Brazil

Date range: 1988-2020
Brazil was controlled by the military between 1964 and 1985. In 1985 José Sarney was elected to the presidency of Brazil and initiated the democratic transition process. A new constitution was drafted in 1988 and the first direct presidential elections were held in 1989.

Case notes

Fernando Collor de Mello

Collor de Mello was a member of an important family in Brazil and had been elected as mayor of Maceió and governor of the province of Alagoas before running for president. He held no position of relevance in the previous regime and was little known to the public before 1989 (Moraes Valença 2002, 116) (INSIDER, INC_PARL, INC_PRES = 1). Coming from an underdeveloped and impoverished region, Collor de Mello ran a campaign as an outsider differentiating himself from traditional politicians (Panizza, 2000: 181). He engineered a modern communication campaign based entirely on his personal figure (he ran for a small and not well-known political party) (CHARISMA = 3). His campaign surpassed the traditional right-wing candidate and then defeated Lula da Silva’s party in the second round.

Collor de Mello is classical example of the neoliberal populist branch that was so successful in the 90’s in Latin America (Cammack 2000, 158). He based his campaign in fighting against corruption, criticizing particularly the “marajás” (high-ranked civil servants) (Noielli, 2008) (Moraes Valença 2002, 116). As Panizza puts it, “he was uncompromising in his attacks against the state’s bureaucracy, the political establishment and, particularly, against President Sarney” (Panizza, 2000: 182). He viewed the restoration of social order as a moral crusade against the “privileged political and economic elite that had become rich at the expense of the poor” and were “self-serving and corrupt” (Panizza, 2000: 182) and stated that “All elites are my enemies”(Moraes Valença 2002, 119) (OTH_POLCLASS = 3).

Collor de Mello claimed that he aimed “to make the right indignant and leave the left perplexed” (Panizza, 2000: 182-183) and proposed a “vague economic platform, a set of loosely arranged proposals, was designed not to alienate voters and supporters of different leanings or divide them along conflicting lines” (Moraes Valença 2002, 118). He was, however, an early adopter of neoliberal policies and rhetoric (Cammack 2000, 158) and proposed “the opening up of the economy, privatization, fiscal reforms, the end of established cartels and public corporation monopolies, and comprehensive administrative reform, including the elimination of public agencies and ministries as well as the dismissal of personnel” (Moraes Valença 2002, 118) (LRPOSITION = R).

Political classes were the main target of Collor the Mello and had a more complex relationship with businesses, because while he considered them part of the elite, he was endorsed and financed by them because they saw him as the right-wing candidate (Panizza 2000, 183). Collor de Mello was supported by important TV companies and right-wing groups of Brazil which wished to stop the rise of Lula (Ortiz de Zárate, 2016). He did, however, famously rejected one endorsement by “the highly influential Federaçao das Industrias do Estado de Sao Paulo (FIESP)” (Weyland 1993, 9) claiming that

[I] have got here with you alone, without support from organised groups, politicians or businessmen. They [the business organisations] can claim that they are voting for me. At the end of the day they are entitled to vote as they wish. But my public commitment is to govern for the poorest among the poor. (Panizza 2000, 183).

We have decided to code OTH_ECONOMIC as 2 because his criticism of economic elites was tangential to his criticism of political elites. Collor de Mello used this ambiguity to his advantage to gain support from the businesses (his campaign manager received significant amounts of money from businesses that would be later discovered and became the reason for his impeachment) while avoiding being seen as a sell-out to the rest of the population.

We’ve seen no reason to code above 1 for OTH_IMMIGRANTS, OTH_FOREIGN, or OTH_ETHNIC. He claimed to defend the poorest in the country, most of which are not white and promised to pay the foreign debts as opposed to what Lula and Brizola were claiming (Moraes Valença 2002, 118).

Once in government, Collor de Mello implemented a number of shock policies designed to liberalize the country, reduce hyperinflation and break with the previous statist model of economic development (Panizza, 2000: 185). He defended the need to implement neoliberal policies in order to reduce the hyperinflation that the country suffered at the moment (Noielli, 2008) and he liberalized and opened the economy by drastically lowering the import tariffs (Panizza, 2000: 185).

