Bolivia

Date range: 1980-2020
Bolivia was ruled by a dictatorship since 1964 until 1978 when General Padilla staged a coup d’état against the ruling military leaders and called for elections in July 1979. Since no candidate won more than 51% of the vote, Walter Guevara, the president of the Senate, was invested president. In November of that same year, General Natusch staged another coup d´état but a popular insurrection made it fail two weeks later. Lidia Gueiler, president of the Congress, was elected president and new elections were held in June 1980. Hernán Siles Zuazo was the most voted candidate, but he could not be elected president because a third coup d’état, perpetrated by General García Meza, took place. The new military dictatorship continued until 1982, when massive strikes triggered its fall. The elections of 1980 were considered legitimate, and Siles Zuazo was elected president in 1982.
Until the victory of Evo Morales in 2006, three parties dominated Bolivian politics: the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement, Nationalist Democratic Action and Revolutionary Left Movement. Since the Bolivian system makes it difficult for any party to obtain a majority, governments have traditionally been decided through various agreements between these three parties. The lack of perception of a clear alternative within these political options aided in the development of populist parties in Bolivia in the 90’s and 2000’s. Barr (2017: 83), Van Cott (2007), Madrid (2012) and Mayorga (2003) agree upon identifying CONDEPA, UCS and MAS as the main populist parties in Bolivia since the reinstatement of democracy. Bolivia celebrates all its elections (presidential, legislative) on the same day.

Case notes

CONDEPA

The history of CONDEPA (Conscience of the Fatherland or “Conciencia de Patria”) is dependent on the evolution of its leader, Carlos Palenque. Palenque started his career as a musician of a group that introduced popular indigenous rhythms in their songs and later became a very successful TV host. One of his most famous programs consisted of hearing the complaints and everyday stories of mainly indigenous peoples, an activity he combined with social and philanthropic actions. He always claimed his radio was the “radio of the people” (Alenda Mary, 2002: 89) and gained fame as the “compadre”, a term which refers to a father figure for those in need (Mayorga, 2003: 106). His involvement in politics started when the government decided to close all of Palenque’s media outlets because of an interview in which the president was accused of being related to drug trafficking. A massive popular mobilization protested the closure of the radios and, in response, Palenque, who had very little previous experience in politics (INSIDER, INC_PARL, INC_PRESS = 1), created CONDEPA (Ballivián 2003, 71).

CONDEPA was largely based on the messianic charisma of Palenque (Madrid, 2012: 29), who used to dress and talk in popular ways in order to differentiate himself from other politicians. Van Cott (2007: 85) identifies CONDEPA with the left and its rhetoric aimed at establishing an emotional connection with the electorate (Mayorga, 2003: 109). Palenque ran a platform based on the protection of marginal sectors of society by the state and the defence of national resources (Plano Medio, 2011). Madrid explains the political platform of the party in the following way:

CONDEPA, Perú Posible, and the PNP have employed populist appeals to an even greater extent than ethnic appeals. They have run campaigns centered on the personal characteristics of their leaders, rather than on the parties or their programs. They have employed anti-establishment messages, presenting their leaders as political outsiders and as honest and grassroots alternatives to the corrupt traditional politicians. And they have focused their appeals primarily on the lower classes. They have forged alliances with numerous working-class groups from peasant associations to unions, informal sector organizations, and neighborhood groups. The leaders of these parties have adopted a popular, at times folksy, style of campaigning, and much of their discourse has centered on meeting the needs of disadvantaged and neglected sectors of the population. Some of the mestizo-led parties, such as CONDEPA and the PNP, have also made nationalist and state interventionist appeals, denouncing neo-liberal policies and U.S. intervention. (Madrid, 2012: 29)

Palenque was very explicit in criticizing the betrayal of the elites: “"We are patriots, we defend revolutionary nationalism and we consider that we are precisely the ones who have inherited revolutionary nationalism, because the rest of the political groups have either betrayed it or have simply abandoned it...” (Makaran 2008, 67). Palenque opposed the liberalizing measures that the government was implementing because he defended an “endogenous model” which would make Bolivia self-sufficient with its own resources (Plano Medio, 2011). He “attacked the liberal economic model head-on, accusing it of being ‘neocolonial, anti-national, dependent and oligarchic’" (Ballivián 2003, 71). We have therefore coded CONDEPA as 3 in OTH_POLCLASS, OTH_FINANCIAL, and OTH_FOREIGN, and L on LRPOSITION..

