Chile

Date range: 1989-2020.
Chile suffered a military dictatorship at the hands of General Augusto Pinochet from 1973 until 1990. In 1988 a referendum was held on whether to continue with Pinochet’s dictatorship, which was won by the NO. The first democratic elections were held in 1989 and Patrio Aylwin, a center-left Christian Democrat, became president. Chile has traditionally been considered an exception to the succession of populist leaders in other Latin American countries. As Drake (1999: 72) argues, “populism did not disrupt the transition to democracy or occupy center stage”. “Centrist and leftist politicians did not want populism to upset the new democracy any more than they wanted to disturb macroeconomic equilibrium” (Drake, 1999: 72). Thus, none of the big coalition of Chilean parties is considered populist by most scholars. However, although no populist leader has held the presidency since 1990, there are a number of less successful candidates that should be included in that category.

Case notes

Francisco Javier Errázuriz

Along with the candidates of the right and left, Francisco Javier Errázuriz, a wealthy businessman that came from a highly influential family in Chile, claimed to represent the “centre-centre” of politics in the 1989 presidential election (Drake, 1999: 73). The movement was a surprise at the time and, not being backed by any party, and he won 15% of the vote.

Errázuriz appealed an antiparty undercurrent based on “vaguely nationalistic, reformist, anticorruption, antipolitician platform aimed at broad segments of the middle classes and unorganized workers” (Drake, 1999: 73). His platform was based on praising the free-market system and promising social justice (Drake, 1999: 73). He put himself, a wealthy businessman, as an example of an accomplished life and claimed to be able to show Chileans the way to the same wealth and wellbeing (Errázuriz, 1989a). We have coded him 1 for OTH_FOREIGN and OTH_FINANCIAL.

Errázuriz’s discourse, although anti-politician, was conciliatory. He argued against the polarization of society in two blocks: “do not divide the country in two sides… we need unity” (Errázuriz, 1989a) and he claimed that he did not call voters to vote against anybody (Errázuriz, 1989b). He claimed that one of the biggest challenges facing Chile was the aggressive opposition of the left and right of the country (LRPOSITION = C). Thus, his criticism of political elites came from a centre-liberal position that aimed to mobilise the people against the current state of divisive politics used by politicians (OTH_POLCLASS = 2).

Although he has been later involved in several cases of corruption, there is nothing in his 1989 campaign that indicates a violation of liberal democratic norms. In fact, he criticised the violation of human rights and argued for the protection of civil liberties (Francisco Errazuriz - Spot de campaña elecciones en Chile 1989 1989) (LIBDEMNORMS = 1). However, his aim to leave the past behind also means that he did not condemn the military dictatorship, nor it consider it part of the establishment (OTH_MILITARY = 1). We have not been able to find any negative references to either immigrants or ethnic others (OTH_ETHNIC and OTH_IMMIGRANT = 1). Before running for president, Errázuriz held no political position and was not involved with any party (INSIDER = 1). His campaign had been described as a “personalistic effort” (Drake 2012, 81) because it was purely based on his personal figure as a successful businessman and a man outside of politics (CHARISMA = 3).

Joaquín Lavín

The Independent Democratic Union (Unión Demócrata Independiente, UDI) was founded in 1982 as one of the parties that defended the military dictatorship. The party was “inspired by Spanish Franquismo corporatism” and “its founding leader, Jaime Guzmán, was the political ideologue of the authoritarian regime” (Luna et al. 2013: 923). The UDI “was born in the midst of neo-conservatism, and in the context of a conservative turn within the Catholic Church” (Luna et al. 2013: 929). Moreover, the party “developed close ties with business interests which partially explains its electoral performance since 1989 in the upper sectors of the Chilean society and its financial campaign advantages” (Luna et al. 2013: 924) but also aimed at attracting the poorer sections of society through the financing of specific programs targeted to the poor (Luna, 2010: 326). As a defender of the military establishment and Pinochet’s legacy, the party cannot be considered populist in its first elections. Scholars agree that it is Joaquin Lavin’s leadership which introduces an “anti-politics discourse” in its campaigns (Silva, 2001; Luna, 2010; Luna et al. 2013; Cortés and Pelfini, 2017).

