Bulgaria

Date range: 1991-2020

Case notes

Bulgarian Business Bloc

The Bulgarian Business Bloc (Bulgarski biznes blok, BBB) was founded to defend business interests in the early 1990s (Kosová 2022, 370). Although not created by him, the party became totally dependent on its 1992 presidential candidate George Ganchev (Lessenski 2020, 45; Zankina 2016, 196; Georgi Karasimeonov 1995, 583), a flamboyant businessman who had lived abroad (CHARISMA = 3). Ganchev placed third in that election with 16.78% and reached 21.9 in the 1996 presidential election. The BBB won 5.27% of the vote in the 1997 parliamentary election. Ganchev split from the party to form the George Ganchev Bloc for the 2001 parliamentary elections, where both entities polled poorly.

Ganchev’s campaign was light on programmatic policy, but heavy on criticism of the political class, both sides of which he alleged to be equally corrupt, dishonest and incompetent (Levitt and Kostadinova 2014, 529). In Cristova’s words:

For the first time, the bifurcation and polarization in political discourse were superseded by an indiscriminate attack on the political elite altogether. His rhetorics witnessed an emergent attack on parliamentary democracy, which was testified in his depiction of deputies as ‘liars in parliament’ (Cristova 2010, 223).

Other literature has labelled him a “protest candidate” (Bastian 1998, 192) and an “opportunist” (Georgi Karasimeonov 1995, 583). On this basis we have coded him 3 on (OTH_POLCLASS = 3)

Other than this anti-politician rhetoric, we cannot see any evidence that the campaigns of Ganchev or BBB should register on the OTH_IMMIGRANT, OTH_ETHNIC, OTH_ECONOMIC, OTH_MILITARY, or OTH_FOREIGN, even though Ganchev was a strident nationalist (Georgi Karasimeonov 1995, 583). Owing to its economic policies we’ve coded party as right wing (LRPOSITION = R). We’ve seen no evidence that Ganchev was a participant in previous governments (INSIDER = 1), or that his campaign violated liberal democratic norms (LIBDEMNORMS = 1).

National Movement – Simeon II

In 2001, the former King Simeon Saxe-Goburg-Gotha, who served as a child monarch during WWII, ran a reformist campaign that is widely referred to as populist (see for example Raycheva and Peicheva 2020, 76). This campaign was supported by a new party, the National Movement - Simeon II (NMSS). Simeon’s campaign was a mixture of royal nostalgia, frustration with the political class, and the promise of an immediate improvement in living conditions (Cristova 2010, 224). It was based exclusively on the charisma of Simeon himself (G Karasimeonov and Lyubenov 2013, 413; Gurov and Zankina 2013, 5) (CHARISMA = 3). Simeon’s OTH_POLCLASS rhetoric was somewhat “softer” (Smilov and Krastev 2008, 9) than other populists in Bulgara, given that he promised to work with rivals transcend the pettiness of the current party system. Nonetheless, his campaign did paint a picture of the elite as enjoying “inexplicable richness” while the people suffered (Cristova 2010, 224), and presented a totally non-ideological and binary representation of the people and the elite (Smilov and Krastev 2008, 16; Gurov and Zankina 2013, 5), justifying at least a 2 on this variable.

We have seen no evidence of any other relevant OTH_ variable (all = 1), and despite his status as a former monarch, he was not any kind of INSIDER when he ran (= 1). Simeon’s transcendent image became diluted in office as he acted in increasingly partisan ways, and by the time he ran for re-election he did not present any populist traits at all (Cholova 2012, 78; Van Kessel 2015, 39), hence we have only included the party in the dataset in 2001.

Attack

Attack (Ataka) emerged in 2005, led by journalist Volen Siderov and based on his cable TV program of the same name. Attack utilised an extreme ethnocentric rhetoric as a rallying cry to disaffected voters, advocating “to take our Bulgaria back for the Bulgarians” (Ghodsee 2008, 30). The country allegedly needed to be taken “back” from a range of enemies, among them ethnic minorities such as Jews, Roma and Turks (Mestan 2022) (OTH_ETHNIC = 3).

It also utilised a radical anti-establishment rhetoric (Stoyanov and Kostadinova 2021, 230), claiming to represent the people as a whole (Smilov and Krastev 2008, 17), in opposition to a corrupt and self-serving elite. In Siderov’s maiden parliamentary speech, he claimed that

the Bulgarian people have been aroused and have deafeningly slapped the face of the so-called political class that has long turned into a herd of grunting pigs, into unfeeling balls of lard, deaf to the problems and the suffering of their own people (cited in Ghodsee 2008, 31).