The indigenous element is fundamental to CONDEPA’s platform. Himself a mestizo (Madrid, 2012: 48), Palenque appealed to the Aymara community and often invoked Aymara sayings and traditions (Alenda Mary, 2002). His support base was basically composed of indigenous people who lived around La Paz (Madrid, 2012: 29). Moreover, his party was the first to elect a “chola” (indigenous woman) to the Bolivian Parliament. We have not seen evidence that his championing of the rights and causes of excluded ethnic groups rose to the point of crafting the white minority as their enemy in populist terms. Palenque defended the inclusion of more indigenous and mestizo population in positive terms “If we are a country of mestizos, cholos and Indians, why is it that the cholos, Indians and mestizos are neither in the government nor in parliament?” (Makaran 2008, 51) (OTH_ETHNIC = 1). We have not found any anti-immigrant rhetoric (OTH_IMMIGRANTS = 1).

Following Panebianco, Mayorga (2003: 111) describes CONDEPA as a ‘charismatic party’ whose functioning was based on loyalty to the leader and the subordination of formal rules to the personal and familial links to Palenque (Mayorga, 2003: 113). Since the figure of the leader is stressed in all the texts that addressed CONDEPA, we have coded it 3 for CHARISMA.

I have neither found claims against the military nor any violation of established liberal democratic norms. In fact, despite their rhetoric, Mayorga (2003: 115) claims that “their emergence did not call into question the democratic regime because they soon participated in the logic of post-electoral deals that characterized the access to national and municipal governments”. Thus, they reached agreements with some of the so-called “neoliberal parties” and did not threaten the usual way of forming governments in Bolivia. Makaran (2008, 62) argues similarly: “CONDEPA responds to the demand for social and political participation of the marginalized sectors of society, without questioning the rules of the democratic game.” (OTH_MILITARY = 1, LIBDEMNORMS = 1).

CONDEPA’s biggest challenge was faced in 1997 when, just a couple of months before the elections, Carlos Palenque suddenly died (Hinojosa 2021, 394). He was substituted by Remedios Loza, the first ‘chola’ to enter the Bolivian parliament. Loza had been with Palenque since his time on the radio and she was known as the “comadre”, the female equivalent to the “compadre”. Loza exhibited a clear continuist line with the politics and proposals of Palenque (Alenda Mary, 116). “The credibility of the succession oath that Remedios took in front of the compadre’s tomb was interpreted as loyalty to her leader, a leader close to which she has ‘experienced the problems of the people’ as her loyal ‘disciple’” (Alenda Mary, 2002: 118-119). Thus, considering that Palenque led most of the campaign until the very end, that Remedios was also a charismatic character and that she displayed clear continuities with her predecessor, we have not changed the coding from the 1993 elections to the 1997 elections.

Solidarity Civic Unity

Solidarity Civic Unity (or UCS) is usually compared to the case of CONDEPA because both were populist parties that enjoyed relative success in Bolivia in the 1990’s and that suffered the loss of their charismatic founders. Similar to Palenque, Max Fernández, founder of UCS, did not have any previous political experience before he entered politics. Fernández was famous in Bolivia because he was CEO of the largest beer company in Bolivia and he was known for his philanthropic donations to the poor (INSIDER, INC_PARL, INC_PRESS = 1)

Barr (2017: 90) clearly identifies the party as populist due to its use of “antiestablishment rhetoric and plebiscitarian linkages” and appeals “to informal sector workers and marginalized groups, including indigenous populations”. The party defended greater solidarity among the population (one of its mottos was “The poor less poor and the rich more solidary” (Alenda Mary, 2002: 97)) and bashed traditional politicians (Mayorga, 2003: 109). One spokesperson of the party stated in reference to traditional politicians “Enough lies, enough corruption, enough lack of schools and drinking water. We are hungry for an independent country and not dependent on the great powers.” (Pucci [1993] 2016).

However, the UCS lacked a programmatic proposal and an ideological profile (Mayorga, 2003: 115). Mayorga (2003) sums up the party’s ideology with the term “asistencialismo”. Asistencialismo implies that the leader solves problems through the donation of money to a specific marginal group without an ideological basis and without addressing structural problems. As a wealthy man, Fernández was able to perform many acts of philanthropy through which he formed his electoral basis (Mayorga, 2003: 99) which Alenda Mary (2002: 86) has described as “pure clientelism”. Fernández recognized to have spent 3.5 million euros in constructions (Gisbert 1992, 16).