In line with his populist and personalist style, he also attempted to run with the support of the public opinion but without the backing of a stable party alliance. Panizza describes it in the following way:

Once in office, Collor faced two options: he could either radicalize the ‘politics of anti-politics’ campaign and refuse to acknowledge the legitimacy of the existing political establishment or, alternatively, become immersed in the political game, thus losing his status as political outsider. Eventually, Collor fell between two stools (Panizza, 2000: 187-188).

When his economic policies failed and he was accused of corruption by his own brother, the congress decided to impeach him. He resigned just before the impeachment, but congress incapacitated him for office for 8 years. Despite the corruption in his government, his campaign was meant to clean of corruption the Brazilian state, help the poor and modernise the country (Weyland 1993, 5). Therefore, we have not found any discursive or rhetorical break of established liberal democratic norms. To the contrary, his discurse promoting these norms ultimately backfired when he was shown to equally corrupt as previous leaders (LIBDEMNORMS = 1).

Workers’ Party

The Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores. PT) is the most prominent party in Brazilian politics of the last decades. It was founded in 1980 by a group of academics, intellectuals and union leaders led by Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, a popular union leader with no formal educational background (French y Fortes 2005, 18). Lula ran unsuccessful presidential campaigns in 1989, 1994, 1998 before finally winning in 2002. During this period, the party went through an important transformation in its discourse, moderating its radicalism with every electoral bid (Hunter, 2010: 60). Whether or not Lula should be considered populist has been the subject of considerable debate. Conniff (1999: 59), for example has stated that he “could not even remotely be called populist,” while Zedillo (2002: 55) argues that Lula ran on a populist platform.

PT’s platform was rooted in achieving socialism and in an opposition to trade liberalization, labor ‘flexibilization’ and neoliberal reforms (Hunter 2010, 26). Moreover, “the PT adopted a pro-labor and anti-foreign capital positions in its Constituent Assembly” (Hunter, 2010: 26). It even proposed the nationalization of the financial sector in 1989. The 1989 campaign was very much based on populist rhetoric. It was depicted as a struggle between “rich versus poor, exploiters versus exploited” and the solution was a radical rupture with the previous system (Hunter, 2010: 110). The PT fiercely criticized the status quo and rejected privatizations because they were seen as “delivering the national patrimony over to greedy domestic and foreign interests” (Hunter, 2010: 111). Additionally, Lula da Silva’s image, as an uncompromising “bearded labor leader in rolled-up sleeves” (Hunter, 2010: 111) signalled his stylistic opposition to traditional politicians.

Collor de Mello’s corruption and the economic hardship of the time encouraged the PT to continue with its oppositional politics and to present itself as proposing a radical departure from the existing order (Hunter, 2010: 117). Mentions to “transformation”, “revolution” and criticism of the “dominant classes” were common in the campaign and PT’s program concentrated on issues such as the external debt, land reform and privatizations (Hunter, 2010: 118). However, there was substantial moderation in the discourse, as Hunter (2010: 119) puts it “the zero-sum language of 1989 (e.g., the poor can only gain at the expense of the rich) gave way to the concept of ‘citizenship’” as a way of “guaranteeing basic rights to the population as a whole”. Although the possibility of a “third way” was rejected Lula, himself more moderate than the party, he threatened to call off his candidacy if the radical trend the party was taken continued (Hunter, 2010: 121). In order to further his moderation, Lula chose Aloizio Mercandante as vice-president because of his links to the business world and to the military (Hunter, 2010: 121). We have coded 3 in OTH_POL_CLASS, OTH_FINANCIAL, and OTH_FOREIGN and FL in LRPOSITION in 1994 and in all elections before.