Joaquin Lavin’s professional evolution follows that of other “Chicago boys”, a group of Chilean economists that studied at the University of Chicago and then applied their neoliberal policies during the Pinochet dictatorship (Silva 1991, 368). Lavin studied at Chicago, became dean of School of Economics at a Chilean University, participated in Pinochet’s administration, became secretary general of the UDI from 1990 to 1994 and acted as mayor of a municipality in the 90s. He did not, however, participate in the inner circle of Pinochet’s government (INSIDER = 1). The UDI was very much attached to Pinochet’s legacy but his arrest in London in 1988 introduced a change in the political discourse of the party, which praised the dictatorship less from that point on (Silva, 2001: 28) and crafted a more moderated image for itself (Luna, 2010: 346). The crisis and several cases of corruption in the previous government gave way to Lavin’s anti-political and neo-populist strategy “expressed in his abhorrence of politics and political parties, and his inclination to 'technify' social problems and their solutions” (Silva, 2001: 33). He claimed to be concentrating on the real problems of the people by addressing particular issues instead crafting large plans and promised “more action and less politics” (Silva 2001, 33). The party self-proclaimed itself as the “popular party” in order to enhance its identification with the people and it proclaimed to overcome the left-right divide (Cortés and Pelfini, 2017: 67). We have coded 3 OTH_POLCLASS, 1 for OTH_FINANCIAL and 1 for OTH_FOREIGN, and 2 for CHARISMA since it was Lavin who introduced the novel anti-politics discourse to an already established party. Without him, the party would have continued to exist, but it would not have taken its populist stance.

Neither immigration nor indigenous communities were a central element in Lavin’s campaign, and he has shown itself to be in favor of a better recognition for the Mapuches (Emol, 2013) and for a regulated open immigration policy (OTH_IMMIGRANTS = 1, OTH_ETHNIC = 1). I have not found any indication of Violation of liberal democratic norms. In fact, when he lost the election, he stood in the balcony of the winner, Ricardo Lagos, as a way of signaling his commitment to collaborate with the new government in a friendly manner (Silva, 2001: 35).

Luna et al. (2013) point out that Lavin’s candidacy implied a disrupture in UDI’s traditional politics. This disrupture did not continue after Lavín’s failed bids for president. In 2009, the leader of the Alliance for Chile, was the candidate from the National Renovation, Sebastián Piñera. In 2013, Evelyn Matthei, a former minister under Piñera’s government and member of UDI, was the candidate of the alliance and again in 2017 Piñera was presented as the candidate for the right-wing coalition. Both have explicitly rejected populist rhetoric (Emol, 2013b; Romainville, 2018) and they are not treated as populist in the scholarship. Moreover, it is not clear at what point the party did change its position to a populist one under Lavín. It is perfectly possible to consider Lavín’s anti-political discourse exclusive of the leader and not of the party. However, considering Lavín’s role as the leader of the party as the leader of the opposition for several years, we have decided to leave the UDI in the dataset for the 2001 and 2005 legislative elections. However, we have not added the party before or after Lavín’s period.

Marco Enríquez-Ominami

Marco Enríquez-Ominami, or MEO as he is commonly known, is the son of a guerrilla warrior killed by the military dictatorship (Prados 2015) and step-son of a historic leader of the Socialist Party (Schuster y Osorio 2010, 101). His family was forced into exile and when he went back to Chile, he became known as a TV host and as a movie director. He became a member of parliament in 2005 for the Socialist Party, which was ruling at the time. In 2009, the left-wing electoral alliance denied the possibility of holding primary elections and instead chose former president Eduardo Frei as their candidate (BCN 2020). Enríquez-Ominami decided then to run for the presidency as an independent candidate, where he polled in third place with 20.14%. He had no previous governmental experience (INSIDER = 1, INC_PARL = 1, INC_PRES = 1). He later created his own party (The Progressive Party) and ran again three more times in 2013, 2017 and 2021, although less successfully. The campaign of MEO was personalist, mediatic, with a strong emotional speech, based on the closeness to the people and facing its other contenders whom it identified as "figures of the past" (Dosek and Freidenberg, 2014: 22) (Bunker y Navia 2013, 15) (CHARISMA = 3).