Moreover, he cultivated an image of a mestizo self-made man who came from below and was able to achieve success as a businessman (Mayorga, 2003: 106-107). Barr (2017: 13) considers the UCS as “little more than a personalistic vehicle” and Alenda Mary (2002: 98) says that their “program is the leader”. As opposed to the large social movement led by Palenque, Max Fernández’s base was created thanks to personalistic ties with the leader’s philanthropic actions and would not have existed without him (Mayorga, 2003) (CHARISMA = 3).

Fernández included Aymara candidates in his party (Barr, 2017: 90) and he also “spoke Quechua on the campaign trail and was often referred to as a”cholo” entrepreneur, although he generally eschewed identity politics” (Madrid, 2012: 47). This allowed him to win a “sizable number of indigenous votes” (Madrid, 2012: 47) (OTH_ETHNIC = 1). We’ve seen no evidence for any rhetoric against immigrants (OTH_IMMIGRANTS = 1).

It is difficult to code UCS in the remaining categories. We believe the less problematic coding is to consider UCS as a centrist party, that is populist in relation to anti-politician rhetoric (OTH_POLCLASS = 3) but whose criticisms of foreign powers and economic elite are not as stark as those of CONDEPA (OTH_FOREIGN and OTH_FINANCIAL = 2)).

We have not found any indication that UCS violated prior liberal democratic norms. As Mayorga pointed out in relation to both UCS and CONDEPA: “their emergence did not call into question the democratic regime because they soon participated in the logic of post-electoral deals that characterized the access to national and municipal governments” (Mayorga, 2003: 115).

In a similar fashion to CONDEPA, Max Fernández died suddenly in 1995 and the party had to adapt to the new situation. The leadership role landed in Jhonny Fernández, Max’s son (Alenda Mary, 2002: 111). His legitimacy derived from him being the son of the party founder and from becoming mayor of Santa Cruz soon after his father’s death (Alenda Mary, 2002: 111-112). He continued with his father’s policies and rhetoric and was a candidate in the 2002 presidential election. However, due to his young age, he was not able to run in the 1997 election, and the party chose Ivo Kulijs, another businessman, to take his place. Barr (2017: 83) considers the three leaders of UCS as populist, however, Jhonny Fernández and Ivo Kulijs did not have the charisma of Max Fernández and they basically attracted voters by exploiting the memory of the founder. Thus, we have coded 1 in Charisma for both Jhonny Fernández and Ivo Kulijs.

We have found no break with established liberal-democratic norms. During the leadership of Johnyy Fernández, UCS formed part of Banzer’s Right-wing government support coalition, which speaks to their ideological flexibility and their integration as part of the normal party system. In fact, as Mayorga (2003, 104) argues “given the characteristics of the social groups involved in the electoral competition - as militants and voters - it is possible to positively evaluate the democratic role of UCS and Condepa because they prevented poverty and marginalization from becoming a breeding ground for subversive or guerrilla interpellations” (LIBDEMNORMS = 1).

MAS

Evo Morales, of Aymara origin, started working in agriculture at an early age and received little formal education. He later rose as a union leader of coca plantations in the region of Cochabamba (Madrid, 2012: 63). During the 90’s, several of the peasant unions, composed overwhelmingly of indigenous people, created indigenous parties to run for election. Although “in the mid-1990s he was still largely unknown outside of Cochabamba”, Morales ran for congress in 1997 as part of one of these parties winning “seventy percent of the vote, more than any other congressional candidate in the country” (Madrid, 2012: 63). Due to conflicts with the leaders of the party, Morales decided to abandon it and create his own. Since his party could not register on time for the 1999 municipal elections, he allied with MAS as the official running party. Movement for Socialism was a dying fascist party when Evo Morales’ political platform used it as a mere legal cover to run for elections in the 1999 municipal elections (Monasterios et al., 2007: 79). Morales completely changed the character and ideology of the party in order to transform it into an indigenous and populist party. Unexpectedly, Morales surged in the polls in the last weeks of the 2002 electoral campaign and came in second (Madrid, 2012: 49). He later won an absolute majority in 2005 and became president between 2006 and 2019. We have coded him as 1 on INSIDER in the 2002 and 2005 elections and as 3 in the following elections.

