Czechia

Case notes

Association for the Republic - Republican Party of Czechoslovakia

The Association for the Republic – Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (Sdružení pro republiku- Republikánská strana Československa SPR-RSČ), also called “Coalition for the Republic” or often just the “Republicans”, was a far-right nationalist party formed by Miroslav Sládek in 1989 (although formally registering as a party in 1990) (Hanley 2012, 68). It contested with negligible success in the election that year but increased its vote to 6% in 1992 and 8% in 1996. The party was never in government and collapsed due to infighting and splits after the 1998 election.

Sládek practiced an “aggressive” populism (Mareš 2011, 285) that has been called “anti-establishment” (Kopeckỳ 1995, 148; Kopecky and Mudde 1999, 418; Dočekalová 2006, 12), “anti-system” (Vlachová 1997, 47; Balík and Hloušek 2016, 108; Hloušek 2010, 98) and stylistically “eccentric” (Brokl 1992, 122), with SPR-RSČ representatives becoming known for their “extremist excesses” (Smolík 2011, 103). The party espoused a radical opposition to the new post-communist political class, which it frequently accused of acting in corrupt self-interest (Hanley 2012, 72); in Sládek’s words, pretending to champion programmatic causes only to “continue their sweet inactivity at the expense of the majority of citizens” (cited in Hanley 2012, 74). Sládek once alleged that this political class had “committed high treason, for this they will hang... after our victory, the privileges of the parasites will be abolished and their property confiscated” (cited in Ulč 1996, 93). The party claimed that the material problems of the post-communist transition were therefore not a consequence of marketisation, but a deliberate plot by the elite to control the people (Hanley 2012, 76). A part of this argument was the allegation that the Velvet Revolution was a sham, and that former communists and dissidents were in fact part of the same network (Hanley 2012, 69). The post-1989 muti-party system was therefore merely a façade (Hanley 2012, 75), as all other parties (referred to by the SPR-RSČ as the “Gang of Five”, Dočekalová 2006, 12) were essentially the same. (Hanley 2012, 78). Against this political class Sládek contrasted the “ordinary people” who had been hitherto forced “merely to watch passively as power is taken over” (cited in Hanley 2012, 74), claiming that only the SPR-RSČ could save the nation on their behalf (Dočekalová 2006, 11). This is sufficient to code the party 3 on OTH_POLCLASS.

The SPR-RSČ has frequently been described as “racist” (Vlachová 1997, 50; Hanley 2012, 69), “nativist” (Stojarová 2018a, 36), and “xenophobic” (Stojarová 2018a, 36) in the literature. According to Smolik it placed “emphasis on the ethnic roots of social and criminal problems” (Smolík 2011, 103). This ethnocentrism was primarily due to its consistent hostility toward-Roma people (Dočekalová 2006, 12; Hanley 2012, 69; Mareš 2011, 285; Stroehlein 1999), whom it directly linked to crime (Císař and Štětka 2016, 290). Sládek once said, for example, that “If we want to lower the crime rate and clean our cities, first we have to solve the Gypsy problem” (Dočekalová 2006, 12). According to Ulč this reached the point of calling for ethnic cleansing against the Roma population (Ulč 1996, 94). Sládek was also hostile to ethnic Germans and Vietnamese (Stojarová 2018a, 36), and was once charged with race-hatred offences for comments suggesting regret that more Germans had not been killed in World War II (Hanley 2012, 71; Stroehlein 1999) (OTH_ETHNIC = 3). This overlapped with Sládek’s anti-immigration rhetoric (Mareš 2011, 285; Ulč 1996, 94), including his “hostility to African and Vietnamese guest workers” (Hanley 2012, 69) and rhetorical linkages between immigrants and crime or other social problems (Smolík 2011, 103) (OTH_IMMIGRANTS = 3).

Regarding economic elites, Hanley mentions that Sládek criticised “the dictatorship of money” (Hanley 2012, 73), and that the privatisation process had been used by the elite to enrich themselves 2012, 75), however this appears to relate more to the corrupt riches of the political class more than the rich or big business per se, and hence we’ve coded the party 1 on OTH_ECONOMIC. Numerous sources claim that foreign states and entities were key “others” in the party’s populism, specifically Germany (Dočekalová 2006, 12; Hanley 2012, 75) and later NATO (Kopecky and Mudde 1999, 418). In Hanley’s words the party “link[ed] domestic elites with external threats and foreign interests” (Hanley 2012, 75), however we’ve not seen evidence that the domestic elite was regarded as total controlled by these foreign forces, and hence we’ve coded it 2 on OTH_FOREIGN = 2. We’ve seen no evidence that the party was hostile to the military (OTH_MILITARY = 1).