Lula strongly rejected the military dictatorship which made it very difficult for his party to be legally recognized in the 80s (Ortiz de Zarate, 2018). However, the military was not the main target of his discourse and he included the son of a military leader, Aloizio Mercandante, as his vice-president in 1994. Thus, we have coded OTH_MILITARY as 2 in all elections.

In 1998, although Leonel Brizola ran with him as vice-president, Lula made an important change to the party’s rhetoric. The PT criticized incumbent Fernando Enrique Cardoso’s policies for exacerbating unemployment, but it did not propose any alternative model, nor did it question the need for privatizations beyond specific problems with the way they were being done (Hunter, 2010: 131). In addition, the PT abandoned the idea of the land reform and minimized the language around class struggle and dominant classes (Hunter, 2010: 132). Lula stressed his poor origins in order to connect with the people while downplaying his role as a labor leader (Hunter, 2010: 133). We have therefore coded L for LRPOSITION in this election.

The biggest change, however, occurred with regards to the 2002 election. The words socialist or socialism did not appear in the 2002 manifesto and were replaced instead with the aim to “reform capitalism” and “democratize the market” (Hunter, 2010: 138). Lula wrote a “Letter to the Brazilian People” outside the margins of his party in which he pledged to maintain many of Cardoso’s policies, honor Brazil’s commitments with the IMF and keep a balanced budget (Hunter, 2010: 137). Furthermore, for the first time, the PT formed alliances with non-leftist parties. Jose Alencar, a businessman from the Liberal Party, was chosen to be Lula’s vice-president. Lastly, the change was not only one of moderation of policies, but of a different construction of the political leader (Giaccaglia 2010, 98). Confrontational politics were left aside to highlight Lula’s capacities as a competent, professional and experienced negotiator and politician (Hunter, 2010: 139). He was dressed in suits more often and one of the mottos of his campaign was “Lula, Peace and Love”. It is difficult to continue considering Lula as a populist in 2002. His campaign was ideological and rhetorically moderate and avoided the opposition between elites and the people that characterized his first campaigns. This does not mean that he was not committed to his leftist ideals, but that the discourse was not a populist one. We have decided, then, not to include him or the Workers Party in the dataset from 2002 (including his successor Dilma Rousseff).

Lula’s popularity among the Brazilian electorate was PT’s biggest asset. As an uneducated industrial worker and labor leader, Lula held no political power before the creation of the PT (INSIDER = 1). The PT emerged from the “New Unionism” movement in the end of the 70’s and the 80’s and Lula was chosen because of his charismatic leadership and well-known participation in actions in strikes (French y Fortes 2005, 18). He was the party’s candidate for all the elections. In his path to moderation, moreover, he struggled to gain autonomy and independence from the party constrains. The party had a strong support base among labor unions and its organizational structure was that of a mass bureaucratic party (Hunter, 2010: 22). Thus, given that the party had a strong supporter base that was not totally controlled by Lula, that it would have existed without him, but that his leadership remained undisputed and his charisma played a significant role, we have coded 2 for CHARISMA.

Lula stressed the need to end corruption, rejected big business money and aimed at democratizing the market. We have not found any explicit act aimed at violating liberal democratic norms throughout the 90s (LIBDEMNORMS = 1). Lula was imprisoned in 2016 in relation to a corruption scandal that took place during his tenure, but he was later acquitted of all charges in what became a very polemic judicial process.

Democratic Labor Party

Brizola was widely considered to be a left-wing populist party (Conniff, 1999). He was a disciple of Gertúlio Vargas and governor of Rio Grande do Sul between 1959 and 1963. He had gained a reputation for aggressive and confrontational politics in 1961, when he organized a revolt to support João Goulart’s (his brother-in-law) ascension to the presidency when it was threatened by the military (Conniff, 1999: 55). After the military coup of 1964, he fled to Uruguay and lived in exile. He returned in 1979 to Brazil after the military dictatorship allowed some regional elections to take place and he founded the The Democratic Labor Party (Partido Democrático Trabalhista, PDT) and became governor of Rio de Janeiro in 1983. Despite his positions as governor and closeness to former presidents, he never held any significant position within the national government (INSISDER = 1). Brizola was the undisputed charismatic leader of the PDT (Gugliano y Jerez Novara 2009, 78) and ran all its campaigns as the presidential candidate. He was said to create a “cult of personality” around him, which difficulted relationships with Lula da Silva (Bellos 2004) (CHARISMA = 3).