What distinguishes MAS from other typical populist movements is the presence of “strong grassroots bases that help shape the parties’ platforms and policies” (Madrid, 2012: 27) due to its origins as an indigenous party which have remained throughout time. and has always remained committed to that origin. As Madrid (2012: 53) puts it “The MAS has succeeded in part because it has appealed to Bolivia’s indigenous population as indigenous people” by establishing close ties with indigenous organizations, running numerous indigenous candidates and employing indigenous symbols such as dressing “in indigenous clothing, participating in indigenous rituals, invoking indigenous sayings, and making speeches in indigenous languages” (Madrid, 2012: 55). The party also implemented bilingual education (Madrid, 2012: 56) and was committed to eliminating racial discrimination through new labour laws (Movimiento al Socialismo 2002, 25).

However, MAS is not simply an indigenous party, what characterizes Morales’ political platform is the combination of ethnic and populist elements. Madrid argues that MAS

runs personalistic electoral campaigns that have revolved around the charismatic personality of its presidential candidate […], has employed extensive anti-establishment rhetoric, aggressively criticizing the traditional parties and politicians […] [and] has employed nationalist and state interventionist appeals. It has staunchly opposed market-oriented policies and U.S. intervention in their countries, and it has vowed to assert greater control over their countries’ natural resources. (Madrid, 2012: 27).

Morales strongly criticized the elite, which he termed “neoliberal parties,” “political mafia,” “oligarchy,” and “mank’a- gastos”—those who eat without working (Assies and Salman, 2005: 271). He clearly articulated the Manichean opposition between people and elite when he said that “We all know that there are two Bolivias. One Bolivia of ‘charlatans’ who always make promises and sign agreements that they never fulfill; and the other Bolivia which is always tricked, subjugated, humiliated, and exploited” (Morales, cited in Postero, 2004: 190). Morales has described inequality as one of the central reasons for the formation of the party, declaring that: “We have created our own political force because wealth and land are being concentrated in the hands of a few, and the majority of the people live in poverty” (Zimmerman, 2002: 8).

As Barr argues “he directed his permanent provocation toward a ‘second independence’ and the ‘re-founding of the country.’ Morales thus framed a reformist agenda in very bold terms. For instance, he promised to”‘bury neoliberalism,’ promote the production of legal coca, nationalize hydrocarbons, and rewrite the constitution” (Barr, 2017: 106). Morales also often attacked foreign intervention. In 2002, MAS’ manifesto said:

The neoliberal parties such as the MNR, ADN, MIR, MBL, UCS, NFR, CONDEPA and other small groupings of their corrupt circle, are characterized by the submission and betrayal of the country, by the handing over of the national patrimony almost without charge to the voraciousness of international capital and its directors, who impose conditions of poverty on the legitimate owners of natural resources. (Movimiento al Socialismo, 2002: 9).

Therefore, Morales’ rhetoric represents an ideal-typical case of Left-wing populist rhetoric and we have coded him and MAS FL on LRPOSITION, and 3 on OTH_POLCLASS, OTH_FINANCIAL, and OTH_FOREIGN.

It is the combination of the populist and ethnic elements that made the party adopt an inclusivist strategy and rhetoric. “Beginning in 2002 the MAS recruited numerous white and mestizo candidates, formed alliances throughout the country with non-indigenous as well as indigenous organizations, and developed a more inclusive and populist discourse” (Madrid, 2012: 28). Central to these alliances was the appointment of Álvaro García Linera, a well-known white leftist academic and a scholar in populism, as the vice-presidential candidate in 2005 (Harnecker et al., 2008: 102). Thus, MAS’ ethnic appeals are framed in terms of including indigenous population to the system rather than excluding the white sectors (OTH_ETHNIC = 1). We have also not found any negative reference to immigrants (OTH_MIGRANTS = 1).

Morales has concentrated the party power around his figure, particularly regarding the party’s extension to non-indigenous regions. Barr (2017: 103) explains that Morales’s approach “was first to create urban-based arms of MAS, which were under his personal control. However, these new urban structures lacked the participatory mechanisms of the earlier rural ones”. “Like other populist leaders, Evo has mostly declined to build institutional structures that might constrain him or develop leaders who might challenge him, preferring instead to concentrate power in his person” (Madrid, 2012: 63). However, Morales’ personalism is not limited to the party’s structure but the party in itself is dependent on his charisma. Some observers speak about ‘Evismo’ a phenomenon similar to the personality cults surrounding other populist leaders like Juan Perón (Benavente 2008, 61). Therefore, although other indigenous parties would have existed without Morales, a party that combined populist and ethnic claims in such as successful manner would have been impossible without the figure of its leader (CHARISMA = 3).

