Argentina

Case notes

Carlos Menem

Carlos Menem is a complicated figure. Most authors agree that he won the 1989 election running a campaign based on the traditional Peronist discourse articulated around the concepts of “salariazo” and “the revolution of production” (Burdman, 2008: 10). His platform promised “welfare state, protection and development of national industry, nationalization of public services, state regulation and intervention in the economy, regulation of the financial market, import substitution and redistribution of income in favor of workers” (Diario Digital Conclusión n.d.) (LRPOSITION = L).

Burdman clearly identifies Menem’s platform as populist (Burdman 2008, 8) and Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser (2017) argue that his 1989 campaign indeed showed a Manichean division between the elite and the people. In this victory speech, for instance, Menem proclaimed his was the victory of the

“heroic march of national unity to be protagonist of a historic battle that all Argentinians must undertake ... against privileges, against vested interests, against speculators and usurers, against those who seek that nothing changes so that misery, underdevelopment, poverty and hunger continue in the Argentinian Republic” (Menem, 1989b).

Menem also proclaimed that “my only compromise is to achieve the happiness of the Argentinian people and the greatness of the fatherland” and cautioned against “playing the game of the vote-grabbing politicians who do not understand the country” (Menem, 1989a)On this basis, we’ve coded his 1989 campaign 3 on OTH_POLCLASS.

Although his platform was clearly leftist and that implied a threat to big businesses (Fair 2008, 113), in his discourse he emphasised national unity of all social actors, including businesses: “To every worker, to every young person, to every businessman, to every woman, to every pensioner, to every soldier, to every child, I say: there is a vacant place from which to build the future” (Burdman 2008, 14). He also emphasized the value of property, of hard work and of economic efficiency that his “Productive revolution” would bring about (Burdman 2008, 12). We have, thus, not found significant evidence that businesses were seen as an intrinsic part of the elite (OTH_ECONOMIC = 1).

Fair (2011: 2) argues that Menem initiated a timid dialogue with the military, stressed the need for peace and hinted that he would pardon the military for the sentences they received for their crimes during the dictatorship. He later fulfilled this promise. Thus, this group was not recognised as a main elite opponent (OTH_MILITARY = 1). Burdam (2008: 13) argues that although Menem stressed the need to achieve economic independence this did not meant, as it did with Perón, freedom from the dependence vis-à-vis the UK, but simply the modernization of the economy and the level of production, without addressing who owns the capital. Borgani (2006, 5) describes the purpose of Menem’s foreign policy was “to improve economic relations with Europe and the United States and to achieve Argentina's economic reinsertion in the world” (OTH_FOREIGN = 1).

Menem rejected accusations of totalitarianism and stressed his commitment to democracy by arguing that his party, as opposed to the Radical Party, was the only one holding primary elections to select their candidate (Menem, 1989a). He claimed that “if there is a democratic party, a democratic movement, one which respects human rights and all the liberties, that has been a victim of all forms of violences, a permanent victim, imprisoned and persecuted and yet holds no grudges and no hate and aims at national unity, that is the Justicialist Party” (Menem, 1989a) (LIBDEMNORMS = 1).

Menem had immigrant origins himself. His parents came from Siria, and he practiced Islam until he decided to convert to Catholicism in his youth. In fact, during his government, he abolished the legal requirement for all presidents to profess the Catholic religion to be able to be elected (Levit 2016). We have found no evidence of a position against immigrants or ethnic others (OTH_ETHNIC, OTH_IMMIGRANTS = 1).

Carlos Menem had been governor of the province of La Rioja before the military dictatorship and again throughout the 80’s. However, he never participated in the national government and the Justicialist party only achieved power again with his government (INC_PARL, INC_PRES, INSIDER = 1). A the leader of the historic Justicialist Party, he nevertheless is considered charismatic by the scholars that studied him (Burdman 2008) (CHARISMA = 2).