It also utilised an anti-globalist narrative against the influence of the US (which Siderov considered to be controlled by Jews, (Ghodsee 2008, 32)), NATO, the World Bank and the IMF (Cristova 2010, 225), and the EU (OTH_FOREIGN=3). We could not find any specific references to anti-immigrant rhetoric in the years in which Ataka is included in the dataset (OTH_IMMIGRANTS = 1), although this could be investigated further. We’ve coded the party’s OTH_ECONOMIC rhetoric 2 given that it seems to be an extension of OTH_POLCLASS and OTH_FOREIGN rhetoric rather than opposition to businesses and the wealthy per se (Ghodsee 2008).

The party was dominated by the personality of Siderov (Ghodsee 2008, 32) (CHARISMA = 3), and given its occasionally violent rhetoric and actions it also deserves a 3 on LIBDEMNORMS. The party’s core left-right ideology is a hotly debated subject. While it presents the nativism and ethnocentrism typical of far-right parties, it also presents a programme critical of neo-liberalism, in particular the privatisation of state assets to political cronies and foreign powers. It has also advocated higher spending on welfare and social programs. Raycheva and Peicheva claim that the party’s ideology is a combination of “extremist right-wing with extreme left-wing ideas” (Raycheva and Peicheva 2020, 75). Given the salience of the party’s ethnonationalism, we’ve coded it FR on LRPOSITION. Cholova has suggested that the party moderated its image around 2009 in order to drop its pariah status (Cholova 2012, 78), but we cannot see enough evidence for a change on any of these variables. Further research should confirm this.

GERB

The strongest populist party since NMSS has been the centre-right Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB) founded by the mayor of Sofia (and former bodyguard) Boyko Borisov in 2006. The party is built around Borisov’s crass man-of-the-people appeal in a similar way to Ganchev in the 1990s, with his main criticism of the political class being corruption and ties to organised crime in existing governments (Cristova 2010, 225; Cholova 2012, 85). GERB achieved remarkable success in taking the place of the SDS and NMSS as the dominant centre right party from 2009 and as a result Borisov has dominated national politics in various coalitions for the past decade, weathering a storm of protests that saw him temporarily resign in 2013.

While he is generally right wing (LRPOSITION = CR), Borisov’s ideology was kept quite vague (Gurov and Zankina 2013, 6; Smilov 2008, 19). His hostility to the political class is rooted in allegations of corruption and incompetence – alleging for example that Parliament was full of “liars” and “losers” (Cristova 2010, 226) – particularly in relation to their inability to tackle organised crime (Cholova 2012, 85). He therefore “portrayed himself as a man of the people fighting against the corrupt elite” (G Karasimeonov and Lyubenov 2013, 415). It is however debatable whether Borisov and GERB deserve a 2 or a 3 in OTH_POLCLASS. There is reason to believe that his anti-politician rhetoric was not as strong as others in Bulgaria at the time – in part due to the fact that Borisov was himself connected to previous governments, and had an interest in eschewing the ‘populist’ label (G Karasimeonov and Lyubenov 2013, 415). While this could be further researched (particularly whether it has changed over time), we’ve labelled it 3 here.

Borisov is also pro-European, and it is not evident from our research that OTH_ETHNIC politics is prominent in his populism. Likewise, OTH_FOREIGN rhetoric does not seem to be a significant part of GERB’s platform, nor is OTH_ECONOMIC rhetoric given that the party generally promotes a sound business environment in its policies and platforms (Cholova 2012, 87). It is difficult to code the party on OTH_IMMIGRANT. Immigration has not been a salient political topic in Bulgaria until very recently, and much of the criticism GERB receives on the issue seems to have more to do with its choice of far right coalition parties rather then rhetoric emanating from Boyko himself. We’ve kept the coding at 1 in elections since 2014, further research should confirm this.

The party was and is entirely built around the down-to-earth tough guy personality of Borisov (Cristova 2010, 226; Smilov 2008, 19) (CHARISMA=3). As opposed to the regal and high-minded Simeon, this was rooted in a common man persona honed by skilled media performances and the personalisation of public policy (Ganev 2018, 99). According to Gurov and Zankina, Borisov “shares the popular dislike of institutions and the bureaucracy, labeling entire socio-occupational categories—such as judges or parliamentary deputies—inefficient and corrupt,” and rarely complies with constitutional constraints on his executive power (Gurov and Zankina 2013, 9). The government has also pressured state TV to supress voices critical of GERB (Ganev 2018, 96). However, it is not clear from our research that this hostility to democratic institutions constitutes a wholesale threat to democracy on the scale of Attack (LIBDEMNORMS = 2). Given that Borisov was the head of the police under Simeon II (Smilov 2008, 19), We have coded him 2 for INSIDER in his first election in 2009 and 3 in all others after forming government.