The SPR-RSČ has been universally placed on the “far right” (Císař and Štětka 2016, 287), “radical right” (Hanley 2012, 68; Stroehlein 1999) or even the “fascist” end of the political spectrum (Vlachová 1997, 50), and indeed the party self-identified as an “extreme right-wing party” (Kreidl et al. 2000, 71). Although its economic program occasionally called for increased social benefits and services, this was balanced by calls for less state intervention (Hanley 2012, 70). On the whole however it did not focus very much on economic issues (Vlachová 1997, 50), and its agenda therein lacked, in Hanley’s words, “intellectual and programmatic sophistication” (Hanley 2012, 82). Owing to the salience of its radical cultural nationalism, we’ve coded it FR on LRPOSITION.

Sládek has been considered in the literature a “charismatic” figure (Mareš 2011, 285) and “a skilled and provocative public speaker” (Císař and Štětka 2016, 290). In Hanley’s words “[t]he SPR-RSČ was quickly marked by Sládek’s egocentric, dominant personality and his radical outspoken statements” (Hanley 2012, 69). Internally Sládek had an “authoritarian style” (Mareš 2011, 286), and the party lacked formal structures that could hold it together in the absence of his dominant leadership beyond his inner circle of close friends and family (Hanley 2012, 72) (CHARISMA = 3). SPR-RSČ and Sládek had “authoritarian elements” from the beginning (Hanley 2012, 69), and have threatened the norms of liberal democracy in several ways. Sládek has incited violence (Stojarová 2018a, 41), maintained alliances with various skinhead groups (Ulč 1996, 94), and defended the use of violence against “illegitimate authorities” (Hanley 2012, 79). When he was charged with hate speech in 1997 he avoided courts, only to be tracked down by the police (Stroehlein 1999). Regarding the party’s acceptance of the democratic system, Vlachová claimed that the party did not accept the “game” of parliamentary democracy, as displayed by members’ politically motivated criminal acts (Vlachová 1997, 47). Hanley on the other had claims that the party was not ideologically opposed to liberal democracy (as compared to other Czech fascist and neo-Nazi groups), but by our standards it does appear to deserve 3 on LIBDEMNORMS. Neither SPR-RSČ nor Sládek ever participated in a national government (INSIDER = 1).

Public Affairs

Public Affairs, (Věci Veřejne, VV) also called “Public Action” was created in 2002 as a citizen’s initiative in Prague focusing on local issues like improving services available to families (Havlík and Hloušek 2014, 556; Just and Chárvat 2016, 93). In the lead up to the 2010 election it emerged as a populist contender with a protest vote narrative, claiming almost 11%. Its emergence from obscurity is largely due to both the investment of businessman Vít Bárta and the role of investigative journalist Radek John (Mareš 2011, 292), who became the party’s chairman and leader in 2009 and gave credibility to its anti-corruption message. VV was a coalition partner of the government after the 2010 elections (Mareš 2011, 292), but was riven by internal scandals and splits that saw it collapse in 2012 (Císař and Štětka 2016, 288), with both the original and breakaway entities receding into irrelevance soon after. The main reason for its collapse was the revelation that Bárta had developed the party mainly to aid his business interests (Havlík and Hloušek 2014, 553; Roberts 2019, 437), an attribute which has led VV to be labelled a “business-firm party” in the secondary literature (Just and Chárvat 2016).