However, once in government, Menem quickly shifted his economic discourse and embraced neoliberal policies devoted to control inflation. This fact has sparked the academic debate on Menem’s populism in government and constitutes a difficult case for our dataset. For those authors who defend a more substantive definition of populism (Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017; Levitsky, 2003) Menem should not be considered populist after 1989. For these authors, neoliberal policies are considered to be opposed to populism and Menem is portrayed as betraying his previous populist stance. For authors that define populism based organizational factors such as personalism, a direct connection with the people, concentration of power and transgressing liberal political norms and less on substantive elements (Weyland, 2003: 6, 1996; Wehner, 2004), neoliberalism and populism have a number of synergies. These include low levels of institutionalization, targeting unorganized poor, distancing themselves from unions, professional organizations and business groups and the use of the state to push through reform against opposition (Weyland, 2003: 2-3). Leaman (1999), for example, defined Menem as the prime example of “populist liberalism”.

By contrast to these two positions, our definition of populism stresses discursive distinction between the elite and the people. In this regard, during Menem’s tenure, the elite/people distinction was significantly blurred. In their analysis of populist discourses, for instance, Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser (2017) find little Manichean discourse between the elite and the people in his 1995 campaign. Moreover, while Burdam identified Menem as populist in 1989, by 1995, he argued that

The antinomies of class (workers-employers), nationalist (national autonomy-foreign intervention) and populist (people-power bloc-oligarchy) are thus eliminated. There must remain, then, an opposition that separates the totality (the community as a whole) from an impersonal outside, whose threat is not linked to a concrete enemy, but to the potential shortcomings of the community itself. Thus, the danger does not lie in the possibility of defeat before an antagonistic force that opposes one's own identity, but in losing the mystique, energy and mobility that will allow national construction. (Burdman 2008, 16)

Burdman’s interpretation is in line with that of Weyland and Wehner in arguing that Menem inherited certain stylistic elements of its original populist discourse when presenting itself as a courageous leader that attacked the crisis head-on and thus deliver the country from hyperinflation demonstrating and reinforced his charisma (Weyland, 2003: 4). This author argues that “when the country confronted a deep open crisis and neoliberals prescribed the shock therapy of drastic market reform, they relied on the boldness and transgressive tendencies of neo-populist leaders to carry out this plan of action” (Weyland 2003: 5). Moreover, it was this boldness in the initial crisis what may explain their downfall as inflation lost importance compared to unemployment and growth, areas where neoliberal policies fare less well (Weyland 2003; Wehner, 2004). Wehner (2004: 41) attributes Menem’s 1995 reelection to the relatively good results of his neoliberal economic policies. High inflation had been huge problem during Alfonsín’s government and, although poverty and employment did not improve, Menem’s ability to control inflation was rewarded by the Argentinian voters (Wehner, 2004: 46). Therefore, being the head of the government, criticism of the political class was circumscribed to criticising the inefficiency of parliamentarians in approving the bold reforms that the country needed (Leaman 1999, 101).

Regarding other types of elites beyond the political class, we also do not find a strong opposition between ordinary people and an estranged elite. In government, he had proclaimed an amnesty to military leaders involved in the dictatorship and promoted close relationships with the USA in what was known as “relaciones carnales” through, for example, participating in the invasion OF Kuwait (Botta, 2012: 157). Moreover, his neoliberal economic discourse became centred around the idea of “economic stability” and the need to reassure investors to participate in the Argentina economy (Leaman 1999, 17). Thus, given his lack of Manichean distinction between any kind of elite and people and his more pluralist understanding of politics in government, we have ruled against including Menem in the dataset beyond the 1989 elections.

Néstor Kirchner, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, Alberto Fernández