He was well known for promoting land reform (Stédile, 2005), rent control and nationalization of utilities (Conniff, 1999: 55) and he gained a reputation as an “anti-Americanist and an enemy of foreign capital” (New York Times, 1962). When the democratic government was overthrown by the military, he flew to Uruguay, from where he supported insurrectionist politics against the military dictatorship (Needler, 1987: 84). He moderated somewhat his discourse when he came back to Brazil in the 80s and embraced a left-wing position within the constitutional democratic context and the market economy (Needler, 1987: 85). Brizola later became governor of Rio and was notable for “founding integrated schools centers for children, curbing police abuses and pressuring congress to hold direct elections for president in 1984” (Conniff, 1999: 58).

In 1998, he ran a campaign based on popular mobilization, condemnation of corruption and inequality and criticism of the media (Brizola, 1992). Brizola did not change his discourse in later years: “His political views remained almost unchanged since the 1960's. Until his death, he advocated a militant form of economic nationalism, liberal benefits for government employees and a generous education policy” (Benson, 2004). In 1995, for example, he criticized Henrique Cardoso´s policies by saying that “if there is no civil reaction to privatization, there will be a military one” (Diamond et al., 2010: 49). Brizola ran for Vice President with Lula in the 1994 elections and lost. He later censured Lula for betraying his leftist politics. We have coded Brizola and the DLP 3 for OTH_POLCLASS, OTH_FINANCIAL and OTH_FOREIGN.

Brizola was extremely critic with the military dictatorship and as one of the few elected socialist governors, represented the democratic opposition to the regime. He “violently criticised the lack of legitimacy, in all fields, of the military regime.” (Mir 1983) (OTH_MILITARY = 3). He supported democracy and the existence of a democratic regime. He argued against military options: “What happened in Argentina in the last decades is exactly what we must avoid. Peronism, for example, did not manage to transcend the frontiers of militarism. Perón himself came to power by the hand of a group of officers. The Brazilian people, at this moment, are giving an example of balance and lucidity. They are prepared for new times. Nobody wants to fight, we want to dialogue. I would not say the same of the Brazilian ruling classes.” (Mir 1983). Thus, we have not found significant violation of liberal-democratic norms (LIBDEMNORMS = 1).

After Brizola’s death in 2004, the party held internal debates between those that defended continuity with Brizola’s politics and those wishing to adopt a more pragmatic and centrist stance and engage in collaboration with other parties (Ortiz de Zárate, 2018: 23). The party was slowly directed towards the second tendency. This is exemplified by the fact that they supported Dilma Rousseff for the 2010 and 2014 presidential elections. Moreover, in 2018, they chose Ciro Gomes, an experienced “center-left” politician (Sandy, 2018) who held centrist macroeconomic policies (Schipani, 2018). We have not included the party since the 2010 election because we do not see evidence that its populist rhetoric was present at this point.

PRONA

The Party of the Reconstruction of the National Order was founded by Enéas Carneiro and espoused a far-right populist ideology. He ran for president unsuccessfully in 1989, 1994 and 1998. He was a doctor with no previous political experience (INSIDER = 1).

Carneiro said that his electoral support indicated a “resounding and unmistakable repudiation of a political class that is rotten, dirty, repugnant and unpatriotic” (Rother, 2002) (OTH_POLCLASS = 3). He argued for the development of an atomic bomb (The Boston Globe, 2007) in order to secure Brazil’s position in the world and “remind Great Powers that we are continental nation that needs to be respected” (Rother, 2002). He added that “the same is true of the Armed Forces, and if elected, I will triple its size, they are the armed wing of the people” (Revista Isto É, 1998) (OTH_MILITARY = 1).