VV’s core message was an “anti-establishment” (Havlík and Hloušek 2014, 558; Kopeček 2016, 730; Havlík and Voda 2016, 124) and “anti-corruption” (Císař and Štětka 2016, 287) platform targeting all existing parties of the left and right (Haughton, Novotná, and Deegan-Krause 2011, 397; Kim 2020, 625), with the party claiming at one point to be “against everyone” (Dostálová 2021, 293). The party styled itself, in Maškarinec and Bláha’s words, as a “pest control squad in top-level politics” (Maškarinec and Bláha 2014, 708), representing ordinary people against the corrupt establishment (Havlík and Hloušek 2014, 557; Kaniok 2014, 10). The core refrain of the party against the political class was that it was full of “dinosaurs” left over from the post-communist era who did not represent the people (Císař and Štětka 2016, 288; Havlík and Hloušek 2014, 557). Gaging the ferocity of this attack is somewhat difficult: at times John suggested that VVs claim was “not a personal attack against dinosaurs. They carried out their work and should step down,” suggesting a somewhat mild populist hostility to the political elite. However at other times John and party leaders were a lot harsher, claiming that “Thieves (politicians) need darkness so no one sees what they steal…(politicians) play games with public funds” or that (in Bárta’s words) the established parties had “led to a democracy of robber barons” (cited in Havlík and Hloušek 2014, 557). The party also launched its 2010 campaign by symbolically firing a cannon at that Czech government headquarters (Naxera 2018, 35). Other secondary sources have emphasised the corruption accusation that VV levelled against the “dinosaurs” (see Kim 2020, 626; Kaniok 2014, 10). We’ve therefore coded the party’s OTH_POLCLASS rhetoric as 3.

VV was not essentially a nativist party, and according to Mareš it “refuse[d] extremism and racism” (Mareš 2011, 292). However according to others it did have an anti-Roma and anti-minority theme in its welfare chauvinism, referring to them in somewhat veiled terms as “unadaptable minorities” (Kim 2020, 626; Maškarinec and Bláha 2014, 708). We’ve therefore coded it 2 on OTH_ETHNIC. Major studies of the party do not talk about its position on immigration. One exception is Kim, who claims that it was anti-immigrant on welfare chauvinism terms (Kim 2020, 619). We’ve therefore coded it 2 on OTH_IMMIGRANTS but this could be corroborated. As a party that was set up in the interests of a business and managed like one (Havlík and Hloušek 2014, 560), unsurprisingly sources do not suggest that VV targeted major business or the wealthy (OTH_ECONOMIC = 1). Mareš claims that it was pro NATO and pro-EU (Mareš 2011, 292), and we’ve seen no evidence for any OTH_FOREIGN rhetoric (= 1), or OTH_MILITARY rhetoric (= 1).

The party has been considered largely eclectic and non-ideological in terms of its policy programme (Císař and Štětka 2016, 291; Havlík and Hloušek 2014, 557; Just and Chárvat 2016, 95), and it distanced itself from left-right labels by embracing a loyalty to common sense rather than ideology (Voda and Havlík 2021, 282). It has been considered “centrist” (Havlík and Hloušek 2014, 553) or cetnre-right (Havlík and Voda 2016, 125), and due to its strong welfare chauvinism (Kim 2020, 619), we’ve coded it right of centre (LRPOSITION = CR). Sources suggest that the VV’s 2010 campaign was highly personalised around John’s “charismatic” image (Císař and Štětka 2016, 294), and that his corruption-fighting image was “central” to its message (Haughton, Novotná, and Deegan-Krause 2011, 397). Structurally, VV was organised around its chief financier Bárta, who had total control behind the scenes (Kopeček 2016, 730; Kubát and Hartliński 2019, 111), and used this to determine candidate selection (Havlík and Hloušek 2014, 563; Just and Chárvat 2016, 94; Hloušek and Kopeček 2018, 6). For its public reliance on John’s leadership we’ve coded it 3 on CHARISMA, but there are some accounts that Bárta was also presented as a leader to the public (Havlík and Hloušek 2014, 566).

Bárta had rival politicians and activists followed by private security (Havlík and Hloušek 2014, 563), and organised so-called “social-intervention patrols” of uniformed members supposedly acting as vigilantes aiding the police (Mareš 2011, 292). The latter were shut down after criticism, for this we’ve coded the party 2 on LIBDEMNORMS. The party leadership had not served in government at the time of the 2010 election campaign (INISIDER = 1).