In 2001, Argentina suffered a very strong economic and political crisis provoked by the “corralito” (which severely restricted people's ability to withdraw cash from banks). Widespread anger against the political system was summed in the motto "All of them must go!" (“¡Que se vayan todos!”) which was widely cried out in rallies, demonstrations and became a nation-wide saying (Holloway 2002). The election of Néstor Kirchner in 2003 as president of Argentina can be seen as the political outcome of that crisis. Néstor ran a campaign based on an opposition to the “old political class” and the “Fatherland’s enemies” (Padoan, 2017: 533; Fernández, 2010: 205). He argued for a radical change in the political system, the retrieval of the traditional Peronists goals of “Economic Independency”, “Political Sovereignty” and “Social Justice” (Padoan, 2017: 533) and criticized the Peronists of the 1990s for not delivering their promises and betraying Perón (Kirchner, 2003) (OTH_POLCLASS = 3). Néstor condemned harshly the human rights abuses of the military dictatorship and the presidents before him for not prosecuting their crimes. Thus, once in government, he revoked the “Law of Due Obedience” and the “Full Stop law” and renewed the military leadership because the previous one was seen as part of the establishment (Fernández, 2010: 202) (OTH_MILITARY = 3).

Economically, Néstor argued forcefully against the neoliberal reforms that Menem had implemented in the previous decade. Kirchner proclaimed the need to rethink the economic system and, in his investment speech, talked about constructing a “National capitalism” (Kirchner, 2003b; Padoan, 2017: 533). The central issue in his economic and international policies was the payment of Argentina’s debt. Argentina had accrued a huge debt problem and Néstor’s solution consisted mainly on restructuring it. He famously proclaimed that “the creditors have to understand that they will only get paid if Argentina performs well” (Kirchner, 2003b; Fernández, 2010: 206). He managed to restructure 76% of the debt in 2005 and then his wife and successor Cristina de Kirchner did it again in 2010 up to 92% (Fernández de Kirchner, 2014). The main construction of a foreign enemy was done precisely on this point. Kirchnerism focuses less on attacks on specific foreign others but calls into question the whole international economic system that promotes neoliberal policies. Therefore, their attacks are mainly directed towards international economic institutions such as the IMF and against the financial elite (both national and international) who is blamed for pressuring in favor of policies that damage “the people” (Fernández, 2010). In Cristina’s presidency this opposition to foreign intervention was exemplified by the conflict over US judge Thomas Griesa’ decision over the payment of the debt to creditors (OTH_FOREIGN = 3). Due to the Kirchner’s opposition to neo-liberal economic policy and advocacy of “national capitalism” as its alternative, we’ve coded them L on LRPOSITION.

There is no important ethnic other for Kirchnerism and immigrants have not been identified as the enemy of the people (OTH_ETHNIC = 1, OTH_IMMIGRANTS = 1). In fact, Cristina has had a welcoming stance towards immigration (Irigaray, 2014).

Néstor Kirchner was an unknown governor of a province when, in 2003, he launched his campaign (INSIDER = 1). He was endorsed by exiting president Eduardo Duhalde, in a move to stop Carlos Menem, who was running again for the presidency, from winning. He started with a 6% share in the polls and ended with a 22%. The personality cult around Kirchner should not be discarded and “Kirchnerism” became the name for the specific branch of populism developed by Néstor and Cristina. Moreover, Kirchner won the election with a party coalition (Front for Victory) and later constructed its party support not just from the traditional Justicialist Party, but from a very diverse mix of groups, governors and people from different ideologies. The only unifying figure of this coalition was Néstor Kirchner himself (Schurman, 2006). Thus, we have coded CHARISMA 1 for the first election and 2 for the rest.

In the 2007 elections, Néstor Kirchner did not seek re-election and instead the Front for Victory presented Néstor’s wife Cristina Fernández de Kirchner. Although she held no position in government, since Cristina was Néstor’s wife, a member of the Senate before her 2007 campaign and participated actively in her husband’s political decisions, she can be considered as belonging to the “inner-circle” of power before running in 2007. Therefore, we have coded her as a 2 on INSIDER. She ruled for two mandates but could not run for a third in 2015. The Front for Victory chose David Scioli as its candidate. Scioli had been vice-president during Néstor’s government and governor of the province of Buenos Aires. Scioli’s campaign and personal position as Vice-president, although not identical, can be considered largely as a continuation of Cristina’s Kirchnerism and his campaign was read as such by the population (Smink, 2015) (INSIDER = 2, CHARISMA = 1).