Although immigration or ethnic others were not central topics in Carneiro’s discourse, his economic nationalist discourse linked the rejection of land gifts to indigenous communities with the rejection to foreign powers: “We condemn the intervention of one country in another, let each country solve its problems, I would say to the great powers: 'Leave us alone, leave our Amazon in peace.' Let's stop this story of giving a huge land, larger than Portugal, to half a dozen Indians. Let's end this internationalization story: the internationalized economy means, in other words: underdeveloped nations on their knees” (Carneiro, 1994). I have labelled 2 for OTH_IMIGRANTS and OTH_ETHNIC and 3 for OTH_FOREIGN.

While Carneiro’s platform was based on economic nationalism and opposition to the neoliberal speculative model, he defended domestic private industry. In his own words:

“One word only: nationalist. We defend private initiative; we want to give a huge boost to the national industry. We need our industrialist to survive and not become, little by little, a reseller of foreign product. I want our farmer to produce, and not, as now, to have to import beans. The old concept of the left is finished. But also, what there is on the right, which today is assimilated to the speculative neoliberal model, which we do not really want. Therefore, there is no way to define this new model: we are nationalists, we defend private initiative, industrial, agriculture, everyone who wants to produce” (Gomes, 1998).

This stance indicates a lack of populist hostility to economic elites (OTH_FINANCIAL = 1). While this suggests a left leaning economic stance, owing to the salience of Carneiro’s cultural nationalism we’ve coded PRONA FR on LRPOSITION.

Carneiro attacked the media harshly by saying that “The government, the media, and the research institutes lie, lie sordidly. This tripod forms a great power. Terrible power. Malignant. And it suffocates the population” (Carneiro, 1994). Furthermore, he was strongly opposed to LGBT rights (Roda Vida, 1994). We have coded him 3 for LIBDEMNORMS.

The party relied heavily on Carneiro’a persona. He had a long and distinctive beard and was famous for his histrionic discourse and for energetically shouting “My name is Enéas” at the end of his political ads (Meu nome é Enéas, 56 2014). It was all part of the construction of a political character easily recognizable as distinct from the political elites. The party did not fare well in legislative elections where Enéas was not the candidate (CHARISMA = 3).

Jair Bolsonaro

Jair Bolsonaro won the 2018 presidential election on a right-wing populist platform. He was an army captain who later entered into the National Congress. He was a member of the congress for more than 25 years and belonged to seven different parties before running for president.

Bolsonaro is universally considered a far-right populist candidate in the literature (Araújo y Prior 2021; Feres Júnior y Gagliardi 2021; Mendonça y Caetano 2021; Ricci y Venturelli 2023). Bolsonaro’s presidential campaign criticized politicians such as Lula and Dilma for their corruption and defended the need to restore the country to its former glory. “Taking inspiration from the campaign rhetoric of US President Donald Trump, Bolsonaro framed his right-wing populism as relatable, authentic, and honest in contrast to his”corrupt, pro-establishment” opponents in the Workers’ Party (PT)” (Specht 2020). “Antiparty rhetoric, however, is not his only concern. He also attacks the Brazilian government system” (Ricci y Venturelli 2023, 1066). Bolsonaro claimed that “We are indeed different from those who ruled over us over the past 20 years – PT and PSDB. With us, you will be in the first place; you will be our bosses! Together we can change Brazil; we won’t have another opportunity!” (Tamaki y Fuks 2020, 113). The PT, representing socialism and communism, was the main political other of Bolsonaro, which expressed it in very clear terms: “right now is polarized: it’s us and PT; it’s the Brazil green and yellow, and them, that represent Cuba, represent the Venezuelan government, with its flag that is red with a hammer and sickle on top of it. Let’s change Brazil! […] We don’t want that kind of people back on the Palácio do Planalto [The Presidential Palace]” (Tamaki y Fuks 2020, 116) (OTH_POLCLASS = 3, LRPOSITION = FR).