ANO 2011

“Action of Dissatisfied Citizens 2011” (Akce nespokojených občanů 2011, ‘ANO2011’ or just ‘ANO’– ano means “yes” in Czech) was founded by Billionaire Andrej Babiš in 2011. Babiš was the owner of the agro-conglomerate Agrofert and one of the country’s richest men. In some ways ANO picked up where VV left off (Naxera 2018, 39), and it has also been considered a “business-firm party” (Kopeček 2016). After failing in the 2012 senate elections, a major investment in political marketing paid dividends the following year where it won 18.7% of the vote and 47 seats and joining a coalition government with established parties (Havlík 2019, 373). It then won the 2017 elections with 29.6% of the vote and 74 seats, with Babiš initially leading a minority government and then governing in a coalition with the Social Democrats with the support of the Communist Party.

Babiš’ rhetoric was “anti-elitist” (Císař and Štětka 2016, 287), “anti-establishment” (Havlík and Voda 2014, 9) (Dostálová 2021, 293) and “anti-party” (Cirhan and Kopeckỳ 2017, 117), forming what Havlík calls an “apolitical technocratic populist narrative” (Havlík 2019, 371). He called the political establishment of politicians, parties and other “forces” a “matrix” that was trying to silence him (Hanley and Vachudova 2018, 281). Established parties and politicians were not differentiated in this claim (Kim 2020, 626), but grouped together as a homogenous bloc of “traditional political parties” who only pretended to be different from one another (Havlík 2019, 376, 378). These forces were irredeemably corrupt in Babiš’eyes (Naxera 2018, 32; Just and Chárvat 2016, 96; Kuba, Hudec, and Stejskal 2022, 3), having “watched over the embezzlement of the country” and “privatized politics for themselves and their pals” (cited in Havlík 2019, 376; Maškarinec and Bláha 2014, 708). He has also called the political establishment the “Czech Palermo” (Kopeček 2016, 732). In the 2017 election ANO broadened its perception of the political class to include “power groups” operating behind the scenes (Kim 2020, 628). This elite was morally contrasted to the hard working and industrious Czech people (Císař and Štětka 2016, 287–88), exemplified by Babiš and his business success (Havlík 2019, 376). For example, Babiš said in his first campaign that “We’re not like established politicians – we don’t steal, we work hard” (cited in Naxera 2018, 39). According to numerous scholars ANO did not moderate its populist rhetoric after joining government in 2013 (Havlík 2019, 373; Just and Chárvat 2016, 102; Hanley and Vachudova 2018, 281). We’ve therefore coded it 3 on OTH_POLCLASS in both 2013 and 2017.

ANO did not define the people or elite in ethnic or religious terms (Havlík 2019, 375), and “lacks a powerful narrative of Czech nationalism” (Hanley and Vachudova 2018, 278), perhaps in part because Babiš’ himself is Slovak-born (OTH_ETHNIC =1). It did however campaign to stop immigration in 2017, even though Babiš rejected Tomio Okamura’s nativist anti-immigrant populism as fearmongering due to the fact that immigration into the country was extremely low (Kim 2020, 629). We’ve coded the party 1 on OTH_IMMIGRANT in 2013 and 2 in 2017, after the 2015 migrant crisis. The party revered business, and claimed that the solutions and practices of the business world could be effectively applied to the political system (Havlík 2019, 376; Maškarinec and Bláha 2014, 708). We’ve found no other evidence of OTH_ECONOMIC rhetoric (= 1). The party was not Eurosceptic (Kaniok and Havlik 2016, 28), and we’ve seen no evidence for any other OTH_FOREIGN rhetoric (= 1), nor any OTH_MILITARY rhetoric (= 1).

While the party avoided identifying on the left-right scale (Havlík and Voda 2014, 9) and maintained a degree of ideological vagueness (Brunnerová 2018, 33; Just and Chárvat 2016, 99), it is generally described as “centrist” (Dostálová 2021, 288; Kuba, Hudec, and Stejskal 2022, 3), as confirmed by a study of votes by ANO deputies (Hájek 2017). It has been called economically “liberal” (Hanley and Vachudova 2018, 281) and “neo-liberal” (Kim 2020, 619), and Babis has occasionally identified as centre-right (Havlík and Voda 2014, 9). There may be a case to code it CR but for now we’ve coded it C on LRPOSITION. Babiš’ charisma has been central to the ANO project (Kubát and Hartliński 2019, 112; Kopeček 2016, 732), to the extent that he “represents the image of the whole party” (Brunnerová 2018, 33), and the party is seen as fundamentally connected to and dependent on him (Just and Chárvat 2016, 96; Kubát and Hartliński 2019, 108; 2019, 109). ANO has been called a “personal project” (Kopeček and Svačinová 2016, 135), and even Babiš himself has claimed the “The party is connected to my person. The party is me” (Hájek 2017, 280). Babiš had total control of the party organisation, and provided much of its funding (Hloušek and Kopeček 2019, 41; Just and Chárvat 2016, 97). At one meeting with deputies over the direction of the party, he simply asserted “I pay, I decide” (Hloušek and Kopeček 2019, 41).