He wished to distance himself from the old political elite, which he considered that had “kidnapped politics and did not offer a change for Chile” (Dosek and Freidenberg, 2014: 23). He denounced that millions of Chileans were “outside of the political process” and campaign to end that situation (Enríquez-Ominami, 2009). In 2013 he coauthored a book titled “The economy is not the problem, power is” in which he criticised the “duopolistic Chile”, in reference to the two big parties at the time (Gumucio Rivas y Enríquez-Ominami 2013, 10). He also stated that “turned into mafias, political parties care little about triumphing with a minority of votes cast; they are incapable of understanding abstention as a form of rejection of the prevailing system” because political partied had become “feudal oligarchies” (Gumucio Rivas y Enríquez-Ominami 2013, 13) (OTH_POLCLASS = 3).

MEO ran on a left-wing platform, based on critiquing neoliberal policies, promising free public education and an increase of the minimum salary (Manifesto, 2009) but his platform was not radical. He wished to “raise corporate taxes but lower the income tax” and he “also expressed an openness to having the state divest itself of a small stake of its copper Company” (Moffett and Pica, 2009) (Bunker y Navia 2013, 15). Thus, his main target was the political class but not the economic elite (LRPOSITION = L, OTH_FINANCIAL = 1). We have also found evidence of criticism to international institutions when he argued, for instance, that “Europe's old parliamentary democracies have lost sovereignty […] to the tyrannical rule of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the European Bank. It matters little the political sign of the parliamentary majorities, whether they are social-democratic or right-wing: they all play the same music contained in the Troika's pentagram.” (Gumucio Rivas y Enríquez-Ominami 2013, 12) but we have found little evidence that this was one of his main elements of campaign, which was centred on criticisng political elites and proposing political reforms. Thus, we have coded OTH_FOREIGN as 2.

Enríquez-Ominami had a favorable position towards immigration and indigenous communities in Chile, arguing that “a great deal of the history of Chile is written together with Mapuches and immigrants” (CNN, 2017). We have therefore coded him 1 for both OTH_IMMIGRANTS and OTH_ETHNIC. We have not found any reference that could be used to identify the military as an enemy of the people in MEO’s discourse (OTH_MILITARY = 1).

Enríquez-Ominami proclaimed the need to democratize the country, regenerate politics, “combat social inequality and promote regional political unity” (Moffett and Pica, 2009). He also criticised harshly the Ministers of Economy of Chile saying that his country needed to “repoliticize to society against the dictatorship of the economists. The economy in Chile has eaten law and democracy” (Prados 2015). Given his defense of primary elections and democracy, we have coded him 1 in LIBDEMNORMS.

Broad Front

The Broad Front (“Frente Amplio”) is a coalition of left-wing parties created in 2017 in order to compete in the elections. Its origins can be traced to the student protests of 2011 and the coalition includes a wide variety of left and far-left parties with the exception of the Communist party, which participated in the centre-left coalition (Miranda Orrego 2022, 187; Soto Pimentel 2017, 51; Thielemann 2018, 6). González Le Saux exposes the Broad Front’s vision of the economic and political system in Chile:

From Frente Amplio’s perspective, the bipartisan logic of compromise between the two ruling coalitions has allowed the neoliberal model-cemented during the country’s 17-year dictatorship under Augusto Pinochet (1973-1990)-to continue, with only moderate reforms aimed at mitigating its most draconian consequences. Frente Amplio seeks to overcome a transitional order characterized by a neoliberal economy, export-driven extractivism, and the privatization of social rights in the realms of education, health, labor, and social security (González Le Saux, 2017).