Bolsonaro has repeatedly made comments against non-white ethnic communities. He claimed, for example, that “people living in reservations were parasites’, that ‘quilombolas’ (black community members, descendants of runaway slaves) ’weren't even fit for breeding” (Henrique Leal, 2017). Furthermore, he stated that the Funai (the National Indigenous Foundation) deliberately chose the “richest and most fertile” lands to “give away” to “Indians and blacks”, while stealing land from whites who had been “living there for centuries” (Henrique Leal, 2017). Bolsonaro is also famous for his religious nationalism. His campaign slogan was “Brazil above everything, God above everyone” (The Economist, 2017). Previously, he had made remarks on the Christian identity of Brazil which Henrique Leal (2017) describes in the following way: “According to Bolsonaro, since Brazil is ‘a Christian country’, non-Christians should stay out of political life - as they are not ‘true citizens’. Islam and African religions should be banned, as they are antithetical to the ‘national faith’ and operate as an ‘open door to terrorists’”. (OTH_ETHNIC = 3).

Bolsonaro exposed a similar discourse regarding migrants. He “had referred to immigrants from Haiti, Senegal, Bolivians, and Syrians as the ‘scum of the world’. In contrast, other recent immigrants from Portugal and Spain were not reprimanded by Bolsonaro” (Filomeno y Vicino 2021, 605). Moreover, he claimed that immigrant’s “behavior, their culture, is completely different from ours” (Filomeno y Vicino 2021, 605). He also claimed that “minorities have to bend down to the majority [ ... ] the minorities [should] either adapt or simply vanish” (Filomeno y Vicino 2021, 606) (OTH_IMMIGRANTS = 3).

On economic issues, Bolsonaro has been a defender of free-market policies and open borders: “He set out a pro-market direction as he promised to lower the tax burden on business and make the country more open to foreign trade” (Financial Times, 2019). Additionally, he has pushed for a business-friendly agenda by putting in place well-known investors like Paulo Guedes and a former Treasury secretary and World Bank economist Joaquim Levy in key positions in his government (Rapoza, 2019). As some scholars have explained: “Bolsonaro offered little tangible proof of his professed commitment to open markets (much less his qualifications to preside over a major economy), Brazil’s business community—at first dubious about the candidate’s purported free-market conversion—later swung behind him when faced with the binary choice between Bolsonaro and the return of the statist PT” (Hunter y Power 2019, 70) (OTH_FINANCIAL = 1).

On foreign policy, Bolsonaro “has repeatedly said he wants to bring Brazil closer to the United States and Israel ‘The Americans played an extraordinary role in our history, preventing us from turning to Cuba in 1964’” (Manchikoni, 2018). However, he also bashed China, arguing that the Asian country did not just buy in Brazil but was, in fact, buying Brazil itself (Jingtao, 2019). Additionally, he has censored international NGO’s actions in his country: “This cowardly business of international NGOs like WWF and so many others from England sticking their noses into Brazil is going to end! This tomfoolery stops right here!” (Phillips, 2018a). His campaign slogan was “Brazil first, God before all.” (Araújo y Prior 2021, 234) (OTH_FOREIGN = 3).

Although he was an experienced parliamentarian, he had never held any position in government and cannot be considered an insider (Hunter y Power 2019, 75) (INSIDER = 1). In 2018, he joined the Social Liberal Party and ran for president. Given this constant movement between parties, it is clear that it is Bolsonaro’s figure what attracted voters rather than his party. Moreover, he is associated with his personal style of politics: bolsonarismo (Lima-de-Sousa, Gómez-Iniesta, y Herranz-de-la-Casa 2023, 104) (CHARISMA = 3).

Bolsonaro has a favorable stance towards Brazil’s former military dictatorship. In 1996, he explicitly said he was “in favor of a dictatorship” (Brooke, 1993) and in 2016, he dedicated his impeachment vote against Dilma Rousseff (who suffered torture during the military regime) to Carlos Alberto Brilhante Ustra, a famous torturer (The Economist, 2017). It is common to see him carrying guns and military symbolism is abundant in his rallies. In a rally shortly before the second round of the presidential election, he threatened to purge leftist outlaws and banish them from the country (Phillips, 2018b) (OTH_MILITARY = 1).