Babiš and ANO wanted a more centralised political system with less limitations on the executive, including strengthened state influence on public media (Havlík 2019, 380). He has also expressed a philosophical hostility to checks and balances (Hanley and Vachudova 2018, 282), which some have considered a rejection of pluralism and embrace of authoritarianism (Hanley and Vachudova 2018, 282). We see these however as systemic changes within the bounds of liberal democracy, and not necessarily a threat to liberal democracy per se, so we’ve coded the party 1 on LIBDEMNORMS, but this could be revisited. Babis was connected to the political establishment well before he founded ANO (Havlík 2019, 373; Roberts 2019, 434), but did not serve in any government prior to 2013. We’ve coded him 1 on INSIDER for that election and 2 for 2017 after ANO’s stint in coalition government.

Dawn of Direct Democracy/ Freedom and Direct Democracy

Dawn of Direct Democracy (Úsvit přímé demokracie, often just called ‘Úsvit’) was created by businessman and senator Tomio Okamura before the 2013 elections on a platform of right wing “direct democracy” platform. Okamura had previously been a prolific commentator and author (Císař and Štětka 2016, 288). The group entered parliament after polling 6.8% but split in early 2015 due to an internal crisis when ten of the party’s 14 MPs opposed Okamura’s leadership (Cirhan and Kopeckỳ 2017, 119). After being ejected from Úsvit, Okamura founded “Freedom and Direct Democracy” (Svoboda a přímá demokracie, SPD) in 2015 on basically the same themes as Úsvit (Kubát and Hartliński 2019, 110). In the 2017 elections SPD polled 10.6% of the vote, while Úsvit’ failed to return to Parliament. Given that both parties revolved around Okamura’s persona and rhetoric, we’ve not seen any reason to code them differently in the 2013 and 2017 elections.

Both Úsvit and SPD have been classed as “anti-establishment” (Kaniok and Havlik 2016, 28) and “anti-system” (Kuba, Hudec, and Stejskal 2022, 3) parties due to their hostility toward the political class and all-encompassing accusations of corruption (Havlík and Voda 2014, 9). Okamura disputed the existence of democracy in the Czech Republic, instead claiming that “it’s a government of the big mega-firms, the godfathers, and as their tools, they have the individual parties” (Voda and Havlík 2021, 282). He consistently claimed that the dynamics of the system were “rigged” (Kazharski 2022, 87) in favour of these “godfather party mafias” (Kim 2020, 627) on all sides of politics (OTH_POLCLASS = 3).

What separated Okamura from other significant populist parties (VV and ANO in particular) was his use of ethno-centric and anti-minorities rhetoric (Kim 2020, 627) and xenophobia (Balík and Hloušek 2016, 105). Initially, this targeted the Roma (Havlík 2014, 46; Vít 2015, 85), whom he called “unadaptables” (Kim 2020, 627). Among several examples of this anti-Roma rhetoric: he has called for Roma to be sent “back” to India (Vít 2015, 99); denied the persecution of the Roma during the Holocaust (Naxera 2018, 49); and visited prisoners convicted of racially motivated murder (Bonansinga 2015, 113). More recently Okamura has targeted Muslims as an “other” to the Czech people (Krobová and Zàpotockỳ 2021, 59). He has proposed a complete ban on Islam in the name of “freedom” (Kim 2020, 619), suggested that his followers walk pigs and dogs near mosques (Bonansinga 2015, 113), and claimed that Czech women will be forced to wear headscarfs if more Muslims come (Vít 2015, 104). SPD MPs have also called Muslims an “invasive species” in Europe (Kazharski 2022, 86). We’ve therefore coded Úsvit’ and SPD 3 on OTH_ETHNIC.