It is a party that criticises harshly the establishment and wishes a radical rupture with it: “Frente Amplio is appealing to the novelty and integrity of its candidates, unpolluted by the links between money and politics. Against the paternalistic and top-down functioning of traditional parties, it promotes a participatory style of politics” (González Le Saux, 2017). The Broad Front, thus, has a “left-wing agenda of anti-neoliberalism, environmentalism, pro-immigrant and LGBTQI rights” (González Le Saux, 2017). They claimed to be an alternative to the “duopoly” of the big traditional Chilean parties, become “independent from the business power” (Manzano 2017, 171) and “antagonise the ‘politicians from the democratic transition’” (Manzano 2017, 178). He party is clearly identified by scholars as having a leftist platform and proposing significant reforms (Soto Pimentel 2017, 50) and has been frequently compared with Podemos in Spain (Manzano 2017, 172; Miranda Orrego 2022, 185). We have coded it 3 on OTH_POLCLASS , OTH_FINANCIAL and FL on LRPOSITION.

The Broad Front’s presidential candidate was Beatriz Sánchez, a radio and TV host that identified herself as “left-wing, but a very democratic left” and who stresses the importance of discussion as a way of reaching agreements (The Global Vote, 2017) The party also wanted to deepen democratic participation by “opening instances of decision and intervention of the State to binding participation, adapting them to the particularities as women, as children and young people, as indigenous or Afro-descendants, as foreigners residing in Chile, as people with disabilities, as LFTBI community” (Manzano 2017, 179) (LIBDEMNORMS = 1). Sánchez never held a position in government and did not belong to any party before 2017 (INSIDER = 1). Since the party was created independently of Sánchez, had a long tradition on social movements (Miranda Orrego 2022, 187) and would have existed without her, we have coded 1 on CHARISMA.

She declared herself as a feminist candidate for the presidency and was a defender of LGTB rights and abortion (The Global Vote, 2017). Additionally, she was particularly critical of the sharp inequalities in Chile: “The concentration of wealth is one of the highest in Latin America. [The rich should] pay fair taxes. I don’t want them not to earn money, but to pay fair taxes.” (The Global Vote, 2017).

The army received harsh criticism from Sanchez due to the lack of governmental control over it (Sanchez, 2016). Moreover, she also argued against the privileges the army has in comparison with other public servants such as a better pension scheme or healthcare system (Sanchez, 2016). The reason for this, she argued, was that “there isn’t a real dominion of the Civil power over the military power” and urged to change that situation (Sanchez, 2016) (MILITARY = 3).

Regarding foreign powers or interests, “the agenda is predominantly domestic, with relatively little reference made to international affairs or Chile’s role in the world” (The Global Vote, 2017). We have not found nationalist rhetoric nor the identification of external threats in Sanchez’s discourse (OTH_FOREIGN = 1).

José Antonio Kast

José Antonio Kast is a lawyer from a prominent political family in Chile. He was a city councillor, a member of the chamber of deputies for 14 years and secretary general of the UDI. Kast was a well-known figure of the most conservative current of the UDI and left the party in 2016 in order to run for president in the 2017 campaign on a more right-wing and populist platform. He has professed many times its admiration for Bolsonaro’s defeat of the “corrupt left” (Tele13, 2018) and is considered to be a prime example of the populist radical right in Latin America (Zanotti y Roberts 2021, 36).

Kast was a strong supporter of the dictatorship of Pinochet, saying that if Pinochet were alive, he would vote for him (Freixas, 2019). He participated in the campaign for the YES to the dictatorship in the 1988 referendum and his brother, as one of the “Chicago Boys”, actively participated in Pinochet’s government. Moreover, he asked for the liberation of one of the torturers of the dictatorship (Freixas, 2019). Kast was in favor of increasing military spending, stating that “the armed forces, in justified cases and as a strictly exceptional measure, will be able to collaborate in matters of public security when they are required in order to fight terrorism and drug trafficking. Improvements, innovation and new powers and attributions require a bigger budget. To this end, the limits of the use of the Fund created by the Copper Reserve Law will be revised so that these resources can be used to increase the available military budget” (The Global Vote, 2017). (OTH_MILITARY = 1).

