Movement (MPD) is not included in the dataset because it has been described as a “traditional party” based on a communist and Maoist ideology (De La Torre 2013, 34-35) with strong connections with the country’s unions. Although it briefly supported Lucio Gutiérrez and Rafael Correa, it later became part of the opposition to these populist leaders. None of the sources consulted describes this party as populist.

References

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