This ethnocentrism overlapped with a sharp hostility toward immigrants (Kazharski 2022, 85; Císař and Štětka 2016, 295; Maškarinec and Bláha 2014, 709; Havlík 2014, 46), whom Okamura considered a threat to the interests and needs of the Czech people. This can be seen in election slogans like “Support to families, not to unadaptables. Work to our [people], not to immigrants” (Kim 2020, 627). While this increased significantly due to the 2015 immigration crisis, scholarship preceding this still points to the centrality of immigration in the party’s program (Havlík 2014, 46; Maškarinec and Bláha 2014, 709), which is somewhat ironic as Okamura himself is the son of a Japanese-Korean migrant father (Kazharski 2022, 85). We’ve therefore coded the parties 3 on OTH_IMMIGRANTS in both 2013 and 2017.

Okamura has been described as “soft-Eurosceptic” (Kaniok and Havlik 2016, 28), but we’ve not seen evidence that it considers foreign forces or states to be the enemy of the people (OTH_FOREIGN = 1). Likewise, we’ve seen no evidence of OTH_ECONOMIC or OTH_MILITARY rhetoric (both = 1). Though Okamura has distanced the party from left-right labels (Voda and Havlík 2021, 282), and has been described as ideologically vacant by some (Vít 2015, 99), both parties are universally considered either far right (Dostálová 2021, 288; Kazharski 2022, 84) or extreme right (Naxera 2018, 46). While this is most apparent in its ethno-nationalism, it also espoused a “hyper-neoliberal welfare chauvinism” on economic matters (Kim 2020, 627) (LRPOSITION = FR). Both parties revolved around Okamura’s personality (Vít 2015, 99; Kopeček and Svačinová 2016, 150) as demonstrated by the fact that the Úsvit disintegrated when he left it (Kubát and Hartliński 2019, 110). This was more structurally so in SPD, which was governed totally by him as chairman (Kubát and Hartliński 2019, 112) in an authoritative style (Cirhan and Kopeckỳ 2017, 119) (CHARISMA = 3).

Okamura has questioned the legitimacy of democratic institutions and the media. When he was barred from running for president in 2012 due to insufficient signatures, he claimed that the system was “rigged” to keep candidates like him out, and that “mafia godfathers were paying the media to be biased in favor of some of the candidates” (Kazharski 2022, 87). As discussed above he has also instructed his supporters to harass Muslims (Bonansinga 2015, 113). We’ve coded the parties 2 on LIBDEMNORMS, although there is a case for this to be increased to 3. Okamura has not been a senior figure in government before (INSIDER = 1).

Czech Pirate Party

The Czech Pirate Party (PP-CZ or “Piráti”) was founded in 2009 by programmer Jiří Kadeřávek on the mantra that “traditional political elites” could not be relied on to ensure internet freedom anymore after the Swedish Pirate Bay case (Šárovec 2019, 4). By the 2017 election it was led by Ivan Bartoš, and surprised many by polling 10.8% and entering parliament for the first time. With 22 seats in the legislature it became the world’s most successful Pirate Party to date.

Whether Pirate Parties should be considered populist has been subject to much debate. Like other Pirate Parties, the Czech Pirates based their formal programme on internet freedom, data privacy, and opposition to tech monopolies (Šárovec 2019, 5) – a programmatically specific agenda that is not itself populist. However the literature suggests that the Czech Pirates extended from this base to a more all-encompassing and invective critique of the political class that focussed on corruption (Naxera 2021, 5; Lucarelli, Fuschillo, and Chytkova 2020, 1144; Maškarinec 2020, 523) and “vigorously criticis[ed] the established order” (Pink and Folvarčný 2021, 177). Numerous scholars have noted that this anti-establishment rhetoric became a “distinguishing feature” of the party (Dostálová 2021, 294), and according to the party’s own strategists, this “protest” narrative superseded its other programmatic focuses during the 2017 election (Šárovec 2019, 10). In one clear example of a populist campaign narrative, the party campaigned with a bus previously used by the prison services adorned with images of established politicians wearing prison uniforms and the motto “Let us blow them down!” (Naxera 2021, 5; Šárovec 2019, 11). As Šárovec describes it:

The main slogans of the campaign, often depicted on black-and-white visuals, were such slogans like “Not everybody steals!”, “Let us go after them!”. On the web page of the “Pirates electoral guidepost” under the program, there are the following introductory words of the PP-CZ chairman: “We are the only party unrelated to scandals, corruption, and bureaucracy…” (Šárovec 2019, 10).