Kast is strongly opposed to abortion, feminism, and LGBT rights and considers the right-wing president, Sebastían Piñera as a “soft right” for “lack of character” and for giving in to pressures from the opposition” (Freixas, 2019). He claimed to be placed “to the right of the right” (Díaz, Rovira Kaltwasser, y Zanotti 2023, 345). After the 2017 election, he created a new party called Republican Action and its logo clearly references that of the French Front National (Cooperativa.cl 2018). Stronger law and order measures and authoritarian tendencies are clear in Kast’s platform. As (Díaz, Rovira Kaltwasser, and Zanotti (2023, 345) argue, “Of the three defining attributes of the PRR, there is little doubt that authoritarianism is the most important for Kast and the Partido Republicano”. He stated, for example, that ” “we unequivocally reject the so-called ‘neo-Marxist postmodernism’ that is beginning to settle in Chilean society through the interested use of matters such as human rights, gender, sexual orientation, immigration or the environment. Thus, we regret the use of names such as ... ‘homophobic’ to those who defend the idea that marriage is between a man and a woman” (Díaz, Rovira Kaltwasser, y Zanotti 2023, 346). These authors also identify nativism and populism as fundamental elements of Kast’s platform (Díaz, Rovira Kaltwasser, y Zanotti 2023, 346-47). For Kast, “the”corrupt elite” is portrayed as an assemblage of powerful actors who attack the common sense supported by the “pure people” (Díaz, Rovira Kaltwasser, y Zanotti 2023, 346-47). On economic issues, he is committed to neoliberal policies (Díaz, Rovira Kaltwasser, y Zanotti 2023, 349) and argues for a small state that is free from “politicking, privileges, duplicities or useless agencies” (Kast, 2017). Given all the above we have coded him FR in LRPOSITION, 3 for OTH_POLCLASS, 3 for LIBDEMNORMS and 1 for OTH_FINANCIAL.

On the relation between Chile and its neighbors, Kast displays a nationalistic view and identifies physical barriers as the solution to the long-standing territorial dispute with neighboring Bolivia. Kast stated that

we want to reaffirm the autonomy of Chile and its sovereignty that must be exercised in every corner of the country. For a long time, we have been passive spectators of the communication abuses of our neighbors of the northeast and we have not responded with sufficient force and decision to the lies of the Bolivian government… Physical barriers are required on the Chile-Peru and the Chile-Bolivia border to support our police and to help to fight drug trafficking and smuggling at the border. In addition, we need to incorporate more technology for the detection and prosecution of border crimes” (The Global Vote, 2017).

He also criticised Michelle Bachelet, the former Chilean president, for her role as High Commissioner for Human Rights, as well as the New York Times and the UN. However, several sources point to the fact that international others are not as significant for Kast as for other far-right parties and that the main outgroup are indigenous people inside the country and (Díaz, Rovira Kaltwasser, y Zanotti 2023, 351; Zanotti y Roberts 2021, 40) (OTH_FOREIGN = 2).

He is in favor of controlling migration, commenting that “those people who are going to come must know that as of today, Chile is not ready to receive all people.” (The Global Vote, 2017). “But we must also be rigorous in controlling our borders and in rejecting illegal immigration in every event (The Global Vote, 2017). Additionally, Kast has been criticized for”constructing a hate discourse regarding race, ethnicity or sexual minorities” (Freixas, 2019) (OTH_ETHNIC = 3, OTHIMMIGRANT = 3).

Although Kast did not participate in the government, he was a prominent member of the UDI for many years and secretary general of the party before he decided to run as an independent. We have therefore coded him as 2 for INSIDER. It is plausible to imagine that other far-right parties could have emerged in the 2017 elections, but Kast’s movement was based on his personas as he ran as an independent and then founded the party Republican Action (Díaz, Rovira Kaltwasser, y Zanotti 2023, 356) (CHARISMA = 3).