The army did not constitute a target of Morales’ anti-elite rhetoric and when he took office (OTH_MILITARY = 1), but he did replace the military leadership with his supporters as a means to assure himself control of the army (El País, 2007).

In relation to liberal-democratic norms, Mudde and Rovira-Kaltwasser (2013) point to the political, social and symbolic inclusion of excluded sectors of Bolivia that Morales has expressed during his campaigns and achieved during his presidency. However, they also note that

Although the political initiatives promoted by Chávez and Morales have triggered more political participation, they have also undermined the rules of public contestation... [Morales] has relied on ‘the people’ as the constituent power in order to undertake constitutional reforms that do not necessarily protect the checks and balances that are inherent to liberal democracy (Cameron and Sharpe, 2010). (Mudde and Rovira-Kaltwasser, 2013: 162)

Morales has concentrated great power in his person, and some have argued that “Evo is very much of a caudillo [strongman], very personalistic. He does not allow any dissidence. He turns his back on or expels any legislator who competes with him” (Madrid, 2012: 63). The supreme courts are chosen in a highly politicized manner and reports on attacks on the press are abundant (Freedom House, 2018).

Morales has eschewed Bolivian political institutions towards his policies and aims. Morales called for a constitutional assembly shortly after winning his first elections. He obtained a majority of seats in the new assembly and rewrote the Constitution. This was a highly contentious issue, and the political environment became polarized. “In an effort to break the growing political impasse, in 2008 the government called for a referendum on whether to recall President Morales and the departmental governors (prefects). Once again, the MAS triumphed” (Madrid, 2012: 51). Thus, although he has made significant changes to prior democratic rules in the country, he has done so with wide popular support.

In 2016, however, Morales lost a referendum on whether he could be reelected for a fourth term even though it was prohibited by the Constitution. Despite the referendums’ result and the Constitutional text, MAS pressured the judges into declaring that article unconstitutional and have allowed Morales to run for reelection (BBC, 2017). This represents the clearest violation of LD norms committed by Morales’ administration.

Given Morales’ initial inclusivist discourse in support of marginalized groups in Bolivia and the lack of any evidence that points to threats against judges, dismissal of election results or use of violence, we have coded him as 1 in LIBDEMNORMS in the 2002 and 2005 elections. However, once in office, his actions against democratic checks and balances, attacks on the press and violation of the Constitution point to a coding up to 3.

In November 2019, Bolivia experienced a political crisis following contested elections where President Evo Morales sought a fourth term. The Constitutional Tribunal's controversial 2017 decision, based on international treaties, allowed Morales to run again despite constitutional limits. Alleged electoral irregularities denounced by the OAS (Organization of the American States) led to protests, and the military, police, and workers' center recommended Morales's resignation. He accepted asylum in Mexico. Senator Jeanine Áñez assumed the presidency amid controversy, facing accusations of a quorum-lacking appointment. Her government, accused of targeting Morales's supporters, initiated legal action against him. Morales labeled it a coup d’état, while international experts were conflicted on the actual existence of fraud or not in the elections. Bolivia's Congress, led by Morales's party, annulled the election results, paving the way for new elections. The situation led to protests by Morales’ supportes and the Senkata and Sacaba massacres. Elections were scheduled for May 2020 but had to de delayed until October of 2020 because of the COVID-19 pandemic.

In these elections, the MAS presented Luis Arce, former Minister of the Economy of Evo Morales as their candidate (INSIDER = 2). However, Morales’ presence was constant throughout the campaign and references to the former president were omnipresent. The MAS considered the whole crisis a coup d’état and were extremely critical with the government, the other parties and police action, particularly with regards to the violence against MAS supporters. Arce denounced "the persecution and criminalization unleashed by the regime against leaders of MAS-IPSP and social movements" (Quiroga y Pagliarone 2023, 9) and argued that “we have lived through a cruel and sanguinary coup d’état, a nightmare” (euronews). Given the clear continuity of the campaign with Morales’ government we have kept all coding classifications for Arce’s campaign including CHARISMA = 3.

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