This anti-elite and anti-corruption criticism was directed against the entire political establishment. In Naxera’s words “The [Pirate’s] anti-corruption appeal was not directed against the left-wing or the right-wing parties, but rather at the system of established parties as such.” (Naxera 2021, 5). This is sufficient to consider the pirates populist by our definition, and we’ve coded them 3 on OTH_POLCLASS. Apparently they tempered their rhetoric significantly after reaching parliament in 2017 (Naxera 2021, 11).

We’ve seen no evidence for any rhetoric on the OTH_ETHNIC, OTH_IMMIGRANTS, OTH_FOREIGN or OTH_MILITARY variables (all = 1). The only “other” relevant to the party’s anti-establishment populism is OTH_ECONOMIC. In its initial digital privacy and freedom narrative, copyright and tech monopolies were a key threat to the freedom of ordinary people (Šárovec 2019, 5), and the party developed a stance against tax avoidance by multinationals (Pink and Folvarčný 2021, 181). It’s debatable whether this quite reaches a 3 by our definition, so we’ve coded it 2.

The Pirates eschewed left-right ideological labels (Šárovec 2019, 5), and their official socio-economic policy was vague and ambivalent (Pink and Folvarčný 2021, 182). It could however be considered new left or left-libertarian in a similar vein to other Pirate parties (Lucarelli, Fuschillo, and Chytkova 2020, 1141), and some have considered the party economically centrist (Bakke 2022, 6). We’ve coded them CL on LRPOSITION but this could be revisited. The party was very decentralised, and didn’t rely on its leader (Naxera 2021, 5), and was internally governed by well-defined statutes and procedures that are independent from the executive. (Šárovec 2019, 4). The party even made a point of avoiding becoming a “one-man party” (Lucarelli, Fuschillo, and Chytkova 2020, 1143) (CHARISMA = 1). The party was not hostile to the media like other Czech populists (Naxera 2021, 10), and we’ve seen no evidence that it threatened liberal democratic norms (LIBDEMNORMS = 1). No members of the party leadership had ever served in government at the time of the 2017 election (INSIDER = 1).

Not included

The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy KSČM) is the successor of the Communist party of Czechoslovakia. Unlike other communist successor parties in eastern and central Europe, KSČM never made any transition into a more moderate social democratic party and retains a Marxist Leninist identity (Císař and Kubát 2021, 7). It has been frequently mentioned in studies of populism in the Czech Republic, many of which have concluded that the party has “populist features” (Císař and Štětka 2016, 287), or have claimed that it espoused anti-elite (Kuba, Hudec, and Stejskal 2022, 3), anti-establishment (Kopecky and Mudde 1999, 418), or (especially) anti-system (Balík and Hloušek 2016, 108; Císař and Kubát 2021, 7) characteristics. However most of this seems to be mainly due to the party’s ideological opposition to the post transition liberal democratic system, rather than due to an entrenched populist narrative in its campaigns. Many studies that have addressed its potential categorisation as populist have identified only “partial traces of populism” (Pitrová 2007, 8), or “partly revolutionary rhetoric” (Kuba, Hudec, and Stejskal 2022, 4), and noted that it “does not fulfil all the defining features of populism” (Císař and Kubát 2021, 7). Frič and Gyárfášová, for example, note the KSČM’s “above average levels of populism” regarding anti-elite and ant-establishment rhetoric in the 2010s, but note that this is significantly less so than the SPD, ANO and the Pirates (Frič and Gyárfášová 2019, 231). Likewise, even its anti-system opposition to liberal democratic rule needs to be qualified, as Vlachová has concluded that the party “works within the system and behaves according to its rules” (Vlachová 1997, 47). Research into the party system via texts from the 1990s did not find sufficient evidence of populist rhetoric. Therefore we’ve not included KSČM in the dataset. This should however be revisited in the future.

References

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