Not Included

We have not found sufficient evidence on the Communist Party at this stage to decide on its inclusion. We have provided below some references in case a later review of the dataset decides to include it.

Communist Party / Together we can do more for Chile

There has been extensive debate over whether Communist and/or Socialist ideologies are similar or dissimilar to populist discourses. Hawkins and Rovira-Kaltwasser (2017) argue that the combination of Marxism and populism is common in Chile, being Salvador Allende its prime example.

The Communist Party of Chile is “a revolutionary Party, which fights for socialism and recognizes the driving role of the working class” (Communist Party of Chile, 2002) that aims at the “suppression of all forms of political, economic, social and cultural domination over the people” (Communist Party of Chile, 2002). Although Marxist parties tend to downplay their national ties in favor of internationalism while populist parties are usually more nationalistic, the Chilean Communist Party aims at combining the two by stating that its inspiration is “national, patriotic, Latin Americanist and internationalist” (Communist Party of Chile, 2002). Furthermore, the party is “anti-imperialistic” and “fights for the self-determination of the peoples and is in solidarity with all those who fight for their national independence, for democracy, for socialism and peace.” (Communist Party of Chile, 2002). We have coded 3 for Financial Elite, Foreign Interests and Political Class and “Far-Left” as its ideology.

Although the Communist party is a revolutionary party and “it’s sustained on the ideas of Marx, Engels and Lenin” (Communist Party of Chile, 2002), it also proclaims that “because of its tradition and democratic spirit, it fights for democracy as a form of political organization of society” and that “its humanistic conception contains the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (Communist Party of Chile, 2002). I have not found actions carried out by the Communist Party in this period that imply a violation of LD norms. I have coded this category as a 2.

The party suffered persecution during the dictatorship and could not compete in the first elections under its name. Since Allende’s government, the Communist party did not participate in the administration and was not led by any charismatic leader. Therefore, I have coded 3 for Military, and 1 for Insider Populism and Personality Dependent.

In 2005, the party forms an electoral alliance with the Humanist party called “Together we can do more for Chile” (“Juntos Podemos Más por Chile”) and presented their leader, Tomás Hirsch, as their candidate for president. There were many ideological similarities between these two parties and the Communist party remained as the largest party in the coalition. Moreover, Hirsh campaigned on a progressive left-wing platform similar to that of the Communist party (Angell and Reig, 2006). Thus, I have kept the same coding as in the previous elections.

In 2009, 2013 and 2017 parliamentary elections, the Communist Party became part of the electoral alliance of the “Concertación” and “Nueva Mayoría” but obtained less than 5% of the votes. For the presidential elections, the party presented a candidate, supported Bachelet’s candidacy for 2013 and her successors in 2017. Thus, I have not coded the Communist party for these years. In 2009, “Together we can do more for Chile” presented Jorge Arrate as their presidential candidate. He ran on similar ideas to what the party defended before.

References

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CNN (2017) “MEO por inmigración:”Buena parte de la historia de Chile se escribe con mapuches e inmigrantes”, 2 October: https://www.cnnchile.com/pais/meo-por-inmigracion-buena-parte-de-la-historia-de-chile-se-escribe-con-mapuches-e_20171002/

Communist Party of Chile (2002) “Estatutos del Partido Comunista de Chile”, October-November: http://www.secst.cl/upfiles/documentos/02052016_1122am_57278cd1a8c05.pdf

Cortés, A. and Pelfini, A. (2017) “El populismo en Chile: ¿tan lejos, tan cerca?”, Izquierdas, 32, March, pp. 58-78.

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Díaz, Camila, Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, y Lisa Zanotti. 2023. «The arrival of the populist radical right in Chile : José Antonio Kast and the “Partido Republicano”». Journal of Language and Politics 22(3): 342-59.

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