Scioli lost the election to Mauricio Macri and between 2015 and 2019 the Peronists were deeply divided into several factions. They were able to regroup all factions by the 2019 elections under the coalition “Front for all”. In this occasion, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner would run as vice-president and Alberto Fernández as president. Alberto had been Chief of the Cabinet of Ministers with both Néstor Kirchner and with Cristina but resigned in 2008 and since then became a fierce critic of Cristina’s government. He spent nearly 10 years active on the media and intervening in some minor campaigns until the renewal of the relationships in time for the 2019 election (Ortiz de Zárate 2019) (INSIDER = 2). The Front for All also included the “Renewal Front”, a party led by Sergio Massa who also had been part of Cristina’s government but later became a critic and ran on his own platform in 2015. Massa would later become the Peronist candidate in the 2023 elections.

The Intransigent Party

The Intransigent Party (Partido Instransigente, PI) was a branch of the Radical Civic Union created and led by Oscar Alende, “a charismatic ex-governor of Buenos Aires province, the PI was moving somewhat closer to the Peronists as the second force in Argentina” (Ranis 1986, 31). The PI has been described as “offering a coherent critique on the "populist left" (Ranis 1986, 31) and obtained its best result in the legislative elections of 1985. As its foundational document states, their principles are”popular participation, economic nationalism, social justice and Latin American integration” (Intransigent Party, 1975: 30). They argued in favor of an anti-imperialist revolution that would transform capitalism and liberate the people (Intransigent Party, 1975: 37). Ferrari describes their platform in the following way:

In the economic sphere, it postulated "to wrest the factors of real power from the hands of the dominant minorities, with rigorous planning of the use of natural and financial resources" according to national objectives and not those of the international monopolies or the native oligarchies. In this sense, it encouraged the dissociation of the financial system from the foreign exchange market, the nationalization of foreign trade, the implementation of a financial policy favorable to economic growth and the socialization of wealth -with nationalization of the banking system and credit orientation-, the reorganization of the public sector, the refinancing of the foreign debt and a moratorium, the reduction of inflation and the elimination of indexation. This meant transforming the State, democratizing economic power towards growth and the defense of popular interests. It proposed a free, just and strengthened society, sized on a human scale, which would make possible the self-realization of each individual. It was anti-oligarchic and anti-imperialist. (Ferrari 2017, 27)

We believe these merits a 3 for OTH_POLCLASS, OTH_FINANCIAL, OTH_FOREIGN.

Although the leftist stance of the party is clear from the previous description, other sources describe it in more moderate terms: “The PI emerged as a serious third party with a clearly articulated left-center platform” (Ranis 1986, 33). Thus, we have decided to code the party as L in LRPOSITION to reflect a middle point between these positions.

The party also ran on a platform that was very critical with the military dictatorship and defended democratic participation. According to one scholar, they proposed to “dismantle the repressive apparatus and promote unrestricted respect for human rights, promote institutional forms that ensure popular participation and control (recall of mandates, right of initiative, popular veto, plebiscite, referendum)” (Ferrari 2017, 27) (MILITARY = 3, LIBDEMNORMS = 1).

The party was created in 1972 and led by Oscar Alende, who had been governor of Buenos Aires between 1958 and 1962 but did not held any position of power during the dictatorship (INSIDER = 1, CHARISMA = 3).

Not included

Front for a Country in Solidarity (Frente País Solidario, FrePaSo) was a coalition of parties that included Peronists that were critical of Menem, Frente Grande, the Communist party, the Intransigent party and Christian democrats. The party obtained good results in 1995 in both the legislative and the presidential elections. Bordon’s rhetoric stressed the need for a “serious and responsible” political proposal based on the “work culture” and promised “honesty, austerity and capacity to recognize when I make a mistake” (Neustadt, 1995). The presidential candidate abandoned the party the following year. Koessl (2009) argues that FrePaSo’s success was due to the internal problems of the UCR, Menem’s neoliberal policies and the pact between these parties (“Pacto de Olivos”) which gave the impression that there was no political opposition to the bipartisan system. It is precisely this image as a political alternative what explains its success but the party’s rhetoric, particularly that of its leader, is difficult to classify as populist. Thus, we have not added the party in the list.

References

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