His authoritarian tendencies have been noted by several scholars (Hunter y Power 2019; Ricci y Venturelli 2023, 1059). This included employing a similar marketing strategy to that of Donald Trump based on stating widely polemic comments to attract attention and an intensive use of social media to bypass traditional means of communication (considered by him as “fake news”). He filed lawsuits against newspapers (Araújo y Prior 2021, 234) and claimed that “[we have] the wonderful people on our side and the freedom of social media, which brings you the truth, differently from a large part of the Brazilian media, the biggest fake news factory, a shame to the world” (Ricci y Venturelli 2023, 1066). Sexism is also one of Bolsonao’s trademarks. He famously said that “the only reason he didn’t rape” a congresswoman was “because she didn’t deserve it” because “she was too ugly” (Henrique Leal, 2017) (LIBDEMNORMS = 3).

References

Benson, T. (2004) “Leonel Brizola, 82, Dies; Opposed Military Rule in Brazil”, 23 June: https://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/23/us/leonel-brizola-82-dies-opposed-military-rule-in-brazil.html

Brizola, L. (1992) “Roda Viva”: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=72GpUMDcM2M

Brooke, J. (1993) “Conversations/Jair Bolsonaro; A Soldier Turned Politician Wants To Give Brazil Back to Army Rule”, The New York Times, 25 July: https://www.nytimes.com/1993/07/25/weekinreview/conversations-jair-bolsonaro-soldier-turned-politician-wants-give-brazil-back.html

Carneiro, E. (1994) “Interview”, O Estado de S. Paulo.

Conniff M. (1999) “Brazil’s Populist Republic and Beyond”, in Conniff, M. (ed.) “Populism in Latin America”, London: The University of Alabama Press.

Financial Times (2019) “Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro pledges to open up economy”, 22 January: https://www.ft.com/content/40ec2a48-1e57-11e9-b2f7-97e4dbd3580d

Gomes, N. S. (1998) “Interview with Enéas Carneiro”, Jornal Tribuna da Impresa, 9 February: http://web.archive.org/20070312051046/br.geocities.com/eneaspresidente/tribuna.htm

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Jiangtao, Shi (2019) “Should China be worried about Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro’s bromance with Donald Trump?” 21 March: https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3002734/should-china-be-worried-about-brazilian-president-jair

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Ortiz de Zárate, R. (2016) “Fernando Collor de Mello”, 17 February: https://www.cidob.org/biografias_lideres_politicos/america_del_sur/brasil/fernando_collor_de_melloç

Panizza. F. (2000) “Neopopulism and its limits in Collor’s Brazil”, Bulletin of Latin American Research, Vol. 19(2), pp. 177-192.

Phillips, T. (2018a) “Trump of the tropics: the 'dangerous' candidate leading Brazil's presidential race”, The Guardian, 19 April: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/19/jair-bolsonaro-brazil-presidential-candidate-trump-parallels

Phillips, T. (2018b) “Brazil's Jair Bolsonaro threatens purge of leftwing 'outlaws'”, The Guardian, 22 October: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/22/brazils-jair-bolsonaro-says-he-would-put-army-on-streets-to-fight

Rapoza, K. (2019) “Market Considers Bolsonaro Brazil's ‘Last Chance’ To Reform Economy”, Forbes, 3 January: https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2019/01/03/market-considers-bolsonaro-brazils-last-chance-to-reform-economy/#22b55cf6452d

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Rother, L. (2002) “Long treated as a joke, Brazilian Neofascist may have the Last Laugh”, Ney York Times, 21 October.

Sandy, M. (2018) “AQ INTERVIEW: Ciro Gomes:”Brazil Cannot Endure a Leftist Government”, 21 June: https://www.americasquarterly.org/content/aq-interview-ciro-gomes

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