Patriotic Front/ United Patriots

Two far-right parties smaller than Attack, the National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria (NFSB) and IMRO Bulgarian National Movement (IMRO-BNM), formed a coalition for the 2014 elections called “Patriotic Front” (PF). NFSB is led by Valeri Simeonov, a media mogul who was once closely aligned with Attack’s leader Siderov before the two fell out bitterly (Simeonov is the owner of the SKAT cable TV station that Siderov’s original “Attack” program aired on). The IMRO has a more independent history, and could be considered somewhat more moderate than Attack, although not to the point of changing any of its coding here. The coalition received 7.28% in 2014, and was organised around a program highly similar to Attack’s. After seeing its own vote decline in comparison to the PF, Attack decided to join the group (previously bitter rivals) for the 2017 elections under the name United Patriots (UP), winning 15%.

While there are some differences between the three parties in this coalition, we have not seen any evidence to code PF or UP any differently to Attack, except for on the OTH_IMMIGRANT variable. This is not due to outlook as much as context: immigration was not a salient political issue in Bulgaria until the Syrian refugee crisis made it so (Weisskircher and Rone 2016, 2).

References

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Cholova, Blagovesta. 2012. ‘Bulgaria’. In Populist Political Parties in East Central Europe, edited by Vlastimil Havlík and Aneta Pinková, 73–96. Brno: Munipress.

Cristova, Christiana. 2010. ‘Populism: The Bulgarian Case’. Sociedade e Cultura 13 (2): 221–32.

Ganev, Venelin I. 2018. ‘Explaining Eastern Europe:" Soft Decisionism" in Bulgaria’. Journal of Democracy 29 (3): 91–103.

Ghodsee, Kristen. 2008. ‘Left Wing, Right Wing, Everything: Xenophobia, Neo-Totalitarianism, and Populist Politics in Bulgaria’. Problems of Post-Communism 55 (3): 26–39.

Gurov, Boris, and Emilia Zankina. 2013. ‘Populism and the Construction of Political Charisma: Post-Transition Politics in Bulgaria’. Problems of Post-Communism 60 (1): 3–17.

Karasimeonov, G, and M Lyubenov. 2013. ‘Bulgaria’. In The Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe, Third Edition, edited by Sten Berglund, Joakim Ekam, Kevin Deegan-Krause, and Terje Knutsen, 3 edition, 407–41. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Pub.

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Kosová, Klára. 2022. ‘Wealth Defence Strategies of Bulgarian Oligarchs in the 1990s’. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 22 (3): 361–79.

Lessenski, Marin. 2020. ‘Bulgaria: A Lesson in Learning the Hard Way?’ In Political History of the Balkans (1989-2018), edited by József Dúró and Zoltán Egeresi, 35–49. Budapest: Dialóg Campus.

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Mestan, Adnan. 2022. ‘Critical Analysis of the Russian-Bulgarian Political Relations Based on Far Right Parties 2013-2018’. CenRaPS Journal of Social Sciences 4 (1): 143–58.

Raycheva, Lilia, and Dobrinka Peicheva. 2020. ‘Reappraising the Political Populist Milieu in Bulgaria’. In Populist Political Communication across Europe: Contexts and Contents, edited by Agnieszka Stępińska, 71–87. Berlin: Peter Lang. https://www-peterlang-com.eu1.proxy.openathens.net/document/1059418.

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Smilov, Daniel, and Ivan Krastev. 2008. ‘The Rise of Populism in Eastern Europe: Policy Paper’. In Populist Politics and Liberal Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, edited by Grigorij Mesežnikov, Ol’ga Gyárfášová, and Daniel Smilov, 7–13. Bratislavia: Institute for Public Affairs.

Stoyanov, Dragomir, and Petia Kostadinova. 2021. ‘Bulgarian Political Parties and European Integration: From Anticommunism to Euroscepticism’. European Politics and Society 22 (2): 222–36.

Van Kessel, Stijn. 2015. Populist Parties in Europe: Agents of Discontent? Springer.

Weisskircher, Manès, and Julia Rone. 2016. ‘Unity Makes Strength? How the Radical Right Could Become Kingmakers in Bulgaria’. LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog (blog). London School of Economics and Political Science. 2016. http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/70093/1/blogs.lse.ac.uk-Unity%20makes%20strength%20How%20the%20radical%20right%20could%20become%20kingmakers%20in%20Bulgaria.pdf.

Zankina, Emilia. 2016. ‘Theorizing the New Populism in Eastern Europe’. Politologickỳ Časopis-Czech Journal of Political Science 23 (2